International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union,
Local 37 v. Boyd
No. 195
Argued January 6, 1954; Decided March 8, 1954
347 U.S. 222
APPEAL
FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of
the Court.
This
is an action by Local 37 of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union and several of its alien members to enjoin the District Director of
Immigration and Naturalization at Seattle from so construing § 212(d)(7) of the
Immigration and Nationality [347 U. S. 223] Act of 1952 * as to treat aliens domiciled in the
continental United States returning from temporary work in Alaska as if they
were aliens entering the United States for the first time. Declaratory relief
to the same effect is also sought. Since petitioners asserted in the
alternative that such a construction of the challenged statute would be
unconstitutional, a three-judge district court was convened. The case came
before it on stipulated facts and issues of law, from which it appeared that
the union has over three thousand members who work every summer in the herring an salmon canneries of Alaska, that some of these are
aliens, and that, if alien workers going to Alaska for the 1953 canning season
were excluded on their return, their "contract and property rights [would]
be jeopardized and forfeited." The District Court entertained the suit,
but dismissed it on the merits. 111 F.Supp. 802. In
our order of October 12, 1953, we postponed the question of jurisdiction to the
hearing on the merits. 346 U.S. 804.
On
this appeal, appellee contends that the District Court should not have reached
the statutory and constitutional questions -- that it should have dismissed the
suit for want of a "case or controversy," for lack of standing on the
union's part to bring this action, because the Attorney General was an
indispensable party, and because habeas corpus is the exclusive method for
judicial inquiry in deportation cases. Since the first objection is conclusive,
there is an end of the matter.
Appellants
in effect asked the District Court to rule that a statute the sanctions of
which had not been set in motion against individuals on whose behalf relief was
[347 U. S. 224] sought, because an occasion for doing so had not arisen, would not
be applied to them if in the future such a contingency should arise. That is
not a lawsuit to enforce a right; it is an endeavor to obtain a court's
assurance that a statute does not govern hypothetical situations that may or
may not make the challenged statute applicable. Determination of the scope and
constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in
the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for
the proper exercise of the judicial function. United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75; see Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U. S. 346, and Alabama State
Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450. Since we do not have on the
record before us a controversy appropriate for adjudication, the judgment of
the District Court must be vacated, with directions to dismiss the complaint.
It is so ordered.
*
This section states that the exclusionary provisions of § 212(a) shall, with
exceptions not here relevant, "be applicable to any alien who shall leave
Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands of the United States,
and who seeks to enter the continental United States. . . ."
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(7).
MR.
JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurs, dissenting.
This
looks to me like the very kind of "case or controversy" courts should
decide. With the abstract principles of law relied on by the majority for
dismissing the case I am not in disagreement. Of course federal courts do not
pass on the meaning or constitutionality of statutes as they might be thought
to govern mere "hypothetical situations. . . ."
Nor should courts entertain such statutory challenges on behalf of persons upon
whom adverse statutory effects are "too remote and abstract an inquiry for
the proper exercise of the judicial function." But, as I read the record,
it shows that judicial action is absolutely essential to save a large group of
wage earners on whose behalf this action is brought from irreparable harm due
to alleged lawless enforcement of a federal statute. My view makes it necessary
for me to set out the facts [347 U. S. 225] with a little more detail than they appear in the Court's opinion.
Every
summer, members of the appellant union go from the west coast of continental
United States to Alaska to work in salmon and herring canneries under
collective bargaining agreements. As the 1953 canning season approached, the
union and its members looked forward to this Alaska employment. A troublesome
question arose, however, on account of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, 66 Stat. 182. Section 212(d)(7) of this new Act has language that, given
one construction, provides that all aliens seeking admission to continental
United States from Alaska, even those previously accepted as permanent United
States residents, shall be examined as if entering from a foreign country with
a view to excluding them on any of the many grounds applicable to aliens
generally. This new law created an acute problem for the union and its numerous
members who were lawful alien residents, since aliens generally can be excluded
from this country for many reasons which would not justify deporting aliens
lawfully residing here. The union and its members insisted on another
construction. They denied that Congress intended to require alien workers to
forfeit their right to live in this country for no reason at all except that
they went to Alaska, territory of the United States, to engage in lawful work
under a lawfully authorized collective bargaining contract. The defendant
immigration officer announced that the union's interpretation was wrong, and
that workers going to Alaska would be subject to examination and exclusion.
This is the controversy.
It
was to test the right of the immigration officer to apply § 212(d)(7) to make
these workers subject to exclusion that this suit was filed by the union and
two of its officers on behalf of themselves and all union members who are
aliens and permanent residents. True, the action [347 U. S. 226] was begun before the union members went to Alaska for the 1953
canning season. But it is not only admitted that the Immigration official
intended to enforce § 212(d)(7) as the union and these workers feared. It is
admitted here that he has since done precisely that. All 1953 alien cannery
workers have actually been subjected to the wearisome routine of immigration
procedure as though they had never lived here. And some of the union members
are evidently about to be denied the right ever to return to their homes on
grounds that could not have been legally applied to them had they stayed in
California or Washington instead of going to Alaska to work for an important
American industry.
Thus,
the threatened injury which the Court dismisses as "remote" and
"hypothetical" has come about. For going to Alaska to engage in
honest employment, many of these workers may lose the home this country once
afforded them. This is a strange penalty to put on productive work. Maybe this
is what Congress meant by passing § 212(d)(7). And maybe, in these times, such
a law would be held constitutional. But even so, can it be that a challenge to
this law on behalf of those whom it hits the hardest is so frivolous that it
should be dismissed for want of a controversy that courts should decide?
Workers threatened with irreparable damages, like others, should have their
cases tried.
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