Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)
From the Physics (Hardie and Gaye translation).
References are to book and sections. The material in this
excerpts is known as Aristotle’s doctrine or concept of the four causes.
II.3.
Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not
think they know a thing till they have grasped the 'why'
of it (which is to grasp its primary cause). So clearly
we too must do this as regards both coming to be and
passing away and every kind of physical change, in order
that, knowing their principles, we may try to refer to
these principles each of our problems.
In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes to be
and which persists, is called 'cause',
e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and
the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species.
In another sense (2) the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence, and its genera, are called 'causes' (e.g. of the
octave the relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the
parts in the definition.
Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g. the man
who gave advice is a cause, the father is cause of the child,
and generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of what
is changed.
Again (4) in the sense of end or 'that for the sake of which' a thing is
done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about. ('Why is he walking about?' we say. 'To be healthy', and,
having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) The same is
true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through
the action of something else as means towards the end, e.g. reduction of
flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means towards health.
All these things are 'for the sake of' the end, though they differ from
one another in that some are activities, others instruments.
This then perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term 'cause' is used.
As the word has several senses, it follows that there are several causes
of the same thing (not merely in virtue of a concomitant attribute), e.g.
both the art of the sculptor and the bronze are causes of the statue. These are causes of the statue qua statue, not in virtue of
anything else that it may be-only not in the same way, the one being the
material cause, the other the cause whence the motion comes. Some things
cause each other reciprocally, e.g. hard work causes fitness and vice
versa, but again not in the same way, but the one as end, the other as the
origin of change. Further the same thing is the cause of contrary results.
For that which by its presence brings about one result is sometimes blamed
for bringing about the contrary by its absence. Thus
we ascribe the wreck of a ship to the absence of the pilot whose presence
was the cause of its safety.
All the causes now mentioned fall into four familiar divisions. The
letters are the causes of syllables, the material of artificial
products, fire, &c., of bodies, the parts of the whole, and the premisses of the conclusion, in the sense of
'that from which'. Of these pairs the one set are causes in the sense of
substratum, e.g. the parts, the other set in the sense of essence-the
whole and the combination and the form. But the seed and the doctor and
the adviser, and generally the maker, are all sources whence the change or
stationariness originates, while the others are
causes in the sense of the end or the good of the rest; for 'that for the
sake of which' means what is best and the end of the things that lead up
to it. (Whether we say the 'good itself or the 'apparent good' makes
no difference.)
Such then is the number and nature of the kinds of cause.
Now the modes of causation are many, though when brought under heads they
too can be reduced in number. For 'cause'
is used in many senses and even within the same kind one may be prior to
another (e.g. the doctor and the expert are causes of health, the relation
2:1 and number of the octave), and always what is inclusive to what is particular. Another mode of causation is the
incidental and its genera, e.g. in one way 'Polyclitus', in another
'sculptor' is the cause of a statue, because 'being Polyclitus' and
'sculptor' are incidentally conjoined. Also
the classes in which the incidental attribute is included; thus 'a man'
could be said to be the cause of a statue or, generally, 'a living
creature'. An incidental attribute too may be more
or less remote, e.g. suppose that 'a pale man' or 'a musical man'
were said to be the cause of the statue.
All causes, both proper and incidental, may be spoken of either as
potential or as actual; e.g. the cause of a house being built is
either 'house-builder' or 'house-builder building'. . .
.
II.8. We must explain then (1)
that Nature belongs to the class of causes which act for
the sake of something; (2) about the necessary and its place in
physical problems, for all writers ascribe things to this cause, arguing that since the hot and the cold, &c., are of such and such a
kind, therefore certain things necessarily are and come to
be-and if they mention any other cause (one his
'friendship and strife', another his 'mind'), it is only to
touch on it, and then good-bye to it.
A difficulty presents itself: why should not nature work, not for the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but
just as the sky rains, not in order to
make the corn grow, but of necessity? What is drawn up
must cool, and what has been cooled must become water and descend, the result of this being that the corn grows. Similarly
if a man's crop is spoiled on the threshing-floor, the
rain did not fall for the sake of this-in order that the
crop might be spoiled-but that result just followed. Why then
should it not be the same with the parts in nature, e.g. that our teeth should come up of necessity-the front teeth sharp, fitted
for tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down
the food-since they did not arise for this end, but it was
merely a coincident result; and so with all other parts in
which we suppose that there is purpose? Wherever then all
the parts came about just what they would have been if they had come be for an end, such things survived, being organized spontaneously
in a fitting way; whereas those which grew otherwise
perished and continue to perish, as Empedocles says his
'man-faced ox-progeny' did.
Such are the arguments (and others of the kind) which may cause difficulty on this point. Yet it is impossible that this should be
the true view. For teeth and all other natural things
either invariably or normally come about in a given way; but of not one of the results of
chance or spontaneity is this true. We do not ascribe to
chance or mere coincidence the frequency of rain in
winter, but frequent rain in summer we do; nor heat in the
dog-days, but only if we have it in winter. If then, it is agreed
that things are either the result of coincidence or for an end, and these cannot be the result of coincidence or spontaneity, it
follows that they must be for an end; and that such things
are all due to nature even the champions of the theory
which is before us would agree. Therefore action for an end is present in things which come to be and are
by nature.
Further, where a series has a completion, all the preceding steps are for the sake of that. Now surely as in intelligent action, so
in nature; and as in nature, so it is in each action, if
nothing interferes. Now intelligent action is for the sake
of an end; therefore the nature of things also
is so. Thus if a house, e.g. had
been a thing made by nature, it would have been made in
the same way as it is now by art; and if things made by nature were made also by art, they would come to be in the same way as by
nature. Each step then in the series is for the sake of
the next; and generally art
partly completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and partly
imitates her. If, therefore, artificial products are for
the sake of an end, so clearly also are natural products.
The relation of the later to the earlier terms of the
series is the same in both. This is most obvious in the animals other than man: they make things neither by art nor after inquiry
or deliberation. Wherefore people discuss whether it is by
intelligence or by some other faculty that these creatures
work, spiders, ants, and the like. By gradual advance in
this direction we come to see clearly that in plants too that is
produced which is conducive to the end-leaves, e.g. grow to provide shade for the fruit. If then it is both by nature and for an end
that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web,
and plants grow leaves for the sake of the fruit and send
their roots down (not up) for the sake of nourishment, it is plain that this kind of cause is operative in
things which come to be and are by nature. And since
'nature' means two things, the matter and the form, of
which the latter is the end, and since all the rest is for
the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense
of 'that for the sake of which'. . . .
From the Metaphysics XII
(W.D. Ross translation) References are to the book and sections. This excerpt
contains Aristotle’s conception of the “prime
XII.6. Since there were
three kinds of substance, two of them physical [sensible]
and one unmovable, regarding the latter we must assert that it is
necessary that there should be an eternal unmovable
substance. . . .
Yet if we
follow the theologians who generate the world from night,
or the natural philosophers who say that 'all things were
together', the same impossible result ensues. For how will
there be movement, if there is no actually existing cause? Wood
will surely not move itself-the carpenter's art must act on it; nor will the menstrual blood nor the earth set themselves in
motion, but the seeds must act on the earth and the semen
on the menstrual blood.
This is why some suppose eternal actuality-e.g. Leucippus
and Plato; for they say there is always movement. But why
and what this movement is they do not say, nor, if the
world moves in this way or that, do they tell us the cause of
its doing so. Now nothing is moved at random, but there must always be something present to move it; e.g. as a matter of fact a thing
moves in one way by nature, and in another by
force or through the influence of reason or something
else. (Further, what sort of movement is primary? This
makes a vast difference.) But again for Plato, at
least, it is not permissible to name here that which he
sometimes supposes to be the source of movement-that which
moves itself; for the soul is later, and coeval with the
heavens, according to his account. To suppose potency prior to actuality, then, is in a sense right, and in a sense not; and we
have specified these senses. That actuality is prior is
testified by Anaxagoras (for his 'reason' is actuality)
and by Empedocles in his doctrine of love and strife, and
by those who say that there is always movement, e.g. Leucippus. Therefore chaos or night did not exist
for an infinite time, but the same things have always
existed (either passing through a cycle of changes or obeying some
other law), since actuality is prior to potency. If, then, there is a constant cycle, something must always remain, acting in the same
way. And if there is to be generation and destruction,
there must be something else which is always acting in
different ways. This must, then, act in one way in virtue
of itself, and in another in virtue of something else-either of
a third agent, therefore, or of the first. Now it must be in virtue of the first. For otherwise this again causes the motion both of the second agent and of the
third. Therefore it is better to say 'the first'.
For it was the cause of eternal uniformity; and something else is the cause of
variety, and evidently both together are the cause of eternal variety. This,
accordingly, is the character which the motions actually
exhibit. What need then is there to seek for other principles?
XII.7 Since (1)
this is a possible account of the matter, and (2) if it
were not true, the world would have proceeded out of night and 'all things together' and out of non-being, these difficulties may be
taken as solved. There is, then, something which is always
moved with an unceasing motion, which is motion in a
circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore the first heaven must be eternal. There is
therefore also something which moves it. And since that
which moves and is moved is intermediate, there is
something which moves without being moved, being eternal,
substance, and actuality. And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The
primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For
the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real
good is the primary object of rational wish. But
desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire; for the thinking is the starting-point. And thought is moved by
the object of thought, and one of the two columns of
opposites is in itself the object of thought; and in
this, substance is first, and in substance, that which is simple and exists
actually. (The one and the simple are not the same; for 'one' means a measure,
but 'simple' means that the thing itself has a certain nature.) But the
beautiful, also, and that which is in itself desirable are in the
same column; and the first in any class is always best, or analogous to the
best.
That a final cause may exist among unchangeable entities is shown by the
distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is (a) some being for whose
good an action is done, and (b) something at which the action aims; and of
these the latter exists among unchangeable entities though the former does not.
The final cause, then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things
move by being moved. Now if something is moved it is capable of being otherwise
than as it is. Therefore if its actuality is the primary form of spatial
motion, then in so far as it is subject to change, in this respect it is
capable of being otherwise,-in place, even if not in
substance. But since there is something which moves while itself unmoved,
existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise
than as it is. For motion in space is the first of the kinds of change, and
motion in a circle the first kind of spatial motion; and this the first mover
produces. The first mover, then, exists of necessity; and in so far as it
exists by necessity, its mode of being is good, and it is in this sense a first
principle. For the necessary has all these senses-that which is necessary
perforce because it is contrary to the natural impulse,
that without which the good is impossible, and that which
cannot be otherwise but can exist only in a single way.
On such a principle, then, depend the heavens
and the world of nature. And it is a life such as the best
which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since
its actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason are waking, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so on account of these.)
And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is
thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature
of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of
thought in coming into contact with and thinking its
objects, so that thought and object of thought
are the same. For that which is
capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the
essence, is thought. But it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the possession rather than the
receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to
contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most
pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this
compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And
life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is
life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent
actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that
God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God.
Those who suppose, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus do, that supreme beauty and goodness are not present in the beginning, because the beginnings
both of plants and of animals are causes, but beauty and
completeness are in the effects of these, are wrong in
their opinion. For the seed comes from other individuals
which are prior and complete, and the first thing is not
seed but the complete being; e.g. we must say that before the seed there is a man,-not the man produced from
the seed, but another from whom the seed comes.
It is clear then from what has been said that there is a
substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things. It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any
magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it
produces movement through infinite time, but nothing
finite has infinite power; and, while every magnitude is
either infinite or finite, it cannot, for the above reason, have
finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because there is no infinite magnitude at all). But it has also been shown that
it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other changes
are posterior to change of place.