Modern Social Contract
Theories
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
(1651)
Chapter XVII: Of the
Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Commonwealth
THE final
cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over
others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see
them live in Commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of
a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from
that miserable condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as hath been
shown, to the natural passions of men when there is no visible power to keep
them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their
covenants, and observation of those laws of nature set down in the fourteenth
and fifteenth chapters.
For the laws
of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as
we would be done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause
them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to
partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are
but words and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding
the laws of nature (which every one hath then kept,
when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely), if there be no
power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may
lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men.
And in all places, where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one
another has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law of
nature that the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their honour; and men observed no other laws therein but the laws
of honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving
to men their lives and instruments of husbandry. And as small families did
then; so now do cities and kingdoms, which are but greater families (for their
own security), enlarge their dominions upon all pretences
of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders; endeavour as much as they can to subdue or weaken their neighbours by open force, and secret arts, for want of
other caution, justly; and are remembered for it in after ages with honour.
Nor is it
the joining together of a small number of men that gives them this security;
because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other make the
advantage of strength so great as is sufficient to carry the victory, and
therefore gives encouragement to an invasion. The multitude sufficient to
confide in for our security is not determined by any certain number, but by
comparison with the enemy we fear; and is then sufficient when the odds of the
enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment to determine the event of
war, as to move him to attempt.
And be there
never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to their
particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy,
nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions
concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help,
but hinder one another, and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to
nothing: whereby they are easily, not only subdued by a very few that agree
together, but also, when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each
other for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great multitude
of men to consent in the observation of justice, and other laws of nature,
without a common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose all
mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be, any
civil government or Commonwealth at all, because there would be peace without
subjection.
Nor is it
enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their
life, that they be governed and directed by one judgement for a limited time;
as in one battle, or one war. For though they obtain a victory by their
unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy, yet
afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is
held for an enemy is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and
fall again into a war amongst themselves.
It is true
that certain living creatures, as bees and ants, live sociably one with another
(which are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst political creatures), and
yet have no other direction than their particular judgements and appetites; nor
speech, whereby one of them can signify to another what he thinks expedient for
the common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know why
mankind cannot do the same. To which I answer,
First, that
men are continually in competition for honour and
dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, envy, and hatred, and finally war;
but amongst these not so.
Secondly,
that amongst these creatures the common good differeth
not from the private; and being by nature inclined to their private, they
procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose joy consisteth
in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.
Thirdly,
that these creatures, having not, as man, the use of reason, do not see, nor
think they see, any fault in the administration of their common business:
whereas amongst men there are very many that think themselves wiser and abler
to govern the public better than the rest, and these strive to reform and
innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction
and civil war.
Fourthly,
that these creatures, though they have some use of voice in making known to one
another their desires and other affections, yet they want that art of words by
which some men can represent to others that which is good in the likeness of
evil; and evil, in the likeness of good; and augment or diminish the apparent
greatness of good and evil, discontenting men and troubling their peace at
their pleasure.
Fifthly,
irrational creatures cannot distinguish between injury and damage; and
therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows:
whereas man is then most troublesome when he is most at ease; for then it is
that he loves to show his wisdom, and control the actions of them that govern
the Commonwealth.
Lastly, the
agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men is by covenant only, which
is artificial: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else
required, besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and lasting; which
is a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common
benefit.
The only way
to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion
of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in
such sort as that by their own industry and by the fruits of the earth they may
nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and
strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their
wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to
appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own
and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in
those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit
their wills, every one to his will, and their
judgements to his judgement. This is more than consent, or concord; it is a
real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every
man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this
man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy
right to him, and authorise all his actions in like
manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a
COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great
LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we
owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence.
For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth,
he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror
thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and
mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth
the essence of the Commonwealth; which, to define it, is: one person, of whose
acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made
themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means
of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence.
And he that carryeth this person is called sovereign, and said to have
sovereign power; and every one besides, his subject.
The attaining to this sovereign power is by two ways. One, by natural force: as when a man maketh his children to submit themselves, and their children, to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse; or by war subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter may be called a political Commonwealth, or Commonwealth by Institution; and the former, a Commonwealth by acquisition. And first, I shall speak of a Commonwealth by institution.
John Locke, Second Treatise of
Government (1689)
§87. Man
being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an
uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature,
equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a
power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and
estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and
punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence
deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact,
in his opinion, requires it. But because no political society can be, nor
subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in
order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and
there only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted
this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases
that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by
it. And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded,
the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and
the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for
the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen
between any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and
punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society,
with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern,
who are, and who are not, in political society together. Those who are united
into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to,
with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are
in civil society one with another: but those who have no such common appeal, I
mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no
other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed
it, the perfect state of nature.
Chapter VIII: Of the
Beginning of Political Societies.
§95. MEN
being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one
can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another,
without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his
natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with
other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and
peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their
properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it. This any
number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are
left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men
have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby
presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a
right to act and conclude the rest.
§96. For
when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a
community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act
as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority: for
that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it,
and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is
necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it,
which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or
continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that
united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one
is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see,
that in assemblies, empowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set
by that positive law which empowers them, the act of the majority passes for
the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature
and reason, the power of the whole.
§97. And
thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one
government, puts himself under an obligation, to every one of that society, to
submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else
this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would
signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties
than he was in before in the state of nature. For what appearance would there
be of any compact? what new engagement if he were no farther tied by any
decrees of the society, than he himself thought fit,
and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty, as he
himself had before his compact, or any one else in
the state of nature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it
if he thinks fit.
§98. For if
the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be received as the act of the
whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the consent of every
individual can make anything to be the act of the whole: but such a consent is
next to impossible ever to be had, if we consider the infirmities of health,
and avocations of business, which in a number, though much less than that of a
common-wealth, will necessarily keep many away from the public assembly. To
which if we add the variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests, which
unavoidably happen in all collections of men, the coming into society upon such
terms would be only like Cato’s coming into the theatre, only to go out again.
Such a constitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a shorter
duration, than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was bom in: which cannot be supposed, till we can think, that
rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved:
for where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one
body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again.
§99.
Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community, must be
understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which they unite
into society, to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in
any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to
unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be,
between the individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And thus
that, which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing
but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and
incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did, or
could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social
Contract (1762)
6. The Social Compact
I SUPPOSE
men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their
preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be
greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his
maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can then subsist no longer;
and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence.
But, as men
cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones, they have
no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of
a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. These they have to
bring into play by means of a single motive power, and cause to act in concert.
This sum of
forces can arise only where several persons come together: but, as the force
and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his self-preservation, how
can he pledge them without harming his own interests, and neglecting the care
he owes to himself? This difficulty, in its bearing on my present subject, may
be stated in the following terms:
"The
problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the
whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each,
while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as
free as before." This is the fundamental problem of which the Social
Contract provides the solution.
The clauses
of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest
modification would make them vain and ineffective; so that, although they have
perhaps never been formally set forth, they are everywhere the same and everywhere
tacitly admitted and recognised, until, on the
violation of the social compact, each regains his original rights and resumes
his natural liberty, while losing the conventional liberty in favour of which he renounced it.
These
clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one — the total alienation of
each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community; for, in
the first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same
for all; and, this being so, no one has any interest in making them burdensome
to others.
Moreover,
the alienation being without reserve, the union is as perfect as it can be, and
no associate has anything more to demand: for, if the individuals retained
certain rights, as there would be no common superior to decide between them and
the public, each, being on one point his own judge, would ask to be so on all;
the state of nature would thus continue, and the association would necessarily
become inoperative or tyrannical.
Finally,
each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no
associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over
himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of
force for the preservation of what he has.
If then we
discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that
it reduces itself to the following terms:
"Each
of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction
of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as
an indivisible part of the whole."
At once, in
place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of
association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as
the assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common
identity, its life and its will. This public person, so formed by the union of
all other persons formerly took the name of city, and now takes that of Republic
or body politic; it is called by its
members State when passive. Sovereign
when active, and Power when compared
with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the
name of people, and severally are
called citizens, as sharing in the
sovereign power, and subjects, as
being under the laws of the State. But these terms are often confused and taken
one for another: it is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are
being used with precision.