The Federalist
No. 10
The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard
Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (cont.)
Daily Advertiser
Thursday, November 22, 1787
[James Madison]
To
the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the numerous
advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more
accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of
faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed
for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this
dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan
which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a
proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into
the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which
popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the
favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their
most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American
constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly
be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend
that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished
and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and
virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of
public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the
public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures
are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of
the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing
majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no
foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they
are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our
situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously
charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same
time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest
misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of
public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end
of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of
the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our
public administrations.
By a faction, I
understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or
of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods
of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other,
by controlling its effects.
There are again two
methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty
which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the
same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be
more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease.
Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it
instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is
essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to
wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it
imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient
is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man
continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions
will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his
self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on
each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from
which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to
a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first
object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of
acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property
immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and
views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division
of the society into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of
faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought
into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of
civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning
government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an
attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and
power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting
to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed
them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and
oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this
propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no
substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful
distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and
excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of
factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who
hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in
society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like
discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile
interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity
in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by
different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering
interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the
spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the
government.
No man is allowed to
be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his
judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with
greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both
judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important
acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning
the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of
citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and
parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning
private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side
and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them.
Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous
party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to
prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by
restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions
which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes,
and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The
apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which
seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative
act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant
party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they
overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.
It is in vain to say
that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and
render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not
always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at
all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will
rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in
disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
The inference to
which we are brought is, that the causes of
faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of
controlling its effects.
If a faction consists
of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which
enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog
the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to
execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a
majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other
hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public
good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private
rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve
the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to
which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum
by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which
it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of
mankind.
By what means is this
object attainable? Evidently by one of two only.
Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same
time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or
interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to
concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the
opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor
religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found
to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their
efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion
as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the
subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society
consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the
government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A
common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of
the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government
itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker
party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever
been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible
with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as
short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic
politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously
supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political
rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in
their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which
I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a
different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us
examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall
comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive
from the Union.
The two great points
of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of
the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the
rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country,
over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the
first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views,
by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom
may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and
love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public
voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant
to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for
the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious
tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by
corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the
interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive
republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public
weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious
considerations:
In the first place,
it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives
must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a
few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain
number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the
number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of
the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic,
it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large
than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and
consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as
each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large
than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates
to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often
carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely
to centre in men who possess the most attractive
merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed
that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which
inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of
electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local
circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him
unduly attached to these, and too little fit to
comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution
forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests
being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State
legislatures.
The other point of
difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may
be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and
it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to
be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer
probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the
distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of
the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority,
and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will
they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you
take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable
that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult
for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with
each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is
a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always
checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a
democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a
small republic, -- is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does
the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened
views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and
schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the
Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it
consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties,
against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the
rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it,
in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and
accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here,
again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of
factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be
unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious
sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but
the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the
national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money,
for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other
improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the
Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady
is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and
proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the
diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of
pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in
cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.
PUBLIUS