Plato’s Republic
Book II, 367a to 369b
[Adeimantos is speaking]: The
cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of
the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice --beginning
with the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved
to us, and ending with the men of our own time --no one has
ever blamed injustice or praised justice except with a view to
the glories, honours, and benefits which flow
from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose
the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul, and
invisible to any human or divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a man's soul which he has within him, justice is the greatest
good, and injustice the greatest evil. Had this been the
universal strain, had you sought to persuade us of this from
our youth upwards, we should not have been on the watch to keep
one another from doing wrong, but every one would have been his
own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harbouring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say
that Thrasymachus and others would
seriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating, and
words even stronger than these about justice and injustice, grossly, as I conceive, perverting their true nature. But I speak in this
vehement manner, as I must frankly confess to you, because I
want to hear from you the opposite side; and I would ask you to
show not only the superiority which justice has over injustice,
but what effect they have on the possessor of them which makes
the one to be a good and the other an evil to him. And please,
as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude reputations;
for unless you take away from each of them his true reputation
and add on the false, we shall say that you do not praise
justice, but the appearance of it; we shall think that you are
only exhorting us to keep injustice dark, and that you really
agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is
another's good and the interest of the stronger, and that
injustice is a man's own profit and interest, though injurious
to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is one of
that highest class of goods which are desired indeed for their
results, but in a far greater degree for their own sakes --like sight
or hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural and
not merely conventional good --I would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one point only: I mean the essential good and evil which
justice and injustice work in the possessors of them. Let
others praise justice and censure injustice, magnifying the
rewards and honours of the one and abusing
the other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them, I
am ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your whole life in the consideration of this question, unless I hear the contrary
from your own lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I
say, not only prove to us that justice is better than
injustice, but show what they either of them do to the
possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the
other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.
Socrates -
I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on hearing these words I
was quite delighted, and said: Sons of an illustrious father,
that was not a bad beginning [368a] of the Elegiac verses which the admirer of Glaucon made in honour
of you after you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara:--
'Sons of Ariston,' he sang, 'divine offspring of an
illustrious hero.' The epithet is very appropriate, for there
is something truly divine in being able to argue as you have
done for the superiority of injustice, and remaining
unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you
are not convinced --this I infer from your general character, for had I judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But
now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater is my
difficulty in knowing what to say. For I am in a strait between
two; on the one hand I feel that I am unequal to the task; and
my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you were
not satisfied with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus,
proving, as I thought, the superiority which justice has over
injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help, while breath and
speech remain to me; I am afraid that there would be an impiety
in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting
up a hand in her defence. And therefore I
had best give such help as I can.
Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to
let the question drop, but to proceed in the investigation.
They wanted to arrive at the truth, first, about the nature of
justice and injustice, and secondly, about their relative
advantages. I told them, what I --really thought, that the
enquiry would be of a serious nature, and would require very good eyes.
Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits, I think that we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus; suppose that a
short-sighted person had been asked by some one to read small
letters from a distance; and it occurred to some one else that
they might be found in another place which was larger and in
which the letters were larger --if they were the same and he
could read the larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser
--this would have been thought a rare piece of good fortune.
Very true, said Adeimantus; but how does the
illustration apply to our enquiry?
I will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our enquiry,
is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State.
True, he replied.
And is not a State larger than an individual?
It is.
[369a] Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more easily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into
the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in
the State, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the
greater to the lesser and comparing them.
That, he said, is an excellent proposal.
And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.
I dare say.
When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our
search will be more easily discovered.
Yes, far more easily.
But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I
am inclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore.
I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious
that you should proceed.
Book IV, 427c-d to
445b
But where, amid all this, is justice? son
of Ariston, tell me where. Now that
our city has been made habitable, light a candle and search, and get
your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our
friends to help, and let us see where in it we can discover justice and where
injustice, and in what they differ from one another, and which of them the man
who would be happy should have for his portion, whether seen or unseen by gods
and men.
Socrates - GLAUCON
Nonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise to search
yourself, saying that for you not to help justice in her need would be an
impiety?
I do not deny that I said so, and as you remind me, I will be as good as my
word; but you must join.
We will, he replied.
Well, then, I hope to make the discovery in this way: I mean to begin with the
assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect.
That is most certain.
And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just.
That is likewise clear.
And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not
found will be the residue?
Very good.
[428a] If there were four things, and we were searching for one of them,
wherever it might be, the one sought for might be known to us from the first,
and there would be no further trouble; or we might know the other three first,
and then the fourth would clearly be the one left.
Very true, he said.
And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are also
four in number?
Clearly.
First among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view, and in this
I detect a certain peculiarity.
What is that?
The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in
counsel?
Very true.
And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, but by
knowledge, do men counsel well?
Clearly.
And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?
Of course.
There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge
which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?
Certainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in
carpentering.
Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which
counsels for the best about wooden implements?
Certainly not.
Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots, I said, nor as
possessing any other similar knowledge?
Not by reason of any of them, he said.
Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth;
that would give the city the name of agricultural?
Yes.
Well, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently founded State among
any of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing in the State,
but about the whole, and considers how a State can best deal with itself and
with other States?
There certainly is.
And what is knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked.
It is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and found among those whom we
were just now describing as perfect guardians.
And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of
knowledge?
The name of good in counsel and truly wise.
And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths?
The smiths, he replied, will be far more numerous.
Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name
from the profession of some kind of knowledge?
Much the smallest.
And so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge which
resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole State, being
thus constituted according to nature, will be wise; and this, which has the
only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, [429a] has been ordained by nature
to be of all classes the least.
Most true.
Thus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four
virtues has somehow or other been discovered.
And, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered, he replied.
Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage; and in
what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the State.
How do you mean?
Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will be
thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State's behalf.
No one, he replied, would ever think of any other.
Certainly not.
The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly but their courage
or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the city either
the one or the other.
The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself
which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things
to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them; and
this is what you term courage.
I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think that I
perfectly understand you.
I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.
Salvation of what?
Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law implants through education; and I mean
by the words 'under all circumstances' to intimate that in
pleasure or in pain, or under the influence of desire or fear,
a man preserves, and does not lose this opinion. Shall I give
you an illustration?
If you please.
You know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the true sea-purple, begin by selecting their white colour first; this they prepare and dress
with much care and pains, in order that the white ground may
take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and
whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour, and no washing either with lyes or without them can
take away the bloom. But, when the ground has not been duly
prepared, you will have noticed how poor is the look
either of purple or of any other colour.
Yes, he said; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous appearance.
Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic; we were
contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye
of the laws in perfection, [430a] and the colour
of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was
to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure --mightier
agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye; or by
sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents.
And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in
conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain
to be courage, unless you disagree.
But I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere
uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave --this, in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and
ought to have another name.
Most certainly.
Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe?
Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words 'of a citizen,' you will not be far wrong; --hereafter, if you like, we will carry
the examination further, but at present we are we w seeking not
for courage but justice; and for the purpose of our enquiry we
have said enough.
You are right, he replied.
Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State-first temperance, and
then justice which is the end of our search.
Very true.
Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?
I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight
of; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering temperance first.
Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your request.
Then consider, he said.
Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than
the preceding.
How so? he asked.
Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of 'a
man being his own master' and other traces of the same notion
may be found in language.
No doubt, he said.
There is something ridiculous in the expression 'master of himself'; for the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and
in all these modes of [431a] speaking the same person is
denoted.
Certainly.
The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse
under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; and
this is a term of praise: but when, owing to evil education or
association, the better principle, which is also the smaller,
is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse --in this case
he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled.
Yes, there is reason in that.
And now, I said, look at our newly created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realised;
for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called
master of itself, if the words 'temperance' and 'self-mastery' truly
express the rule of the better part over the worse.
Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true.
Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants,
and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more
numerous class.
Certainly, he said.
Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only
in a few, and those the best born and best educated.
Very true. These two, as you may perceive, have a
place in our State; and the meaner desires of the are held down by the virtuous desires and
wisdom of the few.
That I perceive, he said.
Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a
designation?
Certainly, he replied.
It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?
Yes.
And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?
Undoubtedly.
And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves,
in which class will temperance be found --in the rulers or in
the subjects?
In both, as I should imagine, he replied.
Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?
Why so?
Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the
other valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, [432a]
and runs through all the notes of the scale, and produces a
harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class,
whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or
power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then
may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally
superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both
in states and individuals.
I entirely agree with you.
And so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which
make a state virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what
that was.
The inference is obvious.
The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like
huntsmen, we should surround the cover, and look sharp that
justice does not steal away, and pass out of sight and escape
us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country: watch
therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see
her first, let me know.
Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as
a follower who has just eyes enough to, see what you show him
--that is about as much as I am good for.
Offer up a prayer with me and follow.
I will, but you must show me the way.
Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must push on.
Let us push on.
Here I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and
I believe that the quarry will not escape.
Good news, he said.
Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows.
Why so?
Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was
justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they
have in their hands --that was the way with us --we looked not
at what we were seeking, but at what was far off in the
distance; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her.
What do you mean?
I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of justice, and have failed to recognise
her.
I grow impatient at the length of your exordium.
[433a] Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the
foundation of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which
his nature was best adapted; --now justice is this principle or a part
of it.
Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.
Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others
have said the same to us.
Yes, we said so.
Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?
I cannot, but I should like to be told.
Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are
abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition
of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is
also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three
were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining
one.
That follows of necessity.
If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the
agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the
soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true
nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or
whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in
children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject, --the
quality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and not being a busybody,
would claim the palm --the question is not so easily answered.
Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.
Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage.
Yes, he said.
And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?
Exactly.
Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of
determining suits at law?
Certainly.
And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?
Yes; that is their principle.
Which is a just principle?
Yes.
Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him? [434a]
Very true.
Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a
carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or
their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both,
or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm
would result to the State?
Not much.
But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader,
having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of
his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and
guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the
implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is
trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you
will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this
meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.
Most true.
Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct
classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one
into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be
most justly termed evil-doing?
Precisely.
And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice?
Certainly.
This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary,
and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and
will make the city just.
I agree with you.
We will not, I said, be over-positive as yet; but if, on trial, this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in
the State, there will be no longer any room for doubt; if it be
not verified, we must have a fresh enquiry. First let us
complete the old investigation, which we began, as you remember,
under the impression that, if we could previously examine
justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning
her in the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State,
and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well
that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual --if they agree, we shall
be satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the individual,
we will come back to the State and have another trial of the
theory. [435a] The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will
shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix
in our souls.
That will be in regular course; let us do as you say.
I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are
called the same?
Like, he replied.
The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just State?
He will.
And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the
State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and
qualities of these same classes?
True, he said.
And so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three principles
in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly
described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner?
Certainly, he said.
Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question --whether the soul has these three principles or not?
An easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard
is the good.
Very true, I said; and I do not think that the method which we are
employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question; the true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive
at a solution not below the level of the previous enquiry.
May we not be satisfied with that? he said; --under
the circumstances, I am quite content.
I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied.
Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said.
Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State; and that from
the individual they pass into the State? --how else can they
come there? Take the quality of passion or spirit; --it would
be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, when found in
States, is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to
possess it, e.g. the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the northern nations; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which
is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of
the love of money, which may, with equal truth, [436a] be
attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.
Exactly so, he said.
There is no difficulty in understanding this.
None whatever.
But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we
learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and
with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural
appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each
sort of action --to determine that is the difficulty.
Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty.
Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different.
How can we? he asked.
I replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same
time, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this
contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, we know
that they are really not the same, but different.
Good.
For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the same time in the same part?
Impossible.
Still, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we
should hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a
person to say that one and the same person is in motion and at
rest at the same moment-to such a mode of speech we should
object, and should rather say that one part of him is in motion
while another is at rest.
Very true.
And suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they
spin round with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and
in motion at the same time (and he may say the same of anything
which revolves in the same spot), his objection would not be
admitted by us, because in such cases things are not at rest
and in motion in the same parts of themselves; we should rather
say that they have both an axis and a circumference, and that
the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the perpendicular; and that the circumference goes round. But if, while revolving,
the axis inclines either to the right or left, forwards or
backwards, then in no point of view can they be at rest.
That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.
Then none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe that the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in
relation to the same thing, can act or be acted upon [437a] in
contrary ways.
Certainly not, according to my way of thinking.
Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections, and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume their
absurdity, and go forward on the understanding that hereafter,
if this assumption turn out to be untrue, all the consequences
which follow shall be withdrawn.
Yes, he said, that will be the best way.
Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites,
whether they are regarded as active or passive (for that makes
no difference in the fact of their opposition)?
Yes, he said, they are opposites.
Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and again willing and wishing, --all these you would refer to the
classes already mentioned. You would say --would you not?
--that the soul of him who desires is seeking after the object
of his desires; or that he is drawing to himself the thing
which he wishes to possess: or again, when a person wants anything to
be given him, his mind, longing for the realisation
of his desires, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of
assent, as if he had been asked a question?
Very true.
And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire; should not these be referred to the opposite class of
repulsion and rejection?
Certainly.
Admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular class of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and
thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them?
Let us take that class, he said.
The object of one is food, and of the other drink?
Yes.
And here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything
else; for example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a
word, drink of any particular sort: but if the thirst be
accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold drink; or, if
accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if the thirst be
excessive, then the drink which is desired will be excessive; or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small: but thirst
pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is the
natural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?
Yes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the
simple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.
[438a] But here a confusion may arise; and I should wish to guard against an opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only,
but good drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the
universal object of desire, and thirst being a desire, will
necessarily be thirst after good drink; and the same is true of
every other desire.
Yes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say.
Nevertheless I should still maintain, that of
relatives some have a quality attached to either term of the
relation; others are simple and have their correlatives simple.
I do not know what you mean.
Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?
Certainly.
And the much greater to the much less?
Yes.
And the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the
greater that is to be to the less that is to be?
Certainly, he said.
And so of more and less, and of other correlative terms, such as the double and the half, or again, the heavier and the lighter, the
swifter and the slower; and of hot and cold, and of any other
relatives; --is not this true of all of them?
Yes.
And does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition),
but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of
knowledge; I mean, for example, that the science of
house-building is a kind of knowledge which is defined and
distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed architecture.
Certainly.
Because it has a particular quality which no other has?
Yes.
And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular kind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences?
Yes.
Now, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original meaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning was, that if one term of a relation is taken
alone, the other is taken alone; if one term is qualified, the
other is also qualified. I do not mean to say that relatives may
not be disparate, or that the science of health is healthy, or of disease necessarily diseased, or that the sciences of good and evil are
therefore good and evil; but only that, when the term science
is no longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which
in this case is the nature of health and disease, it becomes
defined, and is hence called not merely science, but the
science of medicine.
I quite understand, and I think as you do.
Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms,
[439a] having clearly a relation --
Yes, thirst is relative to drink.
And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink; but thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good
nor bad, nor of any particular kind of drink, but of drink
only?
Certainly.
Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires only drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it?
That is plain.
And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink, that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him
like a beast to drink; for, as we were saying, the same thing
cannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in
contrary ways about the same.
Impossible.
No more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the bow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes
and the other pulls.
Exactly so, he replied.
And might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink?
Yes, he said, it constantly happens.
And in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something
else forbidding him, which is other and stronger than the
principle which bids him?
I should say so.
And the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which bids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease?
Clearly.
Then we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from one another; the one with which man reasons, we may call the
rational principle of the soul, the other, with which he loves
and hungers and thirsts and feels the flutterings
of any other desire, may be termed the irrational or
appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions?
Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different.
Then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the soul. And what of passion, or spirit?
Is it a third, or akin to one of the preceding?
I should be inclined to say --akin to desire.
Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in
which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the
I have heard the story myself, he said.
The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to
war with desire, as though they were two distinct things.
Yes; that is the meaning, he said.
And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's
desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is
angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the
side of his reason; --but for the passionate or spirited
element to take part with the desires when reason that she
should not be opposed, is a sort of thing which thing which I
believe that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as
I should imagine, in any one else?
Certainly not.
Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he is the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such
as hunger, or cold, or any other pain which the injured person
may inflict upon him --these he deems to be just, and, as I
say, his anger refuses to be excited by them.
True, he said.
But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice;
and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only
the more determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit
will not be quelled until he either slays or is slain; or until
he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason,
bidding his dog bark no more.
The illustration is perfect, he replied; and in our State, as we were
saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the
rulers, who are their shepherds.
I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a further point which I wish you to consider.
What point?
You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind of desire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in
the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the
rational principle.
Most assuredly.
But a further question arises: Is passion different from reason also, or only a kind of reason; in which latter case, instead of three
principles in the soul, there will only be two, the rational
and the concupiscent; or rather, as the State was composed of [441a]
three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors,
so may there not be in the individual soul a third element which
is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by bad education is the
natural auxiliary of reason
Yes, he said, there must be a third.
Yes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to be different from desire, turn out also to be different from reason.
But that is easily proved: --We may observe even in young children that
they are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason, and most of
them late enough.
Excellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals, which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And
we may once more appeal to the words of Homer, which have been
already quoted by us,
He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul, for in this verse Homer
has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the better and worse
to be different from the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it.
Very true, he said.
And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in
the individual, and that they are
three in number.
Exactly.
Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?
Certainly.
Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State constitutes courage in the individual, and that both the State and the
individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues?
Assuredly.
And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in which the State is just?
That follows, of course.
We cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class?
We are not very likely to have forgotten, he said.
We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own
work?
Yes, he said, we must remember that too.
And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited
principle to be the subject and ally?
Certainly.
And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason
with noble words and lessons, and moderating and soothing and
civilizing the wildness of [442a] passion by harmony and
rhythm?
Quite true, he said.
And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know their own functions, will rule over the concupiscent,
which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by
nature most insatiable of gain; over this they will keep
guard, lest, waxing great and strong with the fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the
concupiscent soul, no longer confined to her own sphere, should
attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural-born
subjects, and overturn the whole life of man?
Very true, he said.
Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and the other fighting under
his leader, and courageously executing his commands and
counsels?
True.
And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought
not to fear?
Right, he replied.
And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and which proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to
have a knowledge of what is for the
interest of each of the three parts and of the whole?
Assuredly.
And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason,
and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally
agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel?
Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual.
And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue
of what quality a man will be just.
That is very certain.
And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she the same which we found her to be in the State?
There is no difference in my opinion, he said.
Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few
commonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I
am saying.
What sort of instances do you mean?
If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be
less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of
gold or silver? Would any one deny this?
[443a] No one, he replied.
Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country?
Never.
Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements?
Impossible.
No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonour
his father and mother, or to fall in his religious duties?
No one.
And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether in ruling or being ruled?
Exactly so.
Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such states is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?
Not I, indeed.
Then our dream has been realised; and the suspicion
which we entertained at the beginning of our work of
construction, that some divine power must have conducted us to
a primary form of justice, has now been verified?
Yes, certainly.
And the division of labour which required the
carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be
doing each his own business, and not another's, was a shadow
of justice, and for that reason it was of use?
Clearly.
But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is
the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does
not permit the several elements within him to interfere with
one another, or any of them to do the work of others, --he
sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and
his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together
the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher,
lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals --when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many,
but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted
nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in
a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in
some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and
calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition,
just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it,
wisdom, and [444a] that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.
You have said the exact truth, Socrates.
Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just State, and the nature of justice in each of
them, we should not be telling a falsehood?
Most certainly not.
May we say so, then?
Let us say so.
And now, I said, injustice has to be considered.
Clearly.
Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles --a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of
the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful
authority, which is made by a rebellious subject against a
true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal, --what is all
this confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance and
cowardice and ignorance, and every form of vice?
Exactly so.
And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly,
will also be perfectly clear?
What do you mean? he said.
Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body.
How so? he said.
Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and
that which is unhealthy causes disease.
Yes.
And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?
That is certain.
And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the body; and the
creation of disease is the production of a state of things at
variance with this natural order?
True.
And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and
the creation of injustice the production of a state of things
at variance with the natural order?
Exactly so, he said.
Then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same?
True.
And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?
Assuredly.
Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and injustice has not been answered: [445a] Which
is the more profitable, to be just and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed?
In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We
know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having
all wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when the
very essence of the vital principle is undermined and
corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, if only he be
allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that
he is not to acquire justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice; assuming them both to be such as we have described?