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U.S.
Supreme Court
The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 10 Wall. 557 557 (1870)
The Daniel Ball
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
MICHIGAN
[77 U. S., 558] The act of July 7, 1838,1
provides in its second section that it shall not be lawful for the owner,
master, or captain of any vessel propelled in whole or in part by steam to
transport any merchandise or passengers upon "the bays, lakes, rivers, or
other navigable waters of the United States" after the 1st of October of
that year without having first obtained from the proper officer a license under
existing laws, that for every violation of this enactment the owner or owners
of the vessel shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of five
hundred dollars, and that for this sum the vessel engaged shall be liable and
may be seized and proceeded against summarily by libel in the District Court of
the United States.
The act of
August 30, 1852,2 which is amendatory of the act of July 7, 1838,
provides for the inspection of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam
and carrying passengers and the delivery to the collector of the district of a
certificate of such inspection before a license, register, or enrollment, under
either of the acts can be granted, and declares that if any vessel of this kind
is navigated with passengers on board, without complying with the terms of the
act, the owners and the vessel shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by
the second section of the act of 1838.
In March, 1868, the Daniel
Ball, a vessel propelled by steam, of one hundred and twenty-three tons
burden, was engaged in navigating Grand River, in the State of Michigan,
between the Cities of Grand Rapids and Grand Haven, and in the transportation
of merchandise and passengers between those places without having been
inspected or licensed under the laws of the United States, and to recover the
penalty provided for want of such inspection and license, the United States
filed a libel in the District Court for the Western District of Michigan.
[77 U. S., 559] The libel, as amended, described Grand River as a
navigable water of the United States, and in addition to the employment stated
above, alleged that in such employment the steamer transported merchandise
shipped on board of her destined for ports and places in states other than the
State of Michigan, and was thus engaged in commerce between the states.
The answer of the owners,
who appeared in the case, admitted substantially the employment of the steamer
as alleged, but set up as a defense that Grand River was not a navigable water
of the United States, and that the steamer was engaged solely in domestic trade
and commerce, and was not engaged in trade or commerce between two or more
states or in any trade by reason of which she was subject to the navigation
laws of the United States or was required to be inspected and licensed.
It was admitted by
stipulation of the parties that the steamer was employed in the navigation of
Grand River between the Cities of Grand Rapids and Grand Haven and in the
transportation of merchandise and passengers between those places; that she was
not enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade; that some of the goods that
she shipped at Grand Rapids and carried to Grand Haven were destined and marked
for places in other states than Michigan, and that some of the goods which she
shipped at Grand Haven came from other states and were destined for places
within that state.
It was also admitted that
the steamer was so constructed as to draw only two feet of water, and was
incapable of navigating the waters of Lake Michigan; that she was a common
carrier between the cities named, but did not run in connection with or in continuation
of any line of steamers or vessels on the lake or any line of railway in the
state, although there were various lines of steamers and other vessels running
from places in other states to Grand Haven carrying merchandise, and a line of
railway was running from Detroit which touched at both of the cities named.
The district court dismissed the libel. The circuit court [77 U. S., 560] reversed this
decision, and gave a decree for the penalty demanded.
From this decree the case
was brought by appeal to this Court.
[77 U. S. 562] MR. JUSTICE
FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the Court as follows:
Two questions are presented
in this case for our determination.
First, whether
the steamer was at the time designated in the libel engaged in transporting
merchandise and passengers on a navigable water of the United States within the
meaning of the acts of Congress, and [77 U. S., 563] second,
whether those acts are applicable to a steamer engaged as a common carrier
between places in the same state when a portion of the merchandise transported
by her is destined to places in other states or comes from places without the
state, she not running in connection with or in continuation of any line of
steamers or other vessels or any railway line leading to or from another state.
Upon the first of these
questions we entertain no doubt. The doctrine of
the common law as to the navigability of waters has no application in this
country. Here, the ebb and flow of the tide do not constitute the usual
test, as in England, or any test at all of the navigability of waters. There,
no waters are navigable in fact, or at least to any considerable extent, which
are not subject to the tide, and from this circumstance tidewater and navigable
water there signify substantially the same thing. But in this country, the case
is widely different. Some of our rivers are as navigable for many hundreds of
miles above as they are below the limits of tidewater, and some of them are
navigable for great distances by large vessels which are not even affected by
the tide at any point during their entire length.3 A different test
must therefore be applied to determine the navigability of our rivers, and that
is found in their navigable capacity. Those rivers must be regarded as public
navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in
fact when they are used or are susceptible of being used in their ordinary
condition as highways for commerce over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they
constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts
of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the states, when
they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other
waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with
other states or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce
is conducted by water.
[77 U. S., 564] If we apply this test to
Grand River, the conclusion follows that it must be regarded as a navigable
water of the United States. From the conceded facts in the case, the
stream is capable of bearing a steamer of one hundred-and-twenty-three tons
burden, laden with merchandise and passengers, as far as Grand Rapids, a
distance of forty miles from its mouth in Lake Michigan. And by its junction
with the lake it forms a continued highway for commerce both with other states
and with foreign countries, and is thus brought under the direct control of
Congress in the exercise of its commercial power.
That power authorizes all
appropriate legislation for the protection or advancement of either interstate
or foreign commerce, and for that purpose such legislation as will insure the
convenient and safe navigation of all the navigable waters of the United
States, whether that legislation consists in requiring the removal of
obstructions to their use, in prescribing the form and size of the vessels
employed upon them, or in subjecting the vessels to inspection and license in
order to insure their proper construction and equipment. "The power to
regulate commerce," this Court said in Gilman v. Philadelphia,4 "comprehends the control
for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all navigable waters of the
United States which are accessible from a state other than those in which they
lie. For this purpose, they are the public property of the nation and subject
to all the requisite legislation of Congress."
But it is
contended that the steamer Daniel Ball was only engaged in the internal
commerce of the State of Michigan, and was not, therefore, required to be
inspected or licensed even if it be conceded that Grand River is a navigable
water of the United States, and this brings us to the consideration of the
second question presented.
There is
undoubtedly an internal commerce which is subject to the control of the states.
The power delegated to Congress is limited to commerce "among
the several states," [77 U. S., 565] with foreign nations, and with the Indian tribes. This limitation
necessarily excludes from federal control all commerce not thus designated, and
of course that commerce which is carried on entirely within the limits of a
state and does not extend to or affect other states.5 In this case, it is admitted that the steamer was engaged
in shipping and transporting down Grand River goods destined and marked for
other states than Michigan, and in receiving and transporting up the
river goods brought within the state from without its limits, but inasmuch as
her agency in the transportation was entirely within the limits of the state
and she did not run in connection with or in continuation of any line of
vessels or railway leading to other states, it is contended that she was
engaged entirely in domestic commerce. But this conclusion does not follow. So far as she was employed in transporting goods destined
for other states or goods brought from without the limits of Michigan and
destined to places within that state, she was engaged in commerce between the
states, and however limited that commerce may have been, she was, so far as it
went, subject to the legislation of Congress. She was employed as an
instrument of that commerce, for whenever a commodity has begun to move as an
article of trade from one state to another, commerce in that commodity between
the states has commenced. The fact that several different and independent agencies
are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting entirely in one state
and some acting through two or more states, does in no respect affect the
character of the transaction. To the extent in which each agency acts in that
transportation, it is subject to the regulation of Congress.
It is said that if the
position here asserted be sustained, there is no such thing as the domestic
trade of a state; that Congress may take the entire control of the commerce of
the country and extend its regulations to the railroads within a state on which
grain or fruit is transported to a distant market.
[77 U. S., 566] We answer that the present case relates to
transportation on the navigable waters of the United States, and we are not
called upon to express an opinion upon the power of Congress over interstate
commerce when carried on by land transportation. And we answer further that we
are unable to draw any clear and distinct line between the authority of
Congress to regulate an agency employed in commerce between the states when
that agency extends through two or more states and when it is confined in its
action entirely within the limits of a single state. If its authority does not
extend to an agency in such commerce when that agency is confined within the
limits of a state, its entire authority over interstate commerce may be
defeated. Several agencies combining, each taking up the commodity transported
at the boundary line at one end of a state and leaving it at the boundary line
at the other end, the federal jurisdiction would be entirely ousted and the
constitutional provision would become a dead letter.
We perceive no error in the
record, and the decree of the circuit court must be
Affirmed.
15 Stat. at Large 304.
210 id. 61.
3The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 457; The Hine v. Trevor,
4 Wall. 555.
470 U. S. 3 Wall.
724.