Readings from Classical and
Classical-Christian Sources
Aristotle (representative
of the Classical tradition)
Physics, Book II, Chapter 3 (the “four
causes”) (excerpt):
Now that we have
established these distinctions, we must proceed to consider causes, their
character and number. Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not
think they know a thing till they have grasped the 'why' of (which is to grasp
its primary cause). So clearly we too must do this as regards both coming to be
and passing away and every kind of physical change, in order that, knowing
their principles, we may try to refer to these principles each of our problems.
In one sense, then,
(1) that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called 'cause', e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the
bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species.
In another sense (2)
the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence, and its genera,
are called 'causes' (e.g. of the octave the relation of 2:1, and generally number),
and the parts in the definition.
Again (3) the
primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g. the man who gave advice is
a cause, the father is cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is
made and what causes change of what is changed.
Again (4) in the
sense of end or 'that for the sake of which' a thing is done, e.g. health is
the cause of walking about. ('Why is he walking about?'
we say. 'To be healthy', and, having said that, we think we have assigned the
cause.) The same is true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought
about through the action of something else as means towards the end, e.g.
reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means towards
health. All these things are 'for the sake of' the end, though they differ from
one another in that some are activities, others instruments.
* *
Chapter 8 (excerpt)
We must explain then
(1) that Nature belongs to the class of causes which act for the sake of
something; (2) about the necessary and its place in physical problems, for all
writers ascribe things to this cause, arguing that since the hot and the cold,
&c., are of such and such a kind, therefore certain things necessarily are
and come to be-and if they mention any other cause (one his 'friendship and
strife', another his 'mind'), it is only to touch on it, and then good-bye to
it.
A difficulty
presents itself: why should not nature work, not for the sake of something, nor
because it is better so, but just as the sky rains, not in order tomake the corn grow, but of necessity? What is drawn up
must cool, and what has been cooled must become water and descend, the result
of this being that the corn grows. Similarly if a
man's crop is spoiled on the threshing-floor, the rain did not fall for the
sake of this-in order that the crop might be spoiled-but that result just
followed. Why then should it not be the same with the parts in nature, e.g.
that our teeth should come up of necessity-the front teeth sharp, fitted for
tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food-since they did
not arise for this end, but it was merely a coincident result; and so with all
other parts in which we suppose that there is purpose? Wherever then all the
parts came about just what they would have been if they had come be for an end,
such things survived, being organized spontaneously in a fitting way; whereas
those which grew otherwise perished and continue to perish, as Empedocles says
his 'man-faced ox-progeny' did.
* *
Such are the
arguments (and others of the kind) which may cause difficulty on this point.
Yet it is impossible that this should be the true view. For teeth and all other
natural things either invariably or normally come about in a given way; but of
not one of the results of chance or spontaneity is this true. We do not ascribe
to chance or mere coincidence the frequency of rain in winter, but frequent
rain in summer we do; nor heat in the dog-days, but only if we have it in
winter. If then, it is agreed that things are either the result of coincidence
or for an end, and these cannot be the result of coincidence or spontaneity, it
follows that they must be for an end; and that such things are all due to
nature even the champions of the theory which is before us would agree. Therefore action for an end is present in things which come
to be and are by nature.
Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapter 7 (excerpt):
Happiness, then, is
something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.
Presumably, however,
to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer
account of what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could
first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a
sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or
activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so
would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then,
and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born
without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts
evidently has a function, may one lay it
down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this
be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar
to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there
would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the
horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the
element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle
in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one
and exercising thought. And, as 'life of the rational element' also has two
meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for
this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man
is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we
say 'so-and-so-and 'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in
kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all
cases, eminence in respect of goodness being added to the name of the function
(for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good
lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the function
of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of
the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be
the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed
when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is
the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with
virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and
most complete.
But we must add 'in
a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and
so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.
* *
Politics, Book 1, chapter 1 (excerpt):
Every state is as we
see a sort of partnership, and every partnership is formed with a view to some
good （since all the actions of all mankind are done with a view to what they
think to be good）. It is therefore evident that, while all partnerships aim at some good
the partnership that is the most supreme of all and includes all the others
does so most of all, and aims at the most supreme of all goods; and this is the
partnership entitled the state, the political association.
* *
The partnership
finally composed of several villages is the city-state; it has at last attained
the limit of virtually complete self-sufficiency, and thus, while it comes into
existence for the sake of life, it exists for the good life. Hence every
city-state exists by nature, inasmuch as the first partnerships so exist; for
the city-state is the end of the other partnerships, and nature is an end,
since that which each thing is when its growth is completed we speak of as
being the nature of each thing, for instance of a man, a horse, a household.
Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is its chief good; and
self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good. From these things therefore it is
clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is by nature a
political animal, and a man that is by nature and not merely by fortune citiless is either low in the scale of humanity or
above it （like the “clanless,
lawless, hearthless” an reviled by Homer, for
one by nature unsocial is also ‘a lover of war’) inasmuch as he is solitary, like an
isolated piece at draughts. And why man is a political animal in a greater
measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we
declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals
possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure,
and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well （for their nature
has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant
and to indicate those sensations to one another), but speech is designed to indicate the
advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for
it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he
alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral
qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a
city-state.
Thus also the
city-state is prior in nature to the household and to each of us individually.
For the whole must necessarily be prior to the part; since when the whole body
is destroyed, foot or hand will not exist except in an equivocal sense, like
the sense in which one speaks of a hand sculptured in stone as a hand; because
a hand in those circumstances will be a hand spoiled, and all things are
defined by their function and capacity, so that when they are no longer such as
to perform their function they must not be said to be the same things, but to
bear their names in an equivocal sense. It is clear therefore that the state is
also prior by nature to the individual; for if each individual when separate is
not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are
to their whole, while a man who is incapable of entering into partnership, or
who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state,
so that he must be either a beast or a god.
St.
Thomas Aquinas (representative of the Classical-Christian tradition)
Summa Theologica (Questions 91 to 97 of the First Part of the Second Part of the Summa are often referred to as the “Treatise on Law.”)
The scholastic format of the Summa Theologica or Summary of Theology (or, "Everything You Ever Wanted to Know about Christian Theology but were Afraid to Ask") of St. Thomas takes some getting used to. He divides the treatise up into numbered Questions. Each numbered question is then divided up into Articles. Each Article is divided into a series of Objections, which turn out to be criticisms of the point that Aquinas ultimately wishes to make, followed by a section headed "On the contrary," which marks the beginning of the argument for St. Thomas's position. Then follow the "I answer that" section, which is the key to St. Thomas's argument, and a series of replies to the initial objections. Focus on the "I answer that" paragraphs provided herein.
Question 91 OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (excerpts)
Article 1: I answer that, . . . a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, . . . that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Prov. 8:23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.
Article 2: I answer that, . . . law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above [Article 1], it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Ps. 4:6): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth us good things?" in answer to which question he says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.
Article 3: I answer that, . . . a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (Augustine, De Lib. Arb. [On Free Choice of the Will] i, 6). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed . . . . Wherefore Tully [Cicero] says in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source in nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law."
Article 4: I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction of the part of his reason, besides the natural law and human law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is inproportionate to man's natural faculty, . . . therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God.
Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.
Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene.
Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.
And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. 118:8, where it is said: "The law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin; "converting souls," because it directs not only exterior, but also interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the certainty of what is true and right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.