Part
Two: Twentieth Century Cases
Already
in Hylton v. United States in 1796, Justice Chase
stated that he was very wary of the power of judicial review and would exercise
it only in a “very clear case.” Over the years, in many different opinions, the
Court has repeatedly stated a reluctance to exercise judicial review if it can
decide a case without doing so. In the 1936 case of Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Justice Brandeis collected many
these statements and organized them into seven general reasons for not
considering the constitutionality of a government action if the case can be
properly decided without doing so. A few years later, in Justice Rutledge’s
opinion of the court in Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court (1947), he made reference to Justice Brandeis’s by then
well-known concurrence. Rutledge said: “The
policy's ultimate foundations, some if not all of which also sustain the
jurisdictional limitation, lie in all that goes to make up the unique place and
character, in our scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for
constitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that function, particularly
in view of possible consequences for others stemming also from constitutional
roots; the comparative finality of those consequences; the consideration due to
the judgment of other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope
of their authority; the necessity, if government is to function
constitutionally, for each to keep within its power, including the courts; the
inherent limitations of the judicial process, arising especially from its
largely negative character and limited resources of enforcement; withal in the
paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our system.” This
reluctance can be noted in the fact that typically less than one-third of the
Court’s written opinions each term rest on considerations of constitutionality
or judicial review.
The
last case I want to refer to, however, gives a different impression. The civil
rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s provoked a tumultuous time in the South.
A number of southern states and their governments simply refused to abide by
the rulings of federal courts, a situation that is strikingly similar to the
one witnessed in Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee. Out of a felt need for a strong reassertion of federal judicial
supremacy, the Court in Cooper v. Aaron
(1958), issued an opinion that was not attributed to
just one justice, as the opinions usually are, but to each of the individual
justices on the Court. Each justice was named as an author. The need for
forceful assertion was reflected later in the opinion by an assertion that some
scholars have called the most extreme claim of the Court’s authority in
American history. The justices, citing the Supremacy Clause and Marbury v. Madison, made the following
argument: (1) The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. (2) It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what that
law it. Therefore, (3) “[i]t follows that the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown [v. Board of Education] case is the supreme law of the land, and
Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States ‘any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’” The
statement seems to amend the very Supremacy Clause the Court was relying upon
in its opinion to make the clause read “the Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States; and all interpretations of the Constitution
which a majority of the members of the Supreme Court agree to at any given time,
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.” “Hard cases make bad law,” is the old
axiom, and the statement in Cooper
that makes the will of a Supreme Court majority the supreme law seems to bear
this out.
©William S Miller