Cicero (106-43 B.C.)
From De
re publica (On the Commonwealth) (W.D. Pearman translation)
References are to book and sections. This excerpt is from a section of De re publica often referred t0 as the “Dream
of Scipio.”
VI.17. And as
I gazed upon this more intently, "Come!" said Africanus, "how
long will your mind be chained to the earth? Do you see into what regions you
have come? See! the universe is linked together in nine circles or rather
spheres; one of which is that of the heavens, the outermost of all, which
embraces all the other spheres, the supreme deity, which keeps in and holds
together all the others; and to this are attached those everlasting orbits of
the stars. Beneath this there lie seven, which turn backwards with a counter
revolution to the heavens; and of these spheres that star holds one, which men
on earth call Saturn's star. Next is that bright radiance, rich in hope and
healing for the sons of men, which is called Jove's star; then one fiery red
and dreaded by the world, which you call Mars; next lower down the sun holds
nearly the middle region, the leader, chief and ruler of the other lights, the
mind and ordering spirit of the universe, of such magnitude that he illumines
the whole and fills it with his light. With him Venus and Mercury keep pace as
satellites in their successive spheres; and in the lowest zone of all the moon
revolves lighted up by the rays of the sun. Now below these there is nothing
more but what is mortal and transient except those souls which the bounty of
the Gods has given to the sons of men; above the moon all is eternal. As for
the earth, the ninth and central globe, it does not move but is the lowest
point, and towards it all heavy bodies tend by their own gravity."
VI.18. And,
as I gazed on these things with amazement, when I recovered myself:
"What," I asked, "what is this sound that fills my ears, so loud
and sweet?" "This," he replied, "is that sound, which
divided in intervals, unequal, indeed, yet still exactly measured in their
fixed proportion, is produced by the impetus and movement of the spheres
themselves, and blending sharp tones with grave, therewith makes changing
symphonies in unvarying harmony. For not only is it impossible that such vast
movements should sweep on in silence; but, by a natural law, the outermost
parts on the one side give a grave, and on the other a sharp sound. Wherefore
the highest of all, the celestial zone equipped with stars, whose revolution is
more swift, moves with a sharp, high note; while this
one of the moon, as it is the lowest, with the deepest tone of all. For the
earth, which is the ninth, remaining motionless is ever firmly planted in one
spot, clinging closely to the centre of the universe.
Now the revolutions of those eight spheres, of which two have the same power,
produce seven sounds with well-marked intervals; and this number, generally
speaking, is the mystic bond of all things in the universe, And learned men by
imitating this with stringed instruments and melodies have opened for
themselves the way back to this place, even as other men of noble nature, who
have followed godlike aims in their life as men.
From De natura deorum (On
the Nature of the Gods) (Francis Brooks translation) References are to book
and section.
II.
6. Chrysippus [Stoic
sage, 279-206 B.C.], again, speaks in a way which, though his own mind is a
very keen one, he seems to have learnt direct from nature, rather than to have
discovered himself. “For if,” he says, “there is something in nature which the
mind, the reason, the strength, and the power of man would be unable to
produce, surely that which does produce it is higher than man; now the heavenly
bodies, and all those phenomena which observe an everlasting order, cannot be
created by man; consequently that by which they are created is higher than man.
And what could you say this was rather than God? For if there are no gods,
there can be nothing higher in nature than man, since he alone possesses
reason, and nothing can surpass reason in excellence. But that there should be
a man who thinks that in the whole universe there is nothing higher than himself shows
senseless arrogance. There is, then, something higher, and therefore there is
assuredly a God.” Is it the fact that if you saw a large and beautiful house,
you could not be persuaded, even if you did not see the master, that it had
been built for the sake of mice and weasels,1 and would you not present the appearance
of downright imbecility if you supposed that all this adornment of the world,
all this diversity and beauty of the heavenly bodies, all this might and
amplitude of sea and land, were a dwelling-place belonging to you and not to
the immortal gods? Is not even this understood by us, that everything above is
better, whereas the earth is lowest, and surrounded by the thickest air? For
this very reason the same thing which we see to be also characteristic of
certain districts and cities, namely an extra degree of sluggishness in the
minds of the inhabitants owing to the denser quality of the atmosphere, has
befallen the human race, through their having been placed upon the earth, that
is, in the quarter of the world where the air is thickest.2 And yet, on the ground even of man’s
intelligence, we ought to consider that there exists some mind of the universe,
one that is keener than his and divine. “For whence,” as Socrates says in
Xenophon, “did man get hold of the mind he has?” Why, if any one were to ask
whence we derive the vital juices, the heat that is distributed through the
body, even the earthy firmness of the flesh,1 and lastly the breath we draw, the
answer is clear, that we have received one element from earth, another from
water, another from fire, and another from the air which we take in with our
breath.
II.7. And the element which surpasses all these,
I mean reason, and if we care to express it by a variety of terms,
intelligence, design, reflection, foresight, where did we find, whence did we
secure it? Shall the universe possess all other qualities, and not this one
which is of most importance? Yet surely in all creation there is nothing nobler
than the universe, nothing more excellent and more beautiful. There not only is
not, but there cannot even be imagined anything nobler, and if reason and
wisdom are the noblest of qualities, it is inevitable that they should exist in
that which we acknowledge to be supremely noble. Again, who can help assenting
to what I say when he considers the harmonious, concordant, and unbroken
connection which there is in things? Would the earth be able to have one and
the same time for flowering, and then again one and the same time in which it
lies rough? Or could the approach and departure of the sun be known, at the
time of the summer and winter solstice, by so many objects spontaneously
changing? Or the tides of the sea, and of narrow straits, be affected
by the rising or setting of the moon? Or the dissimilar movements of the
planets be maintained by the one revolution of the whole sky? It
would be certainly impossible for these things to come to pass in this way,
with such mutual harmony amongst all parts of the universe, if they were not
held together by one divine and all-pervading spirit. And this position, if
argued, as I intend to argue it, in a fuller and more flowing style, is better
able to escape the cavilling of the
Academics, whereas if expressed more briefly and concisely in syllogistic form,
as it used to be by Zeno, it is more exposed to criticism. For just as it is
either difficult or impossible for a running stream to be tainted, while this
may easily happen to water that is confined, so the onward flow of argument
sweeps away the detractions of the critic, while that which is confined within
narrow limits has hard work to defend itself. These arguments, for instance,
which are expanded by modern Stoics, used to be compressed by Zeno [founder of
Stoicism, 335-263 B.C.] as follows:—
II.8. “That
which exercises reason is more excellent than that which does not exercise
reason; there is nothing more excellent than the universe, therefore the
universe exercises reason”. In the same way it may be proved that the universe
is wise, blessed, and eternal, for all objects that possess these qualities are
more excellent than those which do not possess them, and there is nothing of
greater excellence than the universe. By this means it will be proved that the
universe is divine. He has also the following: “No part can be sentient where
the whole is not sentient; parts of the universe are sentient, therefore the
universe is sentient”. He goes further and urges his point in more precise
terms. “Nothing,” he says, “that is inanimate and without reason can produce
from itself a being that is animate and possessed of reason; the universe
produces beings that are animate and possessed of reason, therefore the
universe is animate and possessed of reason.” He also, as his habit frequently
was, stated the argument in the form of a comparison, which was to this effect:
“If melodiously piping flutes sprang from the olive, would you doubt that a
knowledge of flute-playing resided in the olive? And what if plane trees bore
harps which gave forth rhythmical sounds? Clearly you would think in the same
way that the art of music was possessed by plane trees. Why, then, seeing that
the universe gives birth to beings that are animate and wise, should it not be
considered animate and wise itself?”
II.11. There is, then, an
element which holds together and maintains the entire universe, an element,
moreover, which is not without sensation and reason. For it is necessary that
every element which is not isolated or simple, but which is joined and linked
with something else, should have in itself some ruling
principle, as, for instance, mind in the case of man, and in the case of
animals something similar to mind, which prompts their desires. In trees, and
in things which spring from the earth, the ruling principle is supposed to be
placed in their roots. By ruling principle I mean the
principle which the Greeks call ἡγεμονικόν,
which cannot but hold, and which ought to hold, the highest place in each
genus. Consequently the thing in which the ruling
principle of the whole of nature is contained, must in the same way be the most
perfect of all, and the most worthy of power and dominion over all existence.
Now we see that in parts of the universe (for there is nothing in the entire
universe which is not a part of the whole), sensation and reason exist. These
qualities must therefore exist, and exist more vividly and to
a greater extent, in that part in which the ruling principle of the
universe resides. Consequently the universe must be
intelligent, and the element which holds all things in its embrace must excel
in perfection of reason; the universe, therefore, must be divine, and so must
the element by which the whole strength of the universe is held together. This
fiery glow which the universe possesses is also far purer, clearer, and
nimbler, and on that account better fitted to arouse sensation, than this heat
of ours, by which the objects known to us are preserved and made strong. Since,
then, men and animals are maintained by this heat, and through it possess
motion and sensation, it is absurd to say that the universe is without
sensation, when it is maintained by a burning heat which is unmixed, and free,
and pure, and at the same time in the highest degree vivid and nimble,
especially considering that the heat which belongs to the universe is moved by
itself and its own action, and is not stirred by anything distinct from itself,
or by impact from outside. For what can be mightier than the universe, so as to act upon and set in motion the heat by which the
universe is to be held together?
II.12.
Let us hear Plato on this question, Plato, the god of philosophers,
as he may be called. He holds that there are two kinds of motion, one
self-imparted and the other derived, and that a thing which is self-moved by
its own action is more divine than that which is set in motion by impact from
something else. The former kind of motion he declares to exist in soul alone,
and he is of opinion that it was from soul that the first principle of motion
was derived. Consequently since all motion arises from
the heat possessed by the universe, and since that heat is moved by its own
action, and not by impact from anything else, it must of necessity be soul, by
which means it is proved that the universe is possessed of soul. It may also be
understood that intelligence exists in the universe, from the fact that the
universe is undeniably of greater excellence than any form of being. For
just as there is no part of our body which is not less important than
ourselves, so the whole universe must be more important than a part of the
universe. If that is so, the universe must be intelligent, for if it were
not, man, who is a part of the universe, would, as participating in reason,
necessarily be of more importance than the entire universe. If, again, we wish
to trace the advance from the first and rudimentary stages of being to the
final and perfect, it is to a divine nature that we must come. For we observe
that the first things maintained by nature are those which spring from the
earth, to which nature has assigned nothing more than protection by means of
nurture and development. To animals she has given sensation, movement, an
impulse, combined with a certain desire, towards what is beneficial, and an
avoidance of what is hurtful. To man she has given more in having added reason,
which was meant to regulate the desires of the mind, at one time allowing them
their way, and at another holding them in check.
II.13. The fourth and highest stage consists of beings
who are created naturally good and wise, in whom right reason in an unchanging
form is innate from the beginning, that reason which must be regarded as more
than human, and must be assigned to what is divine, that is, to the universe,
in which this complete and perfect reason must needs exist. For it cannot be
said that in any order of things there is not something final and perfect. Just
as in the case of vines or cattle, we see that, unless some force interposes,
nature arrives by a way of her own at perfection, and just as a certain
attainment of consummate workmanship exists in painting and architecture and
the other arts, so it is inevitable that in collective nature there should much
more be a progress towards completion and perfection. Many external influences
can prevent the other kinds of being from reaching perfection, but nothing can
stand in the way of universal nature, because it itself limits and contains all
kinds of being. That, therefore, must be the fourth and highest stage, which no
force can come near. Now it is in that stage that universal nature has its
place, and since it is the characteristic of that nature that all things should
be inferior to it, and nothing able to stand in its way, it necessarily follows
that the universe is intelligent, and more than that wise. Besides, what is
more foolish than that the nature which embraces all things should not be
declared supremely excellent, or that, being supremely excellent, it should not
be in the first place animate, in the second possessed of reason and
forethought, and lastly wise? In what other way can it be supremely excellent?
For if it resembled plants, or even animals, it would not deserve to be
considered of the highest degree of excellence, but rather of the lowest, while
if it participated in reason, and yet were not wise from the beginning, the
condition of the universe as compared with that of man would be the lower of
the two. For man can become wise, but if the universe during the limitless course
of past time has been destitute of wisdom, it will assuredly never acquire it,
and will therefore be lower than man. Since that is absurd, the universe must
be regarded as wise from the beginning, and as divine.
II.14. It was, indeed, an ingenious remark of Chrysippus that just as the cover was created for the
shield, and the sheath for the sword, so all other things with the exception of
the universe were created for the sake of something else, the crops and fruits,
for instance, which the earth produces, for the sake of animals, and animals
for the sake of men, as the horse for carrying, the ox for ploughing, and the
dog for hunting and keeping watch. As for man himself, he was born in order to observe and imitate the universe, being in no
wise perfect, but a particle, so to speak, of that which is, for it is only the
universe to which nothing is wanting, and which is knit together on every side,
and is perfect and complete in all its numbers and parts. Now since the
universe embraces all things, and there is nothing that is not contained within
it, it is perfect at every point. How, then, can that which is of most
excellence be lacking to it? There is nothing more excellent than mind and
reason, so it is impossible that these should be lacking to the universe. Chrysippus, therefore, is again right when he declares,
adding instances, that in what is matured and perfect everything is of higher
excellence, in a horse, for example, than in a colt, in a dog than in a whelp,
in a man than in a boy, and in like manner that whatever is best in the whole
world, must reside in something that is perfect and complete. As there is
nothing more perfect than the universe, and nothing more excellent than virtue,
it follows that virtue is an attribute of the universe. Human nature is not
indeed perfect, yet virtue is attained in man, so how much more easily in the
universe! Virtue, then, does exist in the universe, which is therefore wise,
and consequently divine.