National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel
301 U.S. 1, 22-29 (Facts), 29-32 (First. The Scope of the Act), 34-41 (Third.), 41-43 (Fourth), 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937)
[301 U.S. 1, 22] Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the
opinion of the Court.
In a proceeding under the National Labor Relations Act of
19351 the National Labor Relations Board found that the respondent,
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, had violated the act by engaging in
unfair labor practices affecting commerce. The proceeding was instituted by the
Beaver Valley Lodge No. 200, affiliated with the Amalgamated Association of
Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of America, a labor organization. The unfair labor
practices charged were that the corporation was discriminating against members
of the union with regard to hire and tenure of employment, and was coercing and
intimidating its employees in order to interfere with their self-organization.
The discriminatory and coercive action alleged was the discharge of certain
employees.
The National Labor Relations Board, sustaining the charge,
ordered the corporation to cease and desist from such discrimination and
coercion, to offer reinstatement to ten of the employees named, to make good
their losses in pay, and to post for thirty days notices that the corporation
would not discharge or discriminate against members, or those desiring to
become members, of the labor union. As the corporation failed to comply, the
Board petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce the order. The court
denied the petition holding that the order lay beyond the range of federal
power. 83 F.(2d) 998. We granted certiorari. 299 U.S. 534 , 57 S. Ct. 119, 81 L.Ed. 893.
The scheme of the National Labor Relations Act— which is too
long to be quoted in full —may be briefly stated. The first section (29
U.S.C.A. 151) sets forth findings with respect to the injury to commerce
resulting from the denial by employers of the right of employees to organize
and from the refusal of employers to accept the procedure of col- [301 U.S. 1,
23] lective bargaining. There follows a declaration
that it is the policy of the United States to eliminate these causes of
obstruction to the free flow of commerce.2 The act [301 U.S. 1,
24] then defines the terms it uses,
including the terms 'commerce' and 'affecting commerce.' Section
2 (29 U.S.C.A. 152). It creates the National Labor Relations Board and
prescribes its organization. Sections 3-6 (29 U.S.C.A.
153-156). It sets forth the right of employees to self- organization and
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. Section 7 (29 U.S.C.A. 157). It defines 'unfair labor
practices.' Section 8 (29 U.S.C.A. 158). It lays down
rules as to the representation of employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining. Section 9 (29 U.S.C.A. 159). The Board is
empowered to prevent the described unfair labor practices affecting commerce
and the act prescribes the procedure to that end. The Board is authorized to
petition designated courts to secure the enforcement of its order. The findings
of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, are to be conclusive.
If either party on application to the court shows that additional evidence is
material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such
evidence in the hearings before the Board, the court may order the additional
evidence to be taken. Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board may
obtain a review in the designated courts with the same procedure as in the case
of an application by the Board for the enforcement of its order. Section 10 (29 U.S.C.A. 160). The Board has broad powers of
investigation. Section 11 (29 U.S.C.A. 161).
Interference with members of the Board or its agents in the performance of
their duties is punishable by fine and imprisonment. Section
12 (29 U.S.C. A. 162). Nothing in the act is to be construed to
interfere with the right to strike. Section 13 (29 U.S.C.A.
163). There is a separability clause to the
effect that, if any provision of the act or its application to any person or
circumstances shall be held invalid, the remainder of the act or its
application to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected. Section 15 (29 U.S.C.A. 165). The particular provisions
which are involved in the instant case will be considered more in detail in the
course of the discussion.
The procedure in the instant case followed the statute. The
labor union filed with the Board its verified charge. [301 U.S. 1, 25] The Board thereupon issued its complaint
against the respondent, alleging that its action in discharging the employees
in question constituted unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of section 8, subdivisions (1) and (3), and section 2, subdivisions (6)
and (7), of the act. Respondent, appearing specially for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the Board, filed its answer. Respondent
admitted the discharges, but alleged that they were made because of
inefficiency or violation of rules or for other good reasons and were not
ascribable to union membership or activities. As an affirmative defense
respondent challenged the constitutional validity of the statute and its
applicability in the instant case. Notice of hearing was given and respondent
appeared by counsel. The Board first took up the issue of jurisdiction and
evidence was presented by both the Board and the respondent. Respondent then
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and, on denial of that
motion, respondent in accordance with its special appearance withdrew from
further participation in the hearing. The Board received evidence upon the
merits and at its close made its findings and order.
Contesting the ruling of the Board, the respondent argues
(1) that the act is in reality a regulation of labor relations and not of
interstate commerce; (2) that the act can have no application to the
respondent's relations with its production employees because they are not subject
to regulation by the federal government; and (3) that the provisions of the act
violate section 2 of article 3 and the Fifth and Seventh Amendments of the
Constitution of the United States.
The facts as to the nature and scope of the business of the
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation have been found by the Labor Board, and,
so far as they are essential to the determination of this controversy, they are
not in dispute. The Labor Board has found: The corporation is [301 U.S. 1, 26] organized under the laws of Pennsylvania and
has its principal office at Pittsburgh. It is engaged in the business of
manufacturing iron and steel in plants situated in Pittsburgh and nearby
Aliquippa, Pa. It manufactures and distributes a widely diversified line of
steel and pig iron, being the fourth largest producer of steel in the United
States. With its subsidiaries-nineteen in number-it is a completely integrated
enterprise, owning and operating ore, coal and limestone properties, lake and
river transportation facilities and terminal railroads located at its
manufacturing plants. It owns or controls mines in Michigan and Minnesota. It
operates four ore steamships on the Great Lakes, used in the transportation of
ore to its factories. It owns coal mines in Pennsylvania. It operates towboats
and steam barges used in carrying coal to its factories. It owns limestone
properties in various places in Pennsylvania and West Virginia. It owns the
Monongahela connecting railroad which connects the plants of the Pittsburgh
works and forms an interconnection with the Pennsylvania, New York Central and
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad systems. It owns the Aliquippa & Southern
Railroad Company, which connects the Aliquippa works with the Pittsburgh &
Lake Erie, part of the New York Central system. Much of its product is shipped
to its warehouses in Chicago, Detroit, Cincinnati and Memphis,-to the last two
places by means of its own barges and transportation equipment. In Long Island
City, New York, and in New Orleans it operates structural steel fabricating
shops in connection with the warehousing of semi-finished materials sent from
its works. Through one of its wholly-owned subsidiaries it owns, leases, and
operates stores, warehouses, and yards for the distribution of equipment and
supplies for drilling and operating oil and gas wells and for pipe lines,
refineries and pumping stations. It has sales offices in [301 U.S. 1, 27] twenty cities in the United States and a
wholly-owned subsidiary which is devoted exclusively to distributing its product
in Canada. Approximately 75 per cent of its product is shipped out of
Pennsylvania.
Summarizing these operations, the Labor Board concluded that
the works in Pittsburgh and Aliquippa 'might be likened to the heart of a self-contained,
highly integrated body. They draw in the raw materials from Michigan,
Minnesota, West Virginia, Pennsylvania in part through arteries and by means
controlled by the respondent; they transform the materials and then pump them
out to all parts of the nation through the vast mechanism which the respondent
has elaborated.'
To carry on the activities of the entire steel industry,
33,000 men mine ore, 44,000 men mine coal, 4,000 men quarry limestone, 16,000
men manufacture coke, 343,000 men manufacture steel, and 83,000 men transport
its product. Respondent has about 10,000 employees in its Aliquippa plant,
which is located in a community of about 30,000 persons.
Respondent points to evidence that the Aliquippa plant, in
which the discharged, men were employed, contains complete facilities for the
production of finished and semi-finished iron and steel products from raw
materials; that its works consist primarily of a by-product coke plant for the
production of coke; blast furnaces for the production of pig iron; open hearth
furnaces and Bessemer converters for the production of steel; blooming mills
for the reduction of steel ingots into smaller shapes; and a number of
finishing mills such as structural mills, rod mills, wire mills, and the like.
In addition, there are other buildings, structures and equipment, storage
yards, docks and an intra-plant storage system. Respondent's operations at
these works are carried on in two distinct stages, the first being the
conversion of raw materials into pig [301 U.S. 1, 28] iron and the second being
the manufacture of semi-finished and finished iron and steel products; and in
both cases the operations result in substantially changing the character,
utility and value of the materials wrought upon, which is apparent from the
nature and extent of the processes to which they are subjected and which
respondent fully describes. Respondent also directs attention to the fact that
the iron ore which is procured from mines in Minnesota and Michigan and
transported to respondent's plant is stored in stock piles for future use, the
amount of ore in storage varying with the season but usually being enough to
maintain operations from nine to ten months; that the coal which is procured
from the mines of a subsidiary located in Pennsylvania and taken to the plant
at Aliquippa is there, like ore, stored for future use, approximately two to
three months' supply of coal being always on hand; and that the limestone which
is obtained in Pennsylvania and West Virginia is also stored in amounts usually
adequate to run the blast furnaces for a few weeks. Various details of
operation, transportation, and distribution are also mentioned which for the
present purpose it is not necessary to detail.
Practically all the factual evidence in the case, except that which dealt with the nature of respondent's business, concerned its relations with the employees in the Aliquippa plant whose discharge was the subject of the complaint. These employees were active leaders in the labor union. Several were officers and others were leaders of particular groups. Two of the employees were motor inspectors; one was a tractor driver; three were crane operators; one was a washer in the coke plant; and three were laborers. Three other employees were mentioned in the complaint but it was withdrawn as to one of them and no evidence was heard on the action taken with respect to the other two. [301 U.S. 1, 29] While respondent criticizes the evidence and the attitude of the Board, which is described as being hostile toward employers and particularly toward those who insisted upon their constitutional rights, respondent did not take advantage of its opportunity to present evidence to refute that which was offered to show discrimination and coercion. In this situation, the record presents no ground for setting aside the order of the Board so far as the facts pertaining to the circumstances and purpose of the discharge of the employees are concerned. Upon that point it is sufficient to say that the evidence supports the findings of the Board that respondent discharged these men 'because of their union activity and for the purpose of discouraging membership in the union.' We turn to the questions of law which respondent urges in contesting the validity and application of the act.
First. The Scope of the Act.—The act is challenged in its entirety as an attempt to
regulate all industry, thus invading the reserved powers of the States over
their local concerns. It is asserted that the references in the act to
interstate and foreign commerce are colorable at best; that the act is not a
true regulation of such commerce or of matters which directly affect it, but on
the contrary has the fundamental object of placing under the compulsory
supervision of the federal government all industrial labor relations within the
nation. The argument seeks support in the broad words of the preamble (section
13) and in the sweep of the provisions of the act, and it is further
insisted that its legislative history shows an essential universal purpose in
the light of which its scope cannot be limited by either construction or by the
application of the separability clause.
If this conception of terms, intent and consequent
inseparability were sound, the act would necessarily fall [301 U.S. 1, 30] by
reason of the limitation upon the federal power which inheres in the
constitutional grant, as well as because of the explicit reservation of the
Tenth Amendment. Schechter Corporation v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 549 , 550 S., 554, 55
S.Ct. 837, 851, 853, 97 A.L.R. 947. The authority of the federal government may
not be pushed to such an extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the
commerce clause itself establishes, between commerce 'among the several States'
and the internal concerns of a state. That distinction between what is national
and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital to the maintenance of
our federal system. Id.
But we are not at liberty to deny effect to specific
provisions, which Congress has constitutional power to enact, by superimposing
upon them inferences from general legislative declarations of an ambiguous
character, even if found in the same statute. The cardinal principle of
statutory construction is to save and not to destroy. We have repeatedly held
that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it
would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt
that which will save the act. Even to avoid a serious doubt the rule is the
same. Federal Trade Commission v.
American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 307 , 44 S.Ct. 336, 337, 32 A.L.R. 786;
Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S.
375, 390 , 44 S.Ct. 391, 395; Missouri
Pacific R.R. Co., v. Boone, 270 U.S. 466, 472 , 46 S.Ct. 341, 343; Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 , 148,
276 U.S. 594 , 48 S.Ct. 105, 107; Richmond
Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 346 , 48 S.Ct. 194, 198.
We think it clear that the National Labor Relations Act may
be construed so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority.
The jurisdiction conferred upon the Board, and invoked in this instance, is
found in section 10(a), 29 U.S.C.A. 160(a), which provides:
'Sec. 10(a). The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in
section 8 (section 158)) affecting commerce.' [301 U.S. 1, 31] The critical words of this provision,
prescribing the limits of the Board's authority in dealing with the labor
practices, are 'affecting commerce.' The act specifically defines the
'commerce' to which it refers ( section 2(6), 29
U.S.C.A. 152(6):
'The term
'commerce' means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication
among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory
of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign
country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the
District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same State but
through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any
foreign country.'
There can be no question that the commerce thus contemplated
by the act (aside from that within a Territory or the District of Columbia) is
interstate and foreign commerce in the constitutional sense. The act also
defines the term 'affecting commerce' section 2(7), 29 U.S.C.A. 152(7):
'The term
'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or
the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute
burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.'
This definition is one of exclusion as well as inclusion.
The grant of authority to the Board does not purport to extend to the
relationship between all industrial employees and employers. Its terms do not
impose collective bargaining upon all industry regardless of effects upon
interstate or foreign commerce. It purports to reach only what may be deemed to
burden or obstruct that commerce and, thus qualified, it must be construed as
contemplating the exercise of control within constitutional bounds. It is a
familiar principle that acts which directly burden or obstruct interstate or
foreign commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of the congressional
power. Acts having that effect are not [301 U.S. 1, 32] rendered immune because they grow out of
labor disputes. See Texas & N.O.R.
Co. v. Railway & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570 , 50 S.Ct. 427, 433,
434; Schechter Corporation v. United
States, supra, 295 U.S. 495 , at pages 544, 545, 55 S.Ct. 837, 849, 97 A.L.R.
947; Virginian Railway Co. v. System
Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 , 57 S.Ct. 592, decided March 29, 1937. It
is the effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is the
criterion. Second
Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.), 223
U.S. 1, 51, 32 S.Ct. 169, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44. Whether
or not particular action does affect commerce in such a close and intimate
fashion as to be subject to federal control, and hence to lie within the
authority conferred upon the Board, is left by the statute to be determined as
individual cases arise. We are thus to inquire whether in the instant case the
constitutional boundary has been passed.
Second. The Unfair
Labor Practices in Question.—The unfair labor
practices found by the Board are those defined in section 8, subdivisions (1)
and (3). These provide:
'Sec.
8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
'(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 (section 157 of this title). . .
.
'(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.'4 [301 U.S. 1, 33]
Section 8, subdivision (1), refers to section 7, which is as
follows:
'Section
7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.'
Thus, in its present application, the statute goes no
further than to safeguard the right of employees to self-organization and to
select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or other
mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer.
That is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear a right
to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as the
respondent has to organize its business and select its own officers and agents.
Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free exercise of the right of
employees to self-organization and representation is a proper subject for
condemnation by competent legislative authority. Long ago we stated the reason
for labor organizations. We said that they were organized out of the
necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless in dealing
with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the
maintenance of himself and family; that, if the employer refused to pay him the
wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and
resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was essential to give
laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City
Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 , 42
S.Ct. 72, 78, 27 A.L.R. 360. We reiterated these views when we had under
consideration the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577. Fully recognizing
the legality of collective action on the part of employees in [301 U.S. 1,
34] order to safeguard their proper interests, we said that Congress was not required to ignore
this right but could safeguard it. Congress could seek to make appropriate
collective action of employees an instrument of peace rather than of strife. We
said that such collective action would be a mockery if representation were made
futile by interference with freedom of choice. Hence the
prohibition by Congress of interference with the selection of representatives
for the purpose of negotiation and conference between employers and employees,
'instead of being an invasion of the constitutional right of either, was based
on the recognition of the rights of both.' Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Railway & S.S.
Clerks, supra. We have reasserted the same principle in sustaining
the application of the Railway Labor Act as amended in 1934 (45
U.S.C.A. 151 et seq.). Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation, No. 40, supra.
Third. The application of the Act to Employees
Engaged in Production.—The Principle Involved.—Respondent says that,
whatever may be said of employees engaged in interstate commerce, the
industrial relations and activities in the manufacturing department of
respondent's enterprise are not subject to federal regulation. The argument
rests upon the proposition that manufacturing in itself is not commerce. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 , 21 S.,
9 S.Ct. 6; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U.S. 344, 407 , 408 S., 42
S.Ct. 570, 581, 582, 27 A.L.R. 762; Oliver
Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 178 , 43 S.Ct. 526, 529; United Leather Workers' International Union v. Herkert
& Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 465 , 44
S.Ct. 623, 625, 33 A.L.R. 566; Industrial
Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 82 , 45 S.Ct. 403, 407; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,
268 U.S. 295, 310 , 45 S.Ct. 551, 556; Schechter
Corporation v. United States, supra, 295 U.S. 495 , at page 547, 55 S.Ct.
837, 850, 97 A.L.R. 947; Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 , 317 S., 327, 56 S.Ct. 855, 869, 875, 880
The government distinguishes these cases. The various parts
of respondent's enterprise are described as interdependent and as thus
involving 'a great movement of [301 U.S. 1, 35] iron ore, coal and limestone along
well-defined paths to the steel mills, thence through them, and thence in the
form of steel products into the consuming centers of the country-a definite and
well-understood course of business.' It is urged that these activities
constitute a 'stream' or 'flow' of commerce, of which the Aliquippa
manufacturing plant is the focal point, and that industrial strife at that
point would cripple the entire movement. Reference is made to our decision
sustaining the Packers and Stockyards Act.5 Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 , 42
S.Ct. 397, 23 A.L.R. 229. The Court found that the stockyards were but a
'throat' through which the current of commerce flowed and the transactions
which there occurred could not be separated from that movement. Hence the sales
at the stockyards were not regarded as merely local transactions, for, while
they created 'a local change of title,' they did not 'stop the flow,' but
merely changed the private interests in the subject of the current.
Distinguishing the cases which upheld the power of the state to impose a
nondiscriminatory tax upon property which the owner intended to transport to
another state, but which was not in actual transit and was held within the
state subject to the disposition of the owner, the Court remarked: 'The
question, it should be observed, is not with respect to the extent of the power
of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, but whether a particular exercise
of state power in view of its nature and operation must be deemed to be in
conflict with this paramount authority.' Id., 258 U.S. 495 ,
at page 526, 42 S.Ct. 397, 405, 23 A.L.R. 229. See Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 8, 54 S.Ct. 34, 36. Applying the
doctrine of Stafford v. Wallace, supra,
the Court sustained the Grain Futures Act of 19226 with respect to
transactions on the Chicago Board of Trade, although these transactions were
'not in and of themselves interstate commerce.' Congress had found [301 U.S. 1,
36] that they had become 'a constantly
recurring burden and obstruction to that commerce.' Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 32 , 43 S.Ct. 470, 476. Compare Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 69 , 42
S.Ct. 453, 458. See, also, Tagg Bros. &
Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 , 50 S.Ct.
220.
Respondent contends that the instant case presents material
distinctions. Respondent says that the Aliquippa plant is extensive in size and
represents a large investment in buildings, machinery and equipment. The raw
materials which are brought to the plant are delayed for long periods and,
after being subjected to manufacturing processes 'are changed substantially as
to character, utility and value.' The finished products which emerge 'are to a
large extent manufactured without reference to pre-existing orders and
contracts and are entirely different from the raw materials which enter at the
other end.' Hence respondent argues that, 'If importation and exportation in
interstate commerce do not singly transfer purely local activities into the
field of congressional regulation, it should follow that their combination
would not alter the local situation.' Arkadelphia
Milling Co. v. St. Louis, Southwestern R. Co ., 249 U.S. 134, 151 , 39 S.Ct.
237; Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, supra.
We do not find it necessary to determine whether these
features of defendant's business dispose of the asserted analogy to the 'stream
of commerce' cases. The instances in which that metaphor has been used are but
particular, and not exclusive, illustrations of the protective power which the
government invokes in support of the present act. The congressional authority
to protect interstate commerce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to
transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of
interstate or foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions may be due to
injurious action springing from other sources. The fundamental principle is
that the power to regulate commerce is [301 U.S. 1, 37] the power to enact 'all appropriate
legislation' for its 'protection or advancement' (The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 564); to adopt measures 'to promote its
growth and insure its safety' (County of
Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 696 , 697 S.);
'to foster, protect, control, and restrain.' (Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra, 223 U.S. 1 , at page 47, 32 S.Ct. 169, 174, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44). See Texas & N.O.R. Co. v.
Railway & S.S. Clerks, supra. That power is plenary and may be
exerted to protect interstate commerce 'no matter what the source of the
dangers which threaten it.' Second
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 , at page
51, 32 S.Ct. 169, 176, 38 L.R.A.( N.S.) 44; Schechter
Corporation v. United States, supra. Although activities may be intrastate
in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control. Schechter Corporation v. United States,
supra. Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in the
light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace
effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them,
in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government. Id. The question is necessarily one of degree. As the Court said in
Board of Trade of City of Chicago v.
Olsen, supra, 262 U.S. 1 , at page 37, 43 S.Ct. 470, 477, repeating what
had been said in Stafford v. Wallace, supra: 'Whatever amounts to more or less
constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of
interstate commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the
commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and decide the
fact of the danger and to meet it.'
That intrastate activities, by reason of close and intimate
relation to interstate commerce, may fall within federal control is
demonstrated in the case of carriers who [301 U.S. 1, 38] are engaged in both interstate and
intrastate transportation. There federal control has been found essential to
secure the freedom of interstate traffic from interference or unjust
discrimination and to promote the efficiency of the interstate service. The Shreveport Case ( Houston,
E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States), 234 U.S. 342 , 351. 352, 34 S. Ct.
833; Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v.
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 588 , 42 S.Ct. 232, 237, 22
A.L.R. 1086. It is manifest that intrastate rates deal primarily with a local
activity. But in rate making they bear such a close relation to interstate
rates that effective control of the one must embrace some control over the
other. Id. Under the Transportation Act, 1920,7
Congress went so far as to authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to
establish a state-wide level of intrastate rates in order to prevent an unjust
discrimination against interstate commerce. Railroad
Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Co., supra; Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 210 , 211 S., 51 S.Ct. 119, 123. Other illustrations are
found in the broad requirements of the Safety Appliance Act (45 U.S.C.A. 1-10)
and the Hours of Service Act (45 U.S.C.A. 61-64). Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20
, 32 S.Ct. 2; Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U.S. 612 , 31 S.Ct. 621. It
is said that this exercise of federal power has relation to the maintenance of
adequate instrumentalities of interstate commerce. But the agency is not
superior to the commerce which uses it. The protective power extends to the
former because it exists as to the latter.
The close and intimate effect which brings the subject
within the reach of federal power may be due to activities in relation to
productive industry although the industry when separately viewed is local. This
has been abundantly illustrated in the application of the Federal Anti-Trust
Act (15 U.S.C.A. 1-7, 15 note). In the Standard Oil and American Tobacco Cases (Standard Oil Co. v. United States), 221
U.S. 1 , 31 S.Ct. 502, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 834, Ann.Cas.1912D, 734; (United States v. American Tobacco Co.)
221 U.S. 106 , 31 S.Ct. 632), that statute was applied to combinations of
employers engaged in productive industry. [301 U.S. 1, 39] Counsel for the offending corporations
strongly urged that the Sherman Act had no application because the acts
complained of were not acts of interstate or foreign commerce, nor direct and
immediate in their effect on interstate or foreign commerce, but primarily
affected manufacturing and not commerce. 221 U.S. 1, at page 5, 31 S.Ct. 502,
34 L. R.A.(N.S.) 834, Ann.Cas.1912D, 734; 221 U.S. 106
, at page 125, 31 S.Ct. 632. Counsel relied upon the decision in United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1 , 15 S.Ct. 249. The Court stated their
contention as follows: 'That the act, even if the averments of the bill be
true, cannot be constitutionally applied, because to do so would extend the
power of Congress to subject dehors the reach of its authority to regulate commerce, by
enabling that body to deal with mere questions of production of commodities
within the states.' And the Court summarily dismissed the contention in these
words: 'But all the structure upon which this argument proceeds is based upon
the decision in United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 , 15 S.Ct. 249. The view, however, which the
argument takes of that case, and the arguments based upon that view have been
so repeatedly pressed upon this court in connection with the interpretation and
enforcement of the Anti-trust Act, and have been so necessarily and expressly
decided to be unsound as to cause the contentions to be plainly foreclosed and
to require no express notice' ( citing cases). 221
U.S. 1 , at pages 68, 69, 31 S.Ct. 502, 519, 34
L.R.A.(N.S.) 834, Ann.Cas.1912D, 734.
Upon the same principle, the Anti-Trust Act has been applied
to the conduct of employees engaged in production. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 , 28 S.Ct.
301, 13 Ann.Cas. 815; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, supra; Bedford Cut Stone Co.
v. Stone Cutters' Association, 274 U.S. 37 , 47 S.Ct. 522, 54 A.L.R. 791.
See, also, Local 167, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 297 , 54 S.Ct.
396, 398; Schechter Corporation v. United
States, supra. The decisions dealing with the question of that application
illustrate both the principle and its limitation. Thus, in the first Coronado Case, the Court held that
mining was not interstate commerce, that the power of Congress did not extend
to its regulation as such, [301 U.S. 1, 40]
and that it had not been shown that the activities there involved-a
local strike-brought them within the provisions of the Anti-Trust Act,
notwithstanding the broad terms of that statute. A similar conclusion was
reached in United Leather Workers'
International Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., supra, Industrial Association v. United
States, supra, and Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin, 289 U.S.
103, 107 , 53 S.Ct. 549, 550. But in the first Coronado Case the Court also
said that 'if Congress deems certain recurring practices though not really part
of interstate commerce, likely to obstruct, restrain or burden it, it has the
power to subject them to national supervision and restraint.' 259 U.S. 344 , at page 408, 42 S.Ct. 570, 582, 27 A.L.R. 762. And in
the second Coronado Case the Court
ruled that, while the mere reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped
in interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious prevention of its manufacture
or production is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction to that
commerce, nevertheless when the 'intent of those unlawfully preventing the
manufacture or production is shown to be to restrain or control the supply
entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the price of it in interstate
markets, their action is a direct violation of the Anti-Trust Act.' 268 U.S. 295 , at page 310, 45 S.Ct. 551, 556. And the existence of
that intent may be a necessary inference from proof of the direct and
substantial effect produced by the employees' conduct. Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 64 , at page 81, 45 S.Ct. 403, 407. What was absent from the
evidence in the first Coronado Case
appeared in the second and the act was accordingly applied to the mining
employees.
It is thus apparent that the fact that the employees here
concerned were engaged in production is not determinative. The question remains
as to the effect upon interstate commerce of the labor practice involved. In
the Schechter Case, supra, we found
that the effect there was so remote as to be beyond the federal power. To find
'immediacy or directness' there was to find it 'almost [301 U.S. 1, 41] everywhere,' a result inconsistent with the
maintenance of our federal system. In the Carter Case, supra, the Court was of
the opinion that the provisions of the statute relating to production were
invalid upon several grounds,-that there was improper delegation of legislative
power, and that the requirements not only went beyond any sustainable measure
of protection of interstate commerce but were also inconsistent with due
process. These cases are not controlling here.
Fourth. Effects of the Unfair Labor Practice in
Respondent's Enterprise.-Giving full weight to respondent's contention with
respect to a break in the complete continuity of the 'stream of commerce' by
reason of respondent's manufacturing operations, the fact remains that the
stoppage of those operations by industrial strife would have a most serious
effect upon interstate commerce. In view of respondent's far-flung activities,
it is idle to say that the effect would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that
it would be immediate and might be catastrophic. We are asked to shut our eyes
to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal with the question of
direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum. Because there may be but
indirect and remote effects upon interstate commerce in connection with a host
of local enterprises throughout the country, it does not follow that other
industrial activities do not have such a close and intimate relation to
interstate commerce as to make the presence of industrial strife a matter of
the most urgent national concern. When industries organize themselves on a
national scale, making their relation to interstate commerce the dominant
factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor
relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter when
it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences
of industrial war? We have often said that interstate commerce itself is a
practical [301 U.S. 1, 42] conception.
It is equally true that interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a
judgment that does not ignore actual experience.
Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right of employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace. Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of instances. The opinion in the case of Virginia Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, supra, points out that, in the case of carriers, experience has shown that before the amendment, of 1934, of the Railway Labor Act, 'when there was no dispute as to the organizations authorized to represent the employees, and when there was willingness of the employer to meet such representative for a discussion of their grievances, amicable adjustment of differences had generally followed and strikes had been avoided.' That, on the other hand, 'a prolific source of dispute had been the maintenance by the railroads of company unions and the denial by railway management of the authority of representatives chosen by their employees.' The opinion in that case also points to the large measure of success of the labor policy embodied in the Railway Labor Act. But, with respect to the appropriateness of the recognition of self-organization and representation in the promotion of peace, the question is not essentially different in the case of employees in industries of such a character that interstate commerce is put in jeopardy from the case of employees of transportation companies. And of what avail is it to protect the facility of transportation, if interstate commerce is throttled with respect to the commodities to be transported! [301 U.S. 1, 43]
These questions have frequently engaged the attention of
Congress and have been the subject of many inquiries.8 The steel industry is one of the great basic industries of
the United States, with ramifying activities affecting interstate commerce at
every point. The Government aptly refers to the steel strike of 1919-1920 with
its far-reaching consequences.9 The fact that there appears to have
been no major disturbance in that industry in the more recent period did not
dispose of the possibilities of future and like dangers to interstate commerce
which Congress was entitled to foresee and to exercise its protective power to
forestall. It is not necessary again to detail the facts as to respondent's
enterprise. Instead of being beyond the pale, we think that it presents in a
most striking way the close and intimate relation which a manufacturing
industry may have to interstate commerce and we have no doubt that Congress had
constitutional authority to safeguard the right of respondent's employees to
self- organization and freedom in the choice of representatives for collective
bargaining.
Fifth. The Means Which the Act
Employs.-Questions under the Due Process Clause and Other Constitutional Restrictions.
* * * *
Our conclusion is that the order of the Board was within its
competency and that the act is valid as here applied. The judgment of the
Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered.
Reversed and
remanded.
Footnotes
1Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat.
449, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. (29 U.S. C.A. 151 et seq.).
2This section is as follows:
'Section
1. The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to
strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent
or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing
the efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b)
occurring in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or
controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods from
or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in
commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in such volume as
substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into
the channels of commerce.
'The inequality of
bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of
association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in
the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business
depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners
in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and
working conditions within and between industries.
'Experience has
proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and
promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of
industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to
wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of
bargaining power between employers and employees.
'It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.' 29 U.S. C.A. 151.
3See note 2.
4What is quoted above is followed by this
proviso-not here involved-' Provided, That nothing in this Act (chapter), or in
the National Industrial Recovery Act (U.S.C., Supp. VII, title 15, Secs.
701-712), as amended from time to time (sections 701 to 712 of Title 15), or in
any code or agreement approved or prescribed thereunder, or in any other
statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted
by any action defined in this Act (chapter) as an unfair labor practice) to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9(a)
(section 159(a) of this title), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit
covered by such agreement when made.'
542 Stat. 159 (7 U.S.C.A. 181
et seq.).
642 Stat. 998 (7 U.S.C.A. 1-17).
7Sections 416, 422, 41 Stat. 484, 488 (49 U.S.C.A. 13, 15a); Interstate Commerce Act, 13(4), 49 U.S.C.A. 13(4).
8See, for example, Final Report of the Industrial
Commission (1902), vol.19, p. 844; Report of the Anthracite Coal Strike
Commission (1902), Sen.Doc. No. 6, 58th Cong., spec. sess.;
Final Report of Commission on Industrial Relations (1916), Sen.Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st sess., vol. I; National War Labor
Board, Principles and Rules of Procedure (1919), p. 4; Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Bulletin No. 287 (1921), pp. 52-64; History of the Shipbuilding
Labor Adjustment Board, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 283.
9See Investigating Strike in Steel Industries,
Sen.Rep. No. 289, 66th Cong., 1st sess.
MR. JUSTICE VAN
DEVANTER, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, MR. JUSTICE BUTLER, and I are unable to agree
with the decisions just announced.
We conclude that these causes were rightly decided by the
three Circuit Courts of Appeals, and that their judgments should be affirmed.
The opinions there given without dissent are terse, well considered, and sound.
They disclose the meaning ascribed by experienced judges to what this Court has
often declared, and are set out below in full.
Considering the far-reaching import of these decisions, the
departure from what we understand has been consistently ruled here, and the
extraordinary power confirmed to a Board of three,1
the obligation to present our views becomes plain.
The Court, as we think, departs from well-established
principles followed in Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (May, 1935), and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (May, 1936). Upon the
authority of those decisions, the Circuit Courts of Appeals of the Fifth,
Sixth, and Second Circuits in the causes now before us have held the power of
Congress under the commerce clause does not extend to relations between
employers and their employees engaged in manufacture, and therefore the Act
conferred upon the National Labor Relations Board no authority in respect of
matters covered by the questioned orders. In Foster Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Labor Board, 85 F.2d 984, the Circuit
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, held the act inapplicable to manufacture, and
expressed the view that, if so extended, it [301 U. S. 1, 77] would be invalid.
Six District Courts, on the authority of Schechter's and Carter's cases, have
held that the Board has no authority to regulate relations between employers
and employees engaged in local production.a
No decision or judicial opinion to the contrary has been cited, and we find
none. Every consideration brought forward to uphold the act before us was
applicable to support the acts held unconstitutional in causes decided within
two years. And the lower courts rightly deemed them controlling.
By its terms, the Labor Act extends to employers, large and small, unless excluded by definition,2 and declares that if one of these interferes with, restrains, or coerces any employee regarding his labor affiliations, etc., this shall be regarded as unfair labor practice. And a "labor organization" means any organization of any kind or any agency or employee representation committee or plan which exists for the purpose in whole or in part of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, [301 U. S. 1, 78] wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.b
Footnotes
1National Labor Relations Act
(Act of July 5, 1935, c. 372, 49 Stat. 449, U.S.C.Supp.
I, Tit. 29, §§ 151 et seq.).
aStout v. Pratt, 12 F.Supp. 864; Bendix Products Corp. v. Beman,
14 F.Supp. 58; Eagle-Picher Lead Co. v. Madden, 15 F.Supp. 407; Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp. v. Meyers, 15 F.Supp.
915; El Paso Electric Co. v. Elliott,
15 F.Supp. 81; Oberman & Co. v. Pratt, 16
F.Supp. 887.
2 "SEC. 2. (2) The
term 'employer' includes any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States, or any State
or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor
Act, amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when
acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of
such labor organization."
"SEC. 2. (3) The term
'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise,
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or
in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his
home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse."
"SEC. 7. Employees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection."
b"SEC.
2. (5) The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or any
agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work."
"SEC. 3. (a) There is created
a board, to be known as the 'National Labor Relations Board' (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Board'), which shall be composed of three members, who
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. One of the original members shall be appointed for a term of one year,
one for a term of three years, and one for a term of five years, but their
successors shall be appointed for terms of five years each, except that any
individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired
term of the member whom he shall succeed. The President shall designate one
member to serve as chairman of the Board. Any member of the Board may be
removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or
malfeasance in office, but for no other cause."