Articles 1, 3 and 4
included here.
(Trans.
Benziger Bros.)
[The
scholastic format of the Summa Theologica or Summary of Theology (or, "Everything
You Ever Wanted to Know about Christian Theology but were Afraid to Ask")
of St. Thomas takes some getting used to. The 3500-page Summa itself is divided into several parts and sub-parts. He then
divides the treatise up into numbered Questions. Each numbered question is then
divided into Articles. Each Article is divided into a series of Objections,
which turn out to be criticisms of the point that Aquinas ultimately wishes to
make, followed by a section headed "On the contrary," which marks the
beginning of the argument for St. Thomas's position. Then follows the "I
answer that" section, which is the key to St. Thomas's argument, and a
series of replies to the initial objections. Focus on the "I answer
that" paragraphs and then look at the Objections and their Replies. The
complete apparatus for Article 1 is included here; the other articles only
present the “On the contrary” and “I answer that” sections.]
We must now consider the various kinds of
law: under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is an eternal law?
(2)
Whether there is a natural law?
(3) Whether there is a human law?
(4) Whether there is a Divine law?
(5) Whether there is one Divine law, or
several?
(6) Whether there is a law of sin?
(1) Whether there is an eternal law?
Objection 1: It would seem that there
is no eternal law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But
there was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be imposed: since God
alone was from eternity. Therefore, no law is eternal.
Objection 2: Further,
promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from
eternity: because there was no one to whom it could be promulgated from
eternity. Therefore, no law can be eternal.
Objection 3: Further, a law
implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal:
for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore, no law is eternal.
On the contrary, Augustine
says (De Libero Arbitrio [On the
Free Choice of the Will] i, 6): "That Law
which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than
unchangeable and eternal."
I answer that, As stated above (Question [90],
Article [1], ad 2; Articles [3], 4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of
practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect [complete] community.
Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was
stated in the FP, Question [22], Articles [1],2, that the whole community of
the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the
government of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature
of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not subject to
time but is eternal, according to Prov.
8:23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.
Reply to Objection 1: Those
things that are not in themselves, exist with God, inasmuch as they are
foreknown and preordained by Him, according to Rm. 4:17: "Who calls those things that are not, as those that
are." Accordingly, the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the
character of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the
government of things foreknown by Him.
Reply to Objection 2:
Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in both ways the
eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine Word and the writing of the
Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the
part of the creature that hears or reads.
Reply to Objection 3: The law
implies order to the end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to
the end; but not passively—that is to say, the law itself is not ordained to
the end—except accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and
to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the
Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself.
Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end.
(3) Whether there is a human law?
On
the contrary,
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the
other temporal, which he calls human.
I answer that, As
stated above (Question [90], Article [1], ad 2), a law is a dictate of the
practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place
in the practical and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from
principles to conclusions, as stated above (De
Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly
we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known
indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the
knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts
of reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general
and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the
more particular determination of certain matters. These particular
determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the
other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above (Question [90],
Articles [2],3,4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "justice
has its source in nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of
their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were
approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law."
Whether there was any need for a Divine law?
On
the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before him, saying (Ps. 118:33): "Set before me for a
law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord."
I
answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the
directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for four reasons.
First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts
in view of his last end. And indeed if man were ordained to no other end than
that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for
man to have any further direction of the part of his reason, besides the
natural law and human law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained
to an end of eternal happiness which is inproportionate
to man's natural faculty, as stated above (Question [5], Article [5]),
therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man
should be directed to his end by a law given by God.
Secondly, because, on account of the
uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters,
different people form different judgments on human
acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that
man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid,
it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by
God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.
Thirdly, because man can make laws in those
matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of
interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and
yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself
aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law
could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was necessary for
this purpose that a Divine law should supervene.
Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i,
5,6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at
doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would
hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human
intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and
unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins
are forbidden.
And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. 118:8, where it is said: "The
law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin;
"converting souls," because it directs not only exterior, but also
interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the
certainty of what is true and right; "giving wisdom to little ones,"
by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.