Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
CHAP. XIII
Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as
Concerning Their Felicity and Misery
NATURE hath made men so
equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man
sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when
all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so
considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to
which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of body,
the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with
himself.
And as to the faculties
of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that
skill of proceeding upon general and infallible rules, called science, which
very few have and but in few things, as being not a native faculty born with
us, nor attained, as prudence, while we look after somewhat else, I find yet a
greater equality amongst men than that of strength. For prudence is but
experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they
equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality
incredible is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men
think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar; that is, than all men but
themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring with themselves,
they approve. For such is the nature of men that howsoever they may acknowledge
many others to be more witty, or more eloquent or more
learned, yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for
they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than
unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution
of anything than that every man is contented with his share.
From this equality of
ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of
our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which
nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to
their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their
delectation only) endeavour to destroy or subdue one
another. And from hence it comes to pass that where an invader hath no more to
fear than another man's single power, if one plant, sow, build, or possess a
convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces
united to dispossess and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life or liberty. And the invader
again is in the like danger of another.
And from this diffidence
of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as
anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he
can so long till he see no other power great enough to
endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth,
and is generally allowed. Also, because there be some that, taking pleasure in
contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue
farther than their security requires, if others, that otherwise would be glad
to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their
power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation
of dominion over men being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be
allowed him.
Again, men have no
pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company where
there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh
that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself, and
upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavours,
as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them
in quiet is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater
value from his contemners, by damage; and from
others, by the example.
So that in the nature of
man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence;
thirdly, glory.
The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the
third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of
other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them;
the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other
sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their
kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.
Hereby it is manifest
that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe,
they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every
man against every man. For war consisteth not in
battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will
to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is
to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For
as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower
or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the
nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but
in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to
the contrary. All other time is peace.
Whatsoever therefore is
consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same
consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their
own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such
condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is
uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of
the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments
of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the
face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and
which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the
life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
It may seem strange to
some man that has not well weighed these things that Nature should thus
dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another: and he may
therefore, not trusting to this inference, made from
the passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him
therefore consider with himself: when taking a journey, he arms himself and
seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when
even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws and
public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion
he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens,
when he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his
chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my
words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The desires, and other
passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed
from those passions till they know a law that forbids them; which till laws be
made they cannot know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the
person that shall make it.
It may peradventure be
thought there was never such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe
it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places where
they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government
of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on
natural lust, have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish
manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life
there would be, where there were no common power to
fear, by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful
government use to degenerate into a civil war.
But though there had
never been any time wherein particular men were in a condition of war one
against another, yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority,
because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state
and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed
on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of
their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours,
which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the industry of
their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the
liberty of particular men.
To this war of every man
against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The
notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where
there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force
and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none
of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a
man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses and passions. They are qualities
that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the
same condition that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine
distinct; but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as
he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition which man by mere nature is
actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting
partly in the passions, partly in his reason.
The passions that
incline men to peace are: fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary
to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace upon which men may
be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are called the
laws of nature, whereof I shall speak more particularly in the two following
chapters.
CHAP.
XIV
Of
the First and Second Natural Laws, and of Contracts
THE
right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man
hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own
nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything
which, in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
By
liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the
absence of external impediments; which impediments may oft take away part of a
man's power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power
left him according as his judgement and reason shall dictate to him.
A
law of nature, lex naturalis, is
a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to
do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of
preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh
it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject use to
confound jus and lex, right and law, yet they ought
to be distinguished, because right consisteth in
liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas law determineth
and bindeth to one of them: so that law and right
differ as much as obligation and liberty, which in one and the same matter are
inconsistent.
And
because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter)
is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason, and there is
nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his
life against his enemies; it followeth that in such a
condition every man has a right to everything, even to one another's body. And
therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to everything endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong
or wise so ever he be, of living out the time which nature ordinarily allows
men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason: that
every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and
when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of
war. The first branch of which rule contains the first and fundamental law of
nature, which is: to seek peace and follow it. The second, the sum of the right
of nature, which is: by all means we can to defend ourselves.
. . .
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government
Sec. 3. POLITICAL POWER,
then, I take to be a RIGHT of making laws with penalties of death, and
consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property,
and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and
in the defence of the common-wealth from foreign
injury; and all this only for the public good.
CHAP. II.
Of the State of Nature.
Sec. 4. TO understand political
power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all
men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their
actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit,
within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon
the will of any other man.
A state also of
equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having
more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the
same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature,
and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another
without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all
should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and
confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to
dominion and sovereignty.
Sec. 5. This
equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in
itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that
obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe
one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and
charity. His words are,
"The
like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty,
to love others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, must
needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much
at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look
to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to
satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and
the same nature? To have any thing offered them
repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me;
so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others
should shew greater measure of love to me, than they have by me shewed unto
them: my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as
possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of
bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation of equality
between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons
natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no man is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1."
Sec. 6. But
though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a
state of licence: though man in that state have an
uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not
liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but
where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of
nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason,
which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health,
liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent,
and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into
the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose
workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure: and
being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature,
there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us
to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the
inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one,
as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station willfully, so
by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought
he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it
be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends
to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of
another.
Sec. 7. And that all men
may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another,
and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the
peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is,
in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby everyone has a right to
punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its
violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in
this world 'be in vain, if there were no body that in the state of nature had a
power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain
offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may
punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state
of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of
one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, everyone must
needs have a right to do.
Sec. 8. And thus, in the
state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary
power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the
passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute
to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to
his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint:
for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to
another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature,
the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and
common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for
their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tie, which
is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him.
Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of
it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right
he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary,
destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath
transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby
deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the
case, and upon this ground,
EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE
EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.