The Second
Treatise of Civil Government
1690
Sec. 4. TO understand
political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what
state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order
their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit,
within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon
the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all
the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another;
there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and
rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of
the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without
subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by
any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him,
by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
Sec. 5.
This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident
in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that
obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe
one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and
charity. His words are,
"The like natural inducement
hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty, to love others than
themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, must needs all have one
measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's
hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any
part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like
desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the same nature? To
have anything offered them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects
grieve them as much as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there
being no reason that others should shew greater measure of love to me, than
they have by me shewed unto them: my desire therefore to be loved of my equals
in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon
me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which
relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what
several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no
man is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1."
Sec. 6.
But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not
a state of license: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to
dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy
himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler
use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of
nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or
possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and
infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the
world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose
workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure: and
being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature,
there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us
to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the
inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one,
as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station willfully, so
by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought
he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it
be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends
to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of
another.
Sec. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading
others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be
observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of
all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into
every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to
punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its
violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in
this world 'be in vain, if there were no body that in the state of nature had a
power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain
offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may
punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state
of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of
one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to
do.
Sec. 8.
And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but
yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in
his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his
own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as
calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression,
which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are
the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we
call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares
himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is
that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and
so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is
to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him.
Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of
it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right
he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary,
destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath
transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby
deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the
case, and upon this ground, EVERY
MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF
NATURE.
An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding
1690
1. Pleasure and pain, simple ideas. Amongst the simple ideas
which we receive both from sensation and reflection, pain and pleasure are two
very considerable ones. For as in the body there is sensation barely in itself,
or accompanied with pain or pleasure, so the thought or perception of the mind
is simply so, or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or
trouble, call it how you please. These, like other simple ideas, cannot be
described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the
simple ideas of the senses, only by experience. For, to define them by the
presence of good or evil, is no otherwise to make them
known to us than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the
several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are
differently applied to or considered by us.
2. Good and evil, what. Things then are good or evil,
only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good, which is apt to cause
or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us
the possession of any other good or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary,
we name that evil which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any
pleasure in us: or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By
pleasure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body or mind, as they are
commonly distinguished; though in truth they be only different constitutions of
the mind, sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body, sometimes by thoughts
of the mind.
3. Our passions moved by good and evil. Pleasure and
pain and that which causes them,- good and evil, are
the hinges on which our passions turn. And if we reflect on ourselves, and
observe how these, under various considerations, operate in us; what
modifications or tempers of mind, what internal sensations (if I may so call
them) they produce in us we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our
passions.
4. Love. Thus any one reflecting upon the thought he
has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him,
has the idea we call love. For when a man declares in autumn when he is eating
them, or in spring when there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but
that the taste of grapes delights him: let an alteration of health or
constitution destroy the delight of their taste, and he then can be said to
love grapes no longer.
5. Hatred. On the contrary, the thought of the pain
which anything present or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call
hatred. Were it my business here to inquire any further than into the bare
ideas of our passions, as they depend on different modifications of pleasure
and pain, I should remark, that our love and hatred of inanimate insensible
beings is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain which we receive from
their use and application any way to our senses, though with their destruction.
But hatred or love, to beings capable of happiness or misery, is often the
uneasiness or delight which we find in ourselves, arising from a consideration
of their very being or happiness. Thus the being and welfare of a man's
children or friends, producing constant delight in him, he is said constantly
to love them. But it suffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred are
but the dispositions of the mind, in respect of pleasure and pain in general,
however caused in us.
6. Desire. The uneasiness a man finds in himself upon
the absence of anything whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight
with it, is that we call desire; which is greater or less, as that uneasiness is
more or less vehement. Where, by the by, it may perhaps be of some use to
remark, that the chief, if not only spur to human industry and action is
uneasiness. For whatsoever good is proposed, if its absence carries no
displeasure or pain with it, if a man be easy and content without it, there is
no desire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no
more but a bare velleity, the term used to signify
the lowest degree of desire, and that which is next to none at all, when there
is so little uneasiness in the absence of anything, that it carries a man no
further than some faint wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous
use of the means to attain it. Desire also is stopped or abated by the opinion
of the impossibility or unattainableness of the good proposed, as far as the
uneasiness is cured or allayed by that consideration. This might carry our
thoughts further, were it seasonable in this place.
7. Joy is a delight of the mind, from the consideration of
the present or assured approaching possession of a good; and we are then
possessed of any good, when we have it so in our power that we can use it when
we please. Thus a man almost starved has joy at the arrival of relief, even
before he has the pleasure of using it: and a father, in whom the very well-being
of his children causes delight, is always, as long as his children are in such
a state, in the possession of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to
have that pleasure.
8. Sorrow is uneasiness in the mind, upon the thought of a
good lost, which might have been enjoyed longer; or the sense of a present
evil.
9. Hope is that pleasure in the mind, which every one finds
in himself, upon the thought of a probable future
enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight him.
10. Fear is an uneasiness of the mind, upon the thought of
future evil likely to befal us.
11. Despair is the thought of the unattainableness of any
good, which works differently in men's minds, sometimes producing uneasiness or
pain, sometimes rest and indolency.
12. Anger is uneasiness or discomposure of the mind, upon
the receipt of any injury, with a present purpose of revenge.
13. Envy is an uneasiness of the mind,
caused by the consideration of a good we desire obtained by one we think should
not have had it before us.
14. What passions all men have. These two last, envy and
anger,not being caused by pain and pleasure simply in
themselves, but having in them some mixed considerations of ourselves and
others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts, of
valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them. But all the
rest, terminating purely in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all
men. For we love, desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we
hate, fear, and grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately. In fine, all these
passions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure
and pain, or to have pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to them. Thus
we extend our hatred usually to the subject (at least, if a sensible or
voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us; because the fear it leaves is a
constant pain: but we do not so constantly love what has done us good; because
pleasure operates not so strongly on us as pain, and because we are not so
ready to have hope it will do so again. But this by the by.
15. Pleasure and pain, what. By pleasure and pain,
delight and uneasiness, I must all along be understood (as I have above
intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatsoever delight or
uneasiness is felt by us, whether arising from any grateful or unacceptable
sensation or reflection.
16. Removal or lessening of either. It is further to be
considered, that, in reference to the passions, the removal or lessening of a
pain is considered, and operates, as a pleasure: and the loss or diminishing of
a pleasure, as a pain.
17. Shame. The passions too have most of them, in most
persons, operations on the body, and cause various changes in it; which not
being always sensible, do not make a necessary part of the idea of each
passion. For shame, which is an uneasiness of the mind upon
the thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the
valued esteem which others have for us, has not always blushing accompanying
it.
18. These instances to show how our ideas of the passions
are got from sensation and reflection. I would not be mistaken here, as if
I meant this as a Discourse of the Passions; they are many more than those I
have here named: and those I have taken notice of would each of them require a
much larger and more accurate discourse. I have only mentioned these here, as
so many instances of modes of pleasure and pain resulting in our minds from
various considerations of good and evil. I might perhaps have instanced in
other modes of pleasure and pain, more simple than these; as the pain of hunger
and thirst, and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them: the pain of
teeth set on edge; the pleasure of music; pain from captious uninstructive
wrangling, and the pleasure of rational conversation with a friend, or of
well-directed study in the search and discovery of truth. But the passions
being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to instance in them,
and show how the ideas we have of them are derived from sensation or
reflection.