ATLANTA MOTEL v. UNITED STATES, (1964)
379 U.S. 241 (1964)
Argued: October 5, 1964 Decided: December
14, 1964
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a declaratory judgment
action, 28 U.S.C. 2201 and 2202 (1958 ed.), attacking the constitutionality of
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. [379 U.S. 241, 243] 241, 243. 1 In
addition to declaratory relief the complaint sought an injunction restraining
the enforcement of the Act and damages against appellees based on allegedly
resulting injury in the event compliance was required. Appellees counterclaimed
for enforcement under 206 (a) of the Act and asked for a three-judge district
court under 206 (b). A three-judge court, empaneled under 206 (b) as well as 28
U.S.C. 2282 (1958 ed.), sustained the validity of the Act and issued a
permanent injunction on appellees' counterclaim restraining appellant from
continuing to violate the Act which remains in effect on order of MR. JUSTICE
BLACK, 85 S. Ct. 1. We affirm the judgment.
1. The
Factual Background and Contentions of the Parties.
The case comes here on
admissions and stipulated facts. Appellant owns and operates the Heart of
Atlanta Motel which has 216 rooms available to transient guests. The motel is
located on Courtland Street, two blocks from downtown Peachtree Street. It is readily
accessible to interstate highways 75 and 85 and state highways 23 and 41.
Appellant solicits patronage from outside the State of Georgia through various
national advertising media, including magazines of national circulation; it
maintains over 50 billboards and highway signs within the State, soliciting
patronage for the motel; it accepts convention trade from outside Georgia and
approximately 75% of its registered guests are from out of State. Prior to
passage of the Act the motel had followed a practice of refusing to rent rooms
to Negroes, and it alleged that it intended to continue to do so. In an effort
to perpetuate that policy this suit was filed.
The appellant contends
that Congress in passing this Act exceeded its power to regulate commerce under
Art. I, [379 U.S. 241,
244] 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution of the United
States; that the Act violates the Fifth Amendment because appellant is deprived
of the right to choose its customers and operate its business as it wishes,
resulting in a taking of its liberty and property without due process of law
and a taking of its property without just compensation; and, finally, that by
requiring appellant to rent available rooms to Negroes against its will,
Congress is subjecting it to involuntary servitude in contravention of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
The appellees counter
that the unavailability to Negroes of adequate accommodations interferes
significantly with interstate travel, and that Congress, under the Commerce
Clause, has power to remove such obstructions and restraints; that the Fifth
Amendment does not forbid reasonable regulation and that consequential damage
does not constitute a "taking" within the meaning of that amendment;
that the Thirteenth Amendment claim fails because it is entirely frivolous to
say that an amendment directed to the abolition of human bondage and the
removal of widespread disabilities associated with slavery places
discrimination in public accommodations beyond the reach of both federal and
state law.
At the trial the
appellant offered no evidence, submitting the case on the pleadings, admissions
and stipulation of facts; however, appellees proved the refusal of the motel to
accept Negro transients after the passage of the Act. The District Court sustained
the constitutionality of the sections of the Act under attack ( 201 (a), (b)
(1) and (c) (1)) and issued a permanent injunction on the counterclaim of the
appellees. It restrained the appellant from "[r]efusing
to accept Negroes as guests in the motel by reason of their race or color"
and from "[m]aking any distinction whatever upon
the basis of race or color in the availability of the goods, services,
facilities, [379 U.S. 241,
245] privileges, advantages or accommodations offered
or made available to the guests of the motel, or to the general public, within
or upon any of the premises of the Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc."
2. The
History of the Act.
Congress first evidenced
its interest in civil rights legislation in the Civil Rights or Enforcement Act
of April 9, 1866. 2 There
followed four Acts, 3 with a
fifth, the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875, 4 culminating
the series. In 1883 this Court struck down the public accommodations sections
of the 1875 Act in the Civil Rights Cases,109 U.S. 3 . No major legislation in this
field had been enacted by Congress for 82 years when the Civil Rights Act of
1957 5 became
law. It was followed by the Civil Rights Act of 1960. 6 Three
years later, on June 19, 1963, the late President Kennedy called for civil
rights legislation in a message to Congress to which he attached a proposed
bill. Its stated purpose was
"to promote the general welfare by eliminating discrimination
based on race, color, religion, or national origin in . . . public
accommodations through the exercise by Congress of the powers conferred upon it
. . . to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, to
regulate commerce among the several States, and to make laws necessary and
proper to execute the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution." H. R.
Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 14. [379 U.S. 241, 246]
Bills were introduced in each
House of the Congress, embodying the President's suggestion, one in the Senate
being S. 1732 7 and one in the House, H. R.
7152. However, it was not until July 2, 1964, upon the recommendation of
President Johnson, that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, here under attack, was
finally passed.
After extended hearings
each of these bills was favorably reported to its respective house, H. R. 7152
on November 20, 1963, H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., and S. 1732 on
February 10, 1964, S. Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. Although each bill
originally incorporated extensive findings of fact these were eliminated from
the bills as they were reported. The House passed its bill in January 1964 and
sent it to the Senate. Through a bipartisan coalition of Senators Humphrey and
Dirksen, together with other Senators, a substitute was worked out in informal
conferences. This substitute was adopted by the Senate and sent to the House
where it was adopted without change. This expedited procedure prevented the
usual report on the substitute bill in the Senate as well as a Conference
Committee report ordinarily filed in such matters. Our only frame of reference
as to the legislative history of the Act is, therefore, the hearings, reports
and debates on the respective bills in each house.
The Act as finally
adopted was most comprehensive, undertaking to prevent through peaceful and
voluntary settlement discrimination in voting, as well as in places of
accommodation and public facilities, federally secured programs and in
employment. Since Title II is the only portion under attack here, we confine
our consideration to those public accommodation provisions. [379 U.S. 241, 247]
* * *
4. Application
of Title II to Heart of Atlanta Motel.
It is admitted that the operation of the motel brings it within the
provisions of 201 (a) of the Act and that appellant refused to provide lodging
for transient Negroes because of their race or color and that it intends to
continue that policy unless restrained.
The sole question posed is, therefore, the constitutionality of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to these facts. The legislative history
of the Act indicates that Congress based the Act on §5 and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as its power to regulate interstate
commerce under Art. I, 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution. [379 U.S. 241, 250]
The Senate Commerce Committee made it quite clear that the
fundamental object of Title II was to vindicate "the deprivation of
personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public
establishments." At the same time, however, it noted that such an
objective has been and could be readily achieved "by congressional action
based on the commerce power of the Constitution." S. Rep. No. 872, supra,
at 16-17. Our study of the legislative record, made in the light of prior
cases, has brought us to the conclusion that Congress possessed ample power in
this regard, and we have therefore not considered the other grounds relied
upon. This is not to say that the remaining authority upon which it acted was
not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass, but merely that since the
commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have considered it alone.
Nor is 201 (d) or 202, having to do with state action, involved here and we do
not pass upon either of those sections.
* * *
. . . We shall
not burden this opinion with further details since the voluminous testimony
presents overwhelming evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes
interstate travel.
7. The
Power of Congress Over Interstate Travel.
The power of Congress to deal with
these obstructions depends on the meaning of the Commerce Clause. Its meaning
was first enunciated 140 years ago by the great [379 U.S. 241,
254] Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), in these words:
"The subject to be regulated
is commerce; and . . . to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary
to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it
to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities . . . but
it is something more: it is intercourse . . . between nations, and parts of
nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
carrying on that intercourse. [At 189-190.]. . . . .
"To what commerce does this
power extend? The constitution informs us, to commerce `with foreign nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.'
"It has, we believe, been
universally admitted, that these words comprehend every species of commercial
intercourse . . . . No sort of trade can be carried on . . . to which this
power does not extend. [At 193-194.] . . . .
"The subject to which the
power is next applied, is to commerce `among the several States.' The word
`among' means intermingled . . . .
". . . [I]t may very
properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. .
. . The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its
action is to be applied to all the . . . internal concerns [of the Nation] which
affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a
particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not
necessary [379 U.S. 241, 255] to
interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
government. [At 194-195.] . . . . .
"We are now arrived at the
inquiry - What is this power?
"It is the power to
regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.
This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution. . . . If, as has always been understood, the
sovereignty of Congress . . . is plenary as to those objects [specified in the
Constitution], the power over commerce . . . is vested in Congress as
absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution
the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the
constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of Congress,
their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents
possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for
example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to
secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must
often rely solely, in all representative governments. [At 196-197.]"
In short,
the determinative test of the exercise of power by the Congress under the
Commerce Clause is simply whether the activity sought to be regulated is
"commerce which concerns more States than one" and has a real and
substantial relation to the national interest. Let us now turn to this facet of
the problem.
That the "intercourse" of
which the Chief Justice spoke included the movement of persons through
more [379 U.S. 241, 256] States than one
was settled as early as 1849, in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, where Mr.
Justice McLean stated: "That the transportation of passengers is a part of
commerce is not now an open question." At 401. Again in 1913 Mr. Justice
McKenna, speaking for the Court, said: "Commerce among the States, we have
said, consists of intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and includes
the transportation of persons and property." Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 . And only four years later
in 1917 in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 , Mr. Justice Day held for the
Court:
"The transportation of
passengers in interstate commerce, it has long been settled, is within the
regulatory power of Congress, under the commerce clause of the Constitution,
and the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free
from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer
open to question." At 491.
Nor does
it make any difference whether the transportation is commercial in character.
Id., at 484-486. In Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S.
373 (1946), Mr. Justice Reed observed as to the modern movement of
persons among the States:
"The recent changes in
transportation brought about by the coming of automobiles [do] not seem of
great significance in the problem. People of all races travel today more
extensively than in 1878 when this Court first passed upon state regulation of
racial segregation in commerce. [It but] emphasizes the soundness of this
Court's early conclusion in Hall v.
DeCuir, 95 U.S.
485 ." At 383.
The same
interest in protecting interstate commerce which led Congress to deal with
segregation in interstate[379 U.S. 241, 257] carriers
and the white-slave traffic has prompted it to extend the exercise of its power
to gambling, Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); to criminal enterprises,
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432(1925); to deceptive practices in the
sale of products, Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385 (1959); to fraudulent security
transactions, Securities & Exchange
Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); to misbranding of drugs,
Weeks v. United States, 245 U.S. 618 (1918); to wages and hours, United States, v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); to members of labor
unions, Labor Board v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); to crop control, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); to discrimination
against shippers, United States v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 333 U.S. 169 (1948); to the protection of
small business from injurious price cutting, Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); to resale price
maintenance, Hudson Distributors, Inc. v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U.S. 386 (1964), Schwegmann v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); to professional football, Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); and to racial
discrimination by owners and managers of terminal restaurants. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454(1960).
That Congress was legislating
against moral wrongs in many of these areas rendered its enactments no less
valid. In framing Title II of
this Act Congress was also dealing with what it considered a moral problem. But
that fact does not detract from the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive
effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse. It was
this burden which empowered Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and,
given this basis for the exercise of its power, Congress was not restricted by
the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it
was dealing was also deemed a moral and social wrong. [379
U.S. 241, 258]
It is said that the operation of
the motel here is of a purely local character. But, assuming this to be true,
"[i]f it is interstate commerce that feels the
pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the
squeeze." United States v. Women's
Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949). See Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., supra. As Chief Justice Stone put it in United States v. Darby, supra:
"The power of Congress over
interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the
states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation
of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise
of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
421." At 118.
Thus the
power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate
the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of
origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon
that commerce. One need only examine the evidence which we have discussed above
to see that Congress may - as it has - prohibit racial discrimination by motels
serving travelers, however "local" their operations may appear.
Nor does the Act deprive
appellant of liberty or property under the Fifth Amendment. The commerce power
invoked here by the Congress is a specific and plenary one authorized by the
Constitution itself. The only questions are: (1) whether Congress had a rational
basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and
(2) if it had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate that
evil are reasonable and appropriate. [379 U.S. 241, 259] If
they are, appellant has no "right" to select its guests as it sees
fit, free from governmental regulation.
There is nothing novel about such legislation. Thirty-two States8 now
have it on their books either by statute or executive order and many cities
provide such regulation. Some of these Acts go back fourscore years. It has
been repeatedly held by this Court that such laws [379 U.S.
241, 260] do not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps the first such holding was in the Civil Rights
Cases themselves, where Mr. Justice Bradley for the Court inferentially found
that innkeepers, "by the laws of all the States, so far as we are aware,
are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodation
to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them." At 25.
As we have pointed out, 32 States
now have such provisions and no case has been cited to us where the attack on a
state statute has been successful, either in federal or state courts. Indeed,
in some cases the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause objections have been
specifically discarded in this Court. Bob-Lo
Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28,
34 . n. 12 (1948). As a result the constitutionality of such state
statutes stands unquestioned. "The authority of the Federal Government
over interstate commerce does not differ," it was held in United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S.
533 (1939), "in extent or character from that retained by the
states over intrastate commerce." At 569-570. See also Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S.
503 (1944).
It is doubtful if in the long run
appellant will suffer economic loss as a result of the Act. Experience is to
the contrary where discrimination is completely obliterated as to all public
accommodations. But whether this be true or not is of no consequence since this
Court has specifically held that the fact that a "member of the class
which is regulated may suffer economic losses not shared by others . . . has
never been a barrier" to such legislation. Bowles v. Willingham, supra, at 518. Likewise in a long line of
cases this Court has rejected the claim that the prohibition of racial
discrimination in public accommodations interferes with personal liberty. See District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co.,
346 U.S. [379 U.S. 241, 261] 100 (1953),
and cases there cited, where we concluded that Congress had delegated
law-making power to the District of Columbia "as broad as the police power
of a state" which included the power to adopt "a law prohibiting
discriminations against Negroes by the owners and managers of restaurants in
the District of Columbia." At 110. Neither do we find any merit in the
claim that the Act is a taking of property without just compensation. The cases
are to the contrary. See Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551 (1870); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S.
502 (1923); United States v.
Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S.
155 (1958).
We find no merit in the remainder
of appellant's contentions, including that of "involuntary
servitude." As we have seen, 32 States prohibit racial discrimination in
public accommodations. These laws but codify the common-law innkeeper rule which
long predated the Thirteenth Amendment. It is difficult to believe that the
Amendment was intended to abrogate this principle. Indeed, the opinion of the
Court in the Civil Rights Cases is to the contrary as we have seen, it having
noted with approval the laws of "all the States" prohibiting
discrimination. We could not say that the requirements of the Act in this
regard are in any way "akin to African slavery." Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S.
328, 332 (1916).
We, therefore, conclude that the
action of the Congress in the adoption of the Act as applied here to a motel
which concededly serves interstate travelers is within the power granted it by
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court for 140
years. It may be argued that
Congress could have pursued other methods to eliminate the obstructions it
found in interstate commerce caused by racial discrimination. But this is a
matter of policy that rests entirely with the Congress not with the courts. How
obstructions in commerce [379 U.S. 241, 262] may
be removed - what means are to be employed - is within the sound and exclusive discretion of the Congress. It
is subject only to one caveat - that the means chosen by it must be reasonably
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution. We cannot say that its choice
here was not so adapted. The Constitution requires no more.
Affirmed.