CHEVRON U.S. A. v. NATURAL
RES. DEF. COUNCIL
467 U.S. 837
Argued: February 29,
1984 Decided: June 25, 1984
STEVENS, J., delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except MARSHALL and
REHNQUIST, JJ., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases,
and O'CONNOR, J., who took no part in the decision of the cases.
In the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, Congress enacted
certain requirements applicable [467 U.S. 837, 840] to States that had not achieved the national air
quality standards established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
pursuant to earlier legislation. The amended Clean Air Act required these
"nonattainment" States to establish a permit program regulating
"new or modified major stationary sources" of air pollution.
Generally, a permit may not be issued for a new or modified major stationary
source unless several stringent conditions are met. 1 The EPA regulation promulgated to implement this
permit requirement allows a State to adopt a plantwide
definition of the term "stationary source." 2 Under this definition, an existing plant that
contains several pollution-emitting devices may install or modify one piece of
equipment without meeting the permit conditions if the alteration will not
increase the total emissions from the plant. The question presented by these
cases is whether EPA's decision to allow States to treat all of the
pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they
were encased within a single "bubble" is based on a reasonable
construction of the statutory term "stationary source."
I
The EPA
regulations containing the plantwide definition of
the term stationary source were promulgated on October [467
U.S. 837, 841] 14, 1981.
46 Fed. Reg. 50766. Respondents 3 filed a timely petition for review in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 7607(b) (1). 4 The Court of Appeals set aside the regulations.
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 222 U.S. App. D.C. 268,
685 F.2d 718 (1982).
The court
observed that the relevant part of the amended Clean Air Act "does not
explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a `stationary source, to which
the permit program . . . should apply," and further stated that the
precise issue was not "squarely addressed in the legislative
history." Id., at 273, 685 F.2d, at 723. In light of its conclusion that
the legislative history bearing on the question was "at best
contradictory," it reasoned that "the purposes of the nonattainment
program should guide our decision here." Id., at 276, n. 39, 685 F.2d, at
726, n. 39. 5 Based on two of its precedents concerning the
applicability of the bubble concept to certain Clean Air Act programs, 6 the court stated that the bubble concept was
"mandatory" in programs designed merely to maintain existing air
quality, but held that it was "inappropriate" in programs enacted to
improve air quality. Id., at 276, 685 F.2d, at 726. Since the purpose of the permit [467
U.S. 837, 842] program -
its "raison d'etre," in the court's view -
was to improve air quality, the court held that the bubble concept was
inapplicable in these cases under its prior precedents. Ibid. It therefore set
aside the regulations embodying the bubble concept as contrary to law. We
granted certiorari to review that judgment, 461 U.S.
956 (1983), and we now reverse.
The basic
legal error of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static judicial definition
of the term "stationary source" when it had decided that Congress
itself had not commanded that definition. Respondents do not defend the legal
reasoning of the Court of Appeals. 7 Nevertheless, since this Court reviews
judgments, not opinions, 8 we must determine whether the Court of Appeals'
legal error resulted in an erroneous judgment on the validity of the
regulations.
II
When a
court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it
is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, [467
U.S. 837, 843] as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. 9 If, however, the court determines Congress has
not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, 10 as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 11
"The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of
policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly,
by Congress." Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,
231 (1974). If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the
agency to fill, there is an express delegation [467
U.S. 837, 844] of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.12 Sometimes
the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather
than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provison î for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.13
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer, 14 and the principle of deference to administrative
interpretations "has been consistently followed by this Court whenever
decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling
conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory
policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge
respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations. See, e. g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190 ; Labor Board v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S.
111 ; Republic Aviation
Corp. v. [467 U.S. 837, 845] Labor
Board, 324 U.S.
793 ; Securities &
Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S.
194 ; Labor Board v.
Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S.
344 .
". .
. If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies
that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb
it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the
accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned." United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374,
382 , 383 (1961).
Accord, Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, ante, at 699-700.
In light
of these well-settled principles it is clear that the Court of Appeals
misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at issue. Once
it determined, after its own examination of the legislation, that Congress did
not actually have an intent regarding the applicability of the bubble concept
to the permit program, the question before it was not whether in its view the
concept is "inappropriate" in the general context of a program
designed to improve air quality, but whether the Administrator's view that it
is appropriate in the context of this particular program is a reasonable one.
Based on the examination of the legislation and its history which follows, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress did not have a specific intention
on the applicability of the bubble concept in these cases, and conclude that
the EPA's use of that concept here is a reasonable policy choice for the agency
to make.
* * *
The judgment of the Court
of Appeals is reversed.
It is so
ordered.
JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the
consideration or decision of these cases. JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no
part in the decision of these cases.