EUTHYPHRO
c. 390 B.C.
Trans. Benjamin Jowett
PERSONS OF THE
DIALOGUE: Socrates, Euthyphro.
SCENE: The Porch of
the King Archon.
[The bracketed
numbers are the Stephanus numbers proximately
placed.]
[2]
EUTHYPHRO: Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and
what are you doing in the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be
concerned in a suit before the King, like myself?
SOCRATES: Not in a
suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the
Athenians use.
EUTHYPHRO: What! I
suppose that someone has been prosecuting you, for I cannot believe that you
are the prosecutor of another.
SOCRATES: Certainly
not.
EUTHYPHRO: Then some one else has been prosecuting you?
SOCRATES: Yes.
EUTHYPHRO: And who is
he?
SOCRATES: A young man
who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know
him: his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember his appearance; he has a
beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is ill grown.
EUTHYPHRO: No, I do
not remember him, Socrates. But what is the charge which he brings against you?
SOCRATES: What is the
charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a good deal of character in
the young man, and for which he is certainly not to be despised. He says he
knows how the youth are corrupted and who are their
corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing that I am the
reverse of a wise man, he has found me out, and is going to accuse me of
corrupting his young friends. And of this our mother the state is to be the
judge. Of all our political men he is the only one who seems to me to begin in
the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth; like a good husbandman,
he makes the young shoots his [3]first
care, and clears away us who are the destroyers of them. This is only the first
step; he will afterwards attend to the elder branches; and if he goes on as he
has begun, he will be a very great public benefactor.
EUTHYPHRO: I hope
that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the opposite will turn out to be
the truth. My opinion is that in attacking you he is simply aiming a blow at
the foundation of the state. But in what way does he say that you corrupt the
young?
SOCRATES: He brings a
wonderful accusation against me, which at first hearing excites surprise: he
says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and that I invent new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the ground of his
indictment.
EUTHYPHRO: I
understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the familiar sign which
occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He thinks that you introduce
novelties in religion, and he is going to have you up before the court for
this. He knows that such a charge is readily received by the world, as I myself
know too well; for when I speak in the assembly about divine things, and
foretell the future to them, they laugh at me and think me a madman. Yet every
word that I say is true. But they are jealous of us all; and we must be brave
and go at them.
SOCRATES: Their
laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much
consequence. For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I suspect, do
not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to impart his wisdom to
others, and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy,
they are angry.
EUTHYPHRO: I am never
likely to try their temper in this way.
SOCRATES: I dare say
not, for you are reserved in your behaviour, and
seldom impart your wisdom. But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out myself
to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid that the
Athenians may think me too talkative. Now if, as I was saying, they would only
laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at you, the time might pass gaily
enough in the court; but perhaps they may be in earnest, and then what the end
will be you soothsayers only can predict.
EUTHYPHRO: I dare say
that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and that you will win your
cause; and I think that I shall win my own.
SOCRATES: And what is
your suit, Euthyphro? are
you the pursuer or the defendant?
EUTHYPHRO: I am the
pursuer.
SOCRATES: Of whom?
[4]
EUTHYPHRO: You will think me mad when I tell you.
SOCRATES: Why, has the fugitive wings?
EUTHYPHRO: Nay, he is
not very volatile at his time of life.
SOCRATES: Who is he?
EUTHYPHRO: My father.
SOCRATES: Your
father! my good man?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And of what
is he accused?
EUTHYPHRO: Of murder,
Socrates.
SOCRATES: By the
powers, Euthyphro! how
little does the common herd know of the nature of right and truth. A man must
be an extraordinary man, and have made great strides in wisdom, before he could
have seen his way to bring such an action.
EUTHYPHRO: Indeed,
Socrates, he must.
SOCRATES: I suppose
that the man whom your father murdered was one of your relatives—clearly he
was; for if he had been a stranger you would never have thought of prosecuting
him.
EUTHYPHRO: I am
amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction between one who is a relation
and one who is not a relation; for surely the pollution is the same in either
case, if you knowingly associate with the murderer when you ought to clear
yourself and him by proceeding against him. The real question is whether the
murdered man has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the
matter alone; but if unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under the same
roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him. Now the man who
is dead was a poor dependant of mine who worked for
us as a field labourer on our farm in Naxos, and one
day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of our domestic
servants and slew him. My father bound him hand and foot and threw him into a
ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of a diviner what he should do with him.
Meanwhile he never attended to him and took no care about him, for he regarded
him as a murderer; and thought that no great harm would be done even if he did
die. Now this was just what happened. For such was the effect of cold and
hunger and chains upon him, that before the messenger returned from the diviner,
he was dead. And my father and family are angry with me for taking the part of
the murderer and prosecuting my father. They say that he did not kill him, and that if he did, the dead man was but a murderer,
and I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious who prosecutes a
father. Which shows, Socrates, how little they know what the
gods think about piety and impiety.
SOCRATES: Good
heavens, Euthyphro! and is
your knowledge of religion [things divine] and of things pious [holy]
and impious [unholy] so very exact, that, supposing the circumstances to
be as you state them, you are not afraid lest you too may be doing an impious
thing in bringing an action against your father?
EUTHYPHRO: The best
of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him,
Socrates, from other [5] men, is his
exact knowledge of all such matters. What should I be good for without it?
SOCRATES: Rare
friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your
disciple. Then before the trial with Meletus comes on
I shall challenge him, and say that I have always had a great interest in
religious questions, and now, as he charges me with rash imaginations and
innovations in religion, I have become your disciple. You, Meletus,
as I shall say to him, acknowledge Euthyphro to be a
great theologian, and sound in his opinions; and if you approve of him you
ought to approve of me, and not have me into court; but if you disapprove, you
should begin by indicting him who is my teacher, and who will be the ruin, not
of the young, but of the old; that is to say, of myself whom he instructs, and
of his old father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if Meletus
refuses to listen to me, but will go on, and will not shift the indictment from
me to you, I cannot do better than repeat this challenge in the court.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes,
indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am mistaken if I do not
find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great deal more to say to him than
to me.
SOCRATES: And I, my
dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming your disciple. For I observe
that no one appears to notice you—not even this Meletus;
but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has indicted me for
impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety [holiness] and impiety [unholiness],
which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other offences
against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again—is it not always the opposite of piety,
and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes
whatever is impious? *
[*Note: “pious” and
“piety” may be translated throughout as “holy” and “holiness,” following the
translation of Lane Cooper and others. I have amended Jowett’s translation at a
few places throughout with references to Cooper’s translation. The emendations
are underlined. WSM]
EUTHYPHRO: To be
sure, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And what is
piety, and what is impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: Piety is
doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting anyone who is guilty of
murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime—whether he be your father or mother,
or whoever he may be—that makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is
impiety. And please to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you
of the truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to others:—of the
principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go
unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the
gods?—[6] and yet they admit that he
bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly
devoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a
similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father,
they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when
the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.
SOCRATES: May not
this be the reason, Euthyphro,
why I am charged with impiety—that I cannot away with these stories about the
gods? and therefore I suppose that people think me
wrong. But, as you who are well informed about them approve of them, I cannot
do better than assent to your superior wisdom. What else can I say, confessing
as I do, that I know nothing about them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether
you really believe that they are true.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes,
Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the world is in ignorance.
SOCRATES: And do you
really believe that the gods fought with one another, and had dire quarrels,
battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as you may see represented in the
works of great artists? The temples are full of them; and notably the robe of Athene, which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these tales
of the gods true, Euthyphro?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes,
Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would like to hear them,
many other things about the gods which would quite amaze you.
SOCRATES: I dare say;
and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But just at
present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not
as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is
'piety'? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do,
charging your father with murder.
EUTHYPHRO: And what I
said was true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other
pious acts?
EUTHYPHRO: There are.
SOCRATES: Remember
that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to
explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not
recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious,
and the pious pious?
EUTHYPHRO: I
remember.
SOCRATES: Tell me
what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I
may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one
else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious,
such another impious.
EUTHYPHRO: I will
tell you, if you like.
SOCRATES: I should
very much like.
EUTHYPHRO: Piety,
then, is that which is dear to the gods, [7]
and impiety is that which is not dear to them.
SOCRATES: Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer which I
wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although
I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: Come, then,
and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to
the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is
impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that
said?
EUTHYPHRO: It was.
SOCRATES: And well
said?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes,
Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.
SOCRATES: And further,
Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities
and hatreds and differences?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, that
was also said.
SOCRATES: And what
sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and
I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us
enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to
arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: Or suppose
that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by
measuring?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: And we end
a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?
EUTHYPHRO: To be
sure.
SOCRATES: But what
differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and which therefore make us
angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not
occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these enmities
arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable. Are
not these the points about which men differ, and about which when we are unable
satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when
we do quarrel?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes,
Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we quarrel is such as you
describe.
SOCRATES: And the
quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they
occur, are of a like nature?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly
they are.
SOCRATES: They have
differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable:
there would have been no quarrels among them, if there
had been no such differences—would there now?
EUTHYPHRO: You are
quite right.
SOCRATES: Does not
every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the
opposite of them?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: But, as you
say, people regard the same things, [8]
some as just and others as unjust,—about these they dispute; and so there arise
wars and fightings among them.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then the
same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful
and dear to them?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And upon
this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious
and also impious?
EUTHYPHRO: So I
should suppose.
SOCRATES: Then, my
friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I
asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and
impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by
them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising
your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but
disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is
acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and
there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.
EUTHYPHRO: But I
believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of
punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion about that.
SOCRATES: Well, but
speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one
arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?
EUTHYPHRO: I should
rather say that these are the questions which they are always arguing,
especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is
nothing which they will not do or say in their own defence.
SOCRATES: But do they
admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they
ought not to be punished?
EUTHYPHRO: No; they
do not.
SOCRATES: Then there
are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for they do not
venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their
guilt, do they not?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then they
do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but they argue about
the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And the
gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just and unjust,
and some of them say while others deny that injustice is done among them. For
surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice
is not to be punished?
EUTHYPHRO: That is
true, Socrates, in the main.
SOCRATES: But they
join issue about the particulars—gods and men alike; and, if they dispute at
all, they dispute about some act which is called in question, and which by some
is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that true?
EUTHYPHRO: Quite
true.
[9]
SOCRATES: Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do
tell me, for my better instruction and information, what proof have you that in
the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in
chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains
before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought
to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to
proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that
all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they
do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.
EUTHYPHRO: It will be
a difficult task; but I could make the matter very clear indeed to you.
SOCRATES: I
understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of
apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act
is unjust, and hateful to the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes
indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.
SOCRATES: But they
will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. There was a
notion that came into my mind while you were speaking; I said to myself: 'Well,
and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the
gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of
the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful to
the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these
distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also
pleasing and dear to them.' And therefore, Euthyphro,
I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods
condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as
to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or
holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this
be our definition of piety and impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: Why not,
Socrates?
SOCRATES: Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro,
there is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you
in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a
matter for you to consider.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I
should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite
which they all hate, impious.
SOCRATES: Ought we to
enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to
accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you
say?
EUTHYPHRO: We should
enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the test of enquiry.
[10]
SOCRATES: We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point
which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved
by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is
beloved of the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: I do not
understand your meaning, Socrates.
SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of
carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and
being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know
also in what the difference lies?
EUTHYPHRO: I think
that I understand.
SOCRATES: And is not
that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Well; and
now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is
carried, or for some other reason?
EUTHYPHRO: No; that
is the reason.
SOCRATES: And the
same is true of what is led and of what is seen?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And a thing
is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen;
nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because
it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this. And now I think,
Euthyphro,
that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state
of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because
it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither
does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of
suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Is not that
which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the
same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being loved follows the
act of being loved, and not the act the state.
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And what do
you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according
to your definition, loved by all the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Because it
is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
EUTHYPHRO: No, that
is the reason.
SOCRATES: It is loved
because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And that
which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of
them because it is loved of them?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then that
which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy,
nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two
different things.
EUTHYPHRO: How do you
mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: I mean to
say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be loved of God because it is holy,
not to be holy because it is loved.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: But that
which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them, not
loved by them because it is dear to them.
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: But, friend
Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with
that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is
dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; [11] but if that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved
by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But
now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different
from one another. For one (theophiles) is of a kind
to be loved cause it is loved, and the other (osion)
is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness,
to offer an attribute only, and not the essence—the attribute of being loved by
all the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And
therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell
me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not
(for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel); and what is impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: I really
do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For somehow or other our
arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away
from us.
SOCRATES: Your words,
Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor
Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that my arguments walk
away and will not remain fixed where they are placed because I am a descendant
of his. But now, since these notions are your own, you must find some other
gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on
the move.
EUTHYPHRO: Nay,
Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who sets arguments in
motion; not I, certainly, but you make them move or go round, for they would
never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.
SOCRATES: Then I must
be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only made his own inventions to
move, I move those of other people as well. And the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would
give the wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain
them and keep them fixed. But enough of this.
As I perceive that you are lazy, I will myself endeavour
to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety; and I hope that
you will not grudge your labour. Tell me, then—Is not that which is pious necessarily just?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is,
then, all which is just pious? [12] or, is that which is pious all just, but that which is just,
only in part and not all, pious?
EUTHYPHRO: I do not
understand you, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And yet I
know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are younger. But, as I was
saying, revered friend, the abundance of your wisdom
makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in
understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not
mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings—
'Of Zeus, the author
and creator of all these things, You will not tell:
for where there is fear there is also reverence.'
Now I disagree with
this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?
EUTHYPHRO: By all
means.
SOCRATES: I should
not say that where there is fear there is also reverence; for I am sure that
many persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not
perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: But where
reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling of reverence and shame
about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid of an ill reputation.
EUTHYPHRO: No doubt.
SOCRATES: Then we are
wrong in saying that where there is fear there is also reverence; and we should
say, where there is reverence there is also fear. But there is not always
reverence where there is fear; for fear is a more extended notion, and
reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, and number is
a more extended notion than the odd. I suppose that you follow me now?
EUTHYPHRO: Quite
well.
SOCRATES: That was
the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked whether the just is
always the pious, or the pious always the just; and whether there may not be
justice where there is not piety; for justice is the more extended notion of
which piety is only a part. Do you dissent?
EUTHYPHRO: No, I
think that you are quite right.
SOCRATES: Then, if
piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part? If you
had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases; for instance, if you had asked
me what is an even number, and what part of number the even
is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which represents a
figure having two equal sides. Do you not agree?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I
quite agree.
SOCRATES: In like
manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety or holiness, that I
may be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice,
or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the
nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.
EUTHYPHRO: Piety or holiness,
Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice which attends to the gods,
as there is the other part of justice which attends to men.
[13]
SOCRATES: That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is
a little point about which I should like to have further information, What is the meaning of 'attention'? For attention can hardly
be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other
things. For instance, horses are said to require attention, and not every
person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is
it not so?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: I should
suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Nor is
every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And I
should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to
dogs?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: As the art
of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: In like
manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?—that would be
your meaning, Euthyphro?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is not
attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the
attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may observe that when
attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved, are they
not?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: As the dogs
are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen by
the art of the oxherd, and all other things are
tended or attended for their good and not for their hurt?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly,
not for their hurt.
SOCRATES: But for
their good?
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: And does
piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art of attending to the
gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you
make any of the gods better?
EUTHYPHRO: No, no;
that was certainly not what I meant.
SOCRATES: And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you the
question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you did not.
EUTHYPHRO: You do me
justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of attention which I mean.
SOCRATES: Good: but I
must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is
called piety?
EUTHYPHRO: It is
such, Socrates, as slaves show to their masters.
SOCRATES: I
understand—a sort of ministration to or waiting on the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Medicine is
also a sort of ministration or service, having in view the attainment of some object—would
you not say of health?
EUTHYPHRO: I should.
SOCRATES: Again,
there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with a view to the
attainment of some result?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes,
Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.
SOCRATES: As there is
an art which ministers to the house-builder with a view to the building of a
house?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And now
tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers to the gods: what work
does that help to accomplish? For you must surely know if, as you say, you are
of all men living the one who is best instructed in religion.
EUTHYPHRO: And I
speak the truth, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Tell me
then, oh tell me—what is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our
ministrations?
EUTHYPHRO: Many and
fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.
[14]
SOCRATES: Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief of them
is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Many and
fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his chief
work is the production of food from the earth?
EUTHYPHRO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And of the
many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal one?
EUTHYPHRO: I have
told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things accurately will be
very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or holiness is learning how to
please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. Such piety is the
salvation of families and states, just as the impious, which is unpleasing to
the gods, is their ruin and destruction.
SOCRATES: I think
that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I
asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see
plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me—clearly not: else why, when we
reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered me I should have
truly learned of you by this time the nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a
question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he leads I must
follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety? Do you
mean that they are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: And
sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes,
Socrates.
SOCRATES: Upon this
view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving?
EUTHYPHRO: You
understand me capitally, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Yes, my
friend; the reason is that I am a votary of your science, and give my mind to
it, and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Please
then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods? Do you mean
that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: Is not the
right way of asking to ask of them what we want?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And the
right way of giving is to give to them in return what they want of us. There
would be no meaning in an art which gives to any one that which he does not
want.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true,
Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then piety,
Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing
business with one another?
EUTHYPHRO: That is an
expression which you may use, if you like.
SOCRATES: But I have
no particular liking for anything but the truth. I wish, however, that you
would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. [15] There is no doubt about what they
give to us; for there is no good thing which they do not give; but how we can
give any good thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they
give everything and we give nothing, that must be an
affair of business in which we have very greatly the advantage of them.
EUTHYPHRO: And do you
imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the
gods from our gifts?
SOCRATES: But if not,
Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are
conferred by us upon the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: What else,
but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now
saying, what pleases them?
SOCRATES: Piety,
then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them?
EUTHYPHRO: I should
say that nothing could be dearer.
SOCRATES: Then once
more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And when
you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away?
Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not
perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes
them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for the argument, as you will
perceive, comes round to the same point. Were we not saying that the holy or
pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? Have you
forgotten?
EUTHYPHRO: I quite
remember.
SOCRATES: And are you
not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and is not this the same as what is dear to them—do you see?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: Then either
we were wrong in our former assertion; or, if we were right then, we are wrong
now.
EUTHYPHRO: One of the
two must be true.
SOCRATES: Then we
must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an
enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I
entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me
the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must detain you,
like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of
piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on behalf of a serf,
have charged your aged father with murder. You would not have run such a risk
of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too much
respect for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore, that you know the nature
of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro,
and do not hide your knowledge.
EUTHYPHRO: Another
time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.
SOCRATES: Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was hoping
that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety; and then I might
have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I
would have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro,
[16] and had given up rash
innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and
that now I am about to lead a better life.