Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics
(Trans.
W.D. Ross)
Every art and every
inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought
to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been
declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart
from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends
apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to
be better than the activities. Now, as there are many
actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the
end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts
fall under a single capacity- as bridle-making and the
other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall
under the art of riding, and this and every military action
under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet
others- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former
that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether
the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or
something else apart from the activities, as in the case of
the sciences just mentioned.
Book 1, Chapter 2 (I. 2)
If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of
this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of
something else (for at that rate the process would go on to
infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain),
clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not
the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit
upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at
least, to determine what it is, and of which of the
sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to
belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly
the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a
state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up
to what point they should learn them; and we see even the
most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g.
strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the
rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this
science must include those of the others, so that this end
must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same
for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems
at all events something greater and more complete whether to
attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to
attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more
godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states.
These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it
is political science, in one sense of that term.
Book 1, Chapter 3 (I. 3)
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the
subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the
crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science
investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation of
opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by
convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now
men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others
by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in
speaking of such subjects and with such premisses
to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about
things which are only for the most part true and with premisses
of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better.
In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of
statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated
man to look for precision in each class of things just so far
as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand
from a rhetorician scientific proofs.
Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is
a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received
an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a
young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political
science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur
in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will
be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not
knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he
is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does
not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each
successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who
desire and act in accordance with a rational principle
knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit.
These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.
Book 6, Chapter
2 (VI. 2) “Intellectual Virtues”
The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work.
Now there are three things in the soul which control action and truth -- sensation,
reason, desire.
Of these sensation originates no action; this is
plain from the fact that the lower animals have sensation but no share in action.
What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit
and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character
concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the
reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and
the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect
and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not
practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity
respectively (for this is the work of everything intellectual); while of the
part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement
with right desire.
The origin of action -- its efficient, not its final
cause -- is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to
an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or
without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a
combination of intellect and character. Intellect itself, however, moves
nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical; for this
rules the productive intellect, as well, since every one
who makes makes for an end, and that which is made is
not an end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a particular relation,
and the end of a particular operation) -- only that which is done is that; for
good action is an end, and desire aims at this. Hence choice is either
desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire, and such an origin of action is a
man. (It is to be noted that nothing that is past is an object of choice, e.g.
no one chooses to have sacked Troy; for no one deliberates about the past, but
about what is future and capable of being otherwise, while what is past is not
capable of not having taken place; hence Agathon is right in saying
For this alone is lacking even
to God, To make undone things that have once been done.
The work of both the intellectual parts, then, is
truth. Therefore the states that are most strictly those in respect of which
each of these parts will reach truth are the virtues of the two parts.
Book 6, Chapter
3 (VI. 3) “Episteme or Scientific
Knowledge”
Let us begin, then, from the beginning, and discuss these
states once more. Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul
possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e. art,
scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive reason;
we do not include judgement and opinion because in these we may be mistaken.
Now what scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak
exactly and not follow mere similarities, is plain from what follows. We all
suppose that what we know is not even capable of being otherwise; of things capable
of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed outside our observation,
whether they exist or not. Therefore the object of scientific knowledge is of
necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for things that are of necessity in the
unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable. Again, every science is
thought to be capable of being taught, and its object of being learned. And all
teaching starts from what is already known, as we maintain in the Analytics
also; for it proceeds sometimes through induction and sometimes by syllogism.
Now induction is the starting-point which knowledge even of the universal
presupposes, while syllogism proceeds from universals. There are therefore
starting-points from which syllogism proceeds, which are not reached by
syllogism; it is therefore by induction that they are acquired. Scientific knowledge is, then, a state
of capacity to demonstrate, and has the other limiting characteristics which we
specify in the Analytics, for it is when a man believes in a certain way and
the starting-points are known to him that he has scientific knowledge, since if
they are not better known to him than the conclusion, he will have his
knowledge only incidentally.
Let this, then, be taken as our account of scientific
knowledge.
Book 6, Chapter
4 (VI. 4) “Techne or Art/Craft”
In the variable are included both things made and
things done; making and acting are different (for their nature we treat even
the discussions outside our school as reliable); so that the reasoned state of
capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. Hence
too they are not included one in the other; for neither is acting making nor is
making acting. Now since architecture is an art and is essentially a reasoned
state of capacity to make, and there is neither any art that is not such a
state nor any such state that is not an art, art is identical with a state of
capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning. All art is concerned
with coming into being, i.e. with contriving and considering how something may
come into being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin
is in the maker and not in the thing made; for art is concerned neither with
things that are, or come into being, by necessity, nor with things that do so
in accordance with nature (since these have their origin in themselves). Making
and acting being different, art must be a matter of making, not of acting. And
in a sense chance and art are concerned with the same objects; as Agathon says,
'art loves chance and chance loves art'. Art,
then, as has been is a state concerned with making, involving a true course of reasoning,
and lack of art on the contrary is a state concerned with making, involving a
false course of reasoning; both are concerned with the variable.
Book 6, Chapter
5 (VI.5) “Phronesis or Prudence,
Practical Wisdom”
Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the
truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought
to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about
what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about
what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of
thing conduce to the good life in general. This is shown by the fact that we
credit men with practical wisdom in some particular respect when they have
calculated well with a view to some good end which is one of those that are not
the object of any art. It follows that in the general sense also the man who is
capable of deliberating has practical wisdom. Now no one deliberates about
things that are invariable, nor about things that it is impossible for him to
do. Therefore, since scientific knowledge involves demonstration, but there is
no demonstration of things whose first principles are variable (for all such
things might actually be otherwise), and since it is impossible to deliberate
about things that are of necessity, practical
wisdom cannot be scientific knowledge nor art; not science because that
which can be done is capable of being otherwise, not art because action and
making are different kinds of thing. The remaining alternative, then, is that
it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things
that are good or bad for man. For while making has an end other than itself,
action cannot; for good action itself is its end. It is for this reason that we
think Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because they can
see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general; we
consider that those can do this who are good at managing households or states.
(This is why we call temperance (sophrosune) by this name; we imply that it preserves one's
practical wisdom (sozousa tan phronsin).
Now what it preserves is a judgement of the kind
we have described. For it is not any and every judgement that pleasant and
painful objects destroy and pervert, e.g. the judgement that the triangle has
or has not its angles equal to two right angles, but only judgements about what
is to be done. For the originating causes of the things that are done consist
in the end at which they are aimed; but the man who has been ruined by pleasure
or pain forthwith fails to see any such originating cause -- to see that for
the sake of this or because of this he ought to choose and do whatever he
chooses and does; for vice is destructive of the originating cause of action.)
Practical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act
with regard to human goods. But further, while there is such a thing as
excellence in art, there is no such thing as excellence in practical wisdom;
and in art he who errs willingly is preferable, but in practical wisdom, as in
the virtues, he is the reverse. Plainly, then, practical wisdom is a virtue and
not an art. There being two parts of the soul that can follow a course of
reasoning, it must be the virtue of one of the two, i.e. of that part which
forms opinions; for opinion is about the variable and so is practical wisdom.
But yet it is not only a reasoned state; this is shown by the fact that a state
of that sort may forgotten but practical wisdom cannot.
Book 6, Chapter
6 (VI. 6) “Nous or Intuitive Reason”
Scientific knowledge is judgement about things that
are universal and necessary, and the conclusions of demonstration, and all scientific
knowledge, follow from first principles (for scientific knowledge involves
apprehension of a rational ground). This being so, the first principle from
which what is scientifically known follows cannot be an object of scientific
knowledge, of art, or of practical wisdom; for that which can be scientifically
known can be demonstrated, and art and practical wisdom deal with things that
are variable. Nor are these first principles the objects of philosophic wisdom,
for it is a mark of the philosopher to have demonstration about some things.
If, then, the states of mind by which we have truth and are never deceived
about things invariable or even variable are scientific knowledge, practical
wisdom, philosophic wisdom, and intuitive reason, and it cannot be any of the
three (i.e. practical wisdom, scientific knowledge, or philosophic wisdom), the
remaining alternative is that it is intuitive
reason that grasps the first principles.
Book 6, Chapter
7 (VI. 7) “Sophia or Philosophic
Wisdom”
Wisdom (1) in the arts we ascribe to their most finished
exponents, e.g. to Phidias as a sculptor and to Polyclitus as a maker of
portrait-statues, and here we mean nothing by wisdom except excellence in art;
but (2) we think that some people are wise in general, not in some particular
field or in any other limited respect, as Homer says in the Margites,
Him did the gods make neither
a digger nor yet a ploughman
Nor wise in anything else.
Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most
finished of the forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only
know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about
the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with
scientific knowledge -- scientific knowledge of the highest objects which has
received as it were its proper completion.
Of the highest objects, we say; for it would be strange
to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge,
since man is not the best thing in the world. Now if what is healthy or good is
different for men and for fishes, but what is white or straight is always the
same, any one would say that what is wise is the same but what is practically
wise is different; for it is to that which observes well the various matters
concerning itself that one ascribes practical wisdom, and it is to this that
one will entrust such matters. This is why we say that some even of the lower
animals have practical wisdom, viz. those which are found to have a power of
foresight with regard to their own life. It is evident also that philosophic
wisdom and the art of politics cannot be the same; for if the state of mind
concerned with a man's own interests is to be called philosophic wisdom, there
will be many philosophic wisdoms; there will not be one concerned with the good
of all animals (any more than there is one art of medicine for all existing
things), but a different philosophic wisdom about the good of each species.
But if the argument be that man is the best of the
animals, this makes no difference; for there are other things much more divine
in their nature even than man, e.g., most conspicuously, the bodies of which
the heavens are framed. From what has been said it is plain, then, that philosophic wisdom is scientific knowledge,
combined with intuitive reason, of the things that are highest by nature. This
is why we say Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them have philosophic but not
practical wisdom, when we see them ignorant of what is to their own advantage,
and why we say that they know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult,
and divine, but useless; viz. because it is not human goods that they seek.
Practical wisdom on the other hand is concerned with
things human and things about which it is possible to deliberate; for we say
this is above all the work of the man of practical wisdom, to deliberate well,
but no one deliberates about things invariable, nor about things which have not
an end, and that a good that can be brought about by action. The man who is
without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is capable of aiming
in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things attainable by
action. Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only -- it must also
recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is concerned with
particulars. This is why some who do not know, and especially those who have
experience, are more practical than others who know; for if a man knew that
light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did not know which sorts of meat
are light, he would not produce health, but the man who knows that chicken is
wholesome is more likely to produce health.
Now practical wisdom is concerned with action; therefore
one should have both forms of it, or the latter in preference to the former.
But of practical as of philosophic wisdom there must be a controlling kind.
Book 6, Chapter 8 “Politiké or Political Wisdom”
Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same
state of mind, but their essence is not the same. Of the wisdom concerned with
the city, the practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is legislative
wisdom, while that which is related to this as particulars to their universal
is known by the general name 'political wisdom'; this has to do with action and
deliberation, for a decree is a thing to be carried out in the form of an
individual act. This is why the exponents of this art are alone said to 'take
part in politics'; for these alone 'do things' as manual labourers
'do things'.
Practical wisdom also is identified especially with
that form of it which is concerned with a man himself -- with the individual;
and this is known by the general name 'practical wisdom'; of the other kinds
one is called household management, another legislation, the third politics,
and of the latter one part is called deliberative and the other judicial. Now
knowing what is good for oneself will be one kind of knowledge, but it is very
different from the other kinds; and the man who knows and concerns himself with
his own interests is thought to have practical wisdom, while politicians are
thought to be busybodies; hence the word of Euripides,
But how could I be wise,
who might at ease,
Numbered among the army's multitude,
Have had an equal share?
For those who aim too high and do too much.
Those who think thus seek their own good, and consider
that one ought to do so. From this opinion, then, has come the view that such
men have practical wisdom; yet perhaps one's own good cannot exist without
household management, nor without a form of government. Further, how one should
order one's own affairs is not clear and needs inquiry.
What has been said is confirmed by the fact that while
young men become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like
these, it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The
cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with
particulars, which become familiar from experience, but a young man has no
experience, for it is length of time that gives experience; indeed one might
ask this question too, why a boy may become a mathematician, but not a philosopher
or a physicist. It is because the objects of mathematics exist by abstraction,
while the first principles of these other subjects come from experience, and
because young men have no conviction about the latter but merely use the proper
language, while the essence of mathematical objects is plain enough to them?
Further, error in deliberation may be either about the
universal or about the particular; we may fall to know either that all water
that weighs heavy is bad, or that this particular water weighs heavy.
That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is
evident; for it is, as has been said, concerned with the ultimate particular
fact, since the thing to be done is of this nature. It is opposed, then, to
intuitive reason; for intuitive reason is of the limiting premisses, for which
no reason can be given, while practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate
particular, which is the object not of scientific knowledge but of perception
-- not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin
to that by which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a
triangle; for in that direction as well as in that of the major premiss there will be a limit. But this is rather
perception than practical wisdom, though it is another kind of perception than
that of the qualities peculiar to each sense.
Book 6, Chapter 9 “Inquiry or
Investigation and Deliberation”
There is a difference between inquiry (dzetein) and deliberation (bouleuesthai);
for deliberation is inquiry into a particular kind of thing. We must grasp the
nature of excellence in deliberation as well whether it is a form of scientific
knowledge, or opinion, or skill in conjecture, or some other kind of thing.
Scientific knowledge it is not; for men do not inquire about the things they
know about, but good deliberation is a kind of deliberation, and he who
deliberates inquires and calculates. Nor is it skill in conjecture; for this
both involves no reasoning and is something that is quick in its operation,
while men deliberate a long time, and they say that one should carry out
quickly the conclusions of one's deliberation, but should deliberate slowly.
Again, readiness of mind is different from excellence in deliberation; it is a
sort of skill in conjecture. Nor again is excellence in deliberation opinion of
any sort. But since the man who deliberates badly makes a mistake, while he who
deliberates well does so correctly, excellence in deliberation is clearly a
kind of correctness, but neither of knowledge nor of opinion; for there is no
such thing as correctness of knowledge (since there is no such thing as error
of knowledge), and correctness of opinion is truth; and at the same time
everything that is an object of opinion is already determined. But again
excellence in deliberation involves reasoning. The remaining alternative, then,
is that it is correctness of thinking; for this is not yet assertion, since,
while even opinion is not inquiry but has reached the stage of assertion, the
man who is deliberating, whether he does so well or ill, is searching for something
and calculating.
But excellence in deliberation is a certain
correctness of deliberation; hence we must first inquire what deliberation is
and what it is about. And, there being more than one kind of correctness,
plainly excellence in deliberation is not any and every kind; for (1) the
incontinent man and the bad man, if he is clever, will reach as a result of his
calculation what he sets before himself, so that he will have deliberated
correctly, but he will have got for himself a great evil. Now to have
deliberated well is thought to be a good thing; for it is this kind of
correctness of deliberation that is excellence in deliberation, viz. that which
tends to attain what is good. But (2) it is possible to attain even good by a
false syllogism, and to attain what one ought to do but not by the right means,
the middle term being false; so that this too is not yet excellence in
deliberation this state in virtue of which one attains what one ought but not
by the right means. Again (3) it is possible to attain it by long deliberation
while another man attains it quickly. Therefore in the former case we have not
yet got excellence in deliberation, which is rightness with regard to the
expedient -- rightness in respect both of the end, the manner, and the time.
(4) Further it is possible to have deliberated well either in the unqualified
sense or with reference to a particular end. Excellence in deliberation in the
unqualified sense, then, is that which succeeds with reference to what is the
end in the unqualified sense, and excellence in deliberation in a particular
sense is that which succeeds relatively to a particular end. If, then, it is
characteristic of men of practical wisdom to have deliberated well, excellence
in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what conduces to the end of
which practical wisdom is the true apprehension.