QUESTION 94. OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
(Trans. Benziger Bros.)
We must now consider the natural
law; concerning which there are six points of inquiry:
(1) What is the natural law?
(2) What are the precepts of the natural law?
(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
(4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?
(5) Whether it is changeable?
(6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?
(I have
included the “Objections” that always begin St. Thomas’s articles of argument
and the “Replies to Objections” that always conclude his articles for the first
point of inquiry or question. In the interest of space, I have omitted them
from the remaining five articles/questions. St. Thomas’s answer to each
question is always included in the “I answer that” portion of the article.)
________________________________________
(1) Whether the natural law is a habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in the soul:
power, habit, and passion." But the natural law is not one of the soul's
powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going through them one
by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit.
Objection 2: Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says that the conscience or "synderesis is the law of our mind"; which can only
apply to the natural law. But the "synderesis"
is a habit, as was shown in the FP, Question [79], Article [12]. Therefore the natural law is a habit.
Objection 3: Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be
shown further on (Article [6]). But man's reason, which the law regards, does
not always think about the natural law. Therefore the
natural law is not an act, but a habit.
On the contrary, Augustine
says (De Bono Conjug.
xxi) that "a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary."
But such is not the natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who
cannot act by it. Therefore the natural law is not a
habit.
I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, properly
and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For it has been
stated above (Question [90], Article [1], ad 2) that the natural law is
something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now
that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for he makes
a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then a habit is that by which
we act, a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially.
Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a
habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And accordingly, since
the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually,
while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural
law may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles
are not the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the
principles the habit of which we possess.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher [Who?] proposes there to
discover the genus of virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle
of action, he mentions only those things which are principles of human acts,
viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in the soul
besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the one
that wills; again, things known are in the knower; moreover
its own natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like.
Reply to Objection 2: "Synderesis"
is said to be the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the
precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human actions.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that the natural law is held
habitually; and this is granted.
To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes a
man is unable to make use of that which is in him habitually, on account of
some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the habit of
science. In like manner, through the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use
the habit of understanding of principles, or the natural law, which is in him
habitually.
(2)
Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?
On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in relation to
practical matters, as the first principles to matters of demonstration. But
there are several first indemonstrable principles. Therefore
there are also several precepts of the natural law.
I answer that, As stated above (Question [91], Article [3]), the precepts
of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of
demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are self-evident
principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in
itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident
in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the subject:
although, to one who knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that
such a proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition,
"Man is a rational being," is, in its very nature, self-evident,
since who says "man," says "a rational being": and yet to
one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it
is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are
universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms
are known to all, as, "Every whole is greater than its part," and,
"Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another." But some
propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of
the terms of such propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is
not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a
place: but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended
universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is
"being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a
man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that "the
same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is based
on the notion of "being" and "not-being": and on this
principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing
that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first
thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is
directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good.
Consequently the first principle of practical reason is
one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all
things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that
"good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All
other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the
practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the
precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a
contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural
inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and
consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects
of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the
order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all
an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common
with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own
being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is
a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to
the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that
pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common
with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to
belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals"
[*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and
so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the
nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural
inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this
respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for
instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to
live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
(3)
Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
On the contrary, Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues are natural." Therefore
virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural law.
I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under the
aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered in their proper
species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all
virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has been stated (Article [2])
that to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according
to his nature. Now each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is
suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat.
Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every
man a natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act
according to virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue are
prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally dictates to
him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in
themselves, i.e. in their proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed
by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature does
not incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found
by men to be conducive to well-living.
(4)
Whether the natural law is the same in all men?
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym.
v, 4): "The natural law is common to all nations."
I answer that, As stated above (Articles [2],3), to the natural law belongs
those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper
to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is
from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys.
i. The speculative reason, however, is differently
situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative
reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be otherwise
than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain
the truth without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with
contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently,
although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to
matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly
then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles
and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the
conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common
notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same
for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and
where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known
to all.
It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether
of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all,
and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative
reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it
is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two
right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions
of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all,
nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and
true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as
a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to
their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a
particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to
restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose
of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the
more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that
goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in
such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the
greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not
right to restore or not to restore.
Consequently we must say that the natural law,
as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to
knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it
were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of
cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it
may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures
subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some
obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by
passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft,
although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong
among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).
(5)
Whether the natural law can be changed?
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural law
dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary according to
time, but remains unchangeable."
I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways.
First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the natural law from
being changed: since many things for the benefit of human life have been added
over and above the natural law, both by the Divine law and by human laws.
Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of
subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law, ceases
to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its
first principles: but in its secondary principles, which, as we have said
(Article [4]), are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first
principles, the natural law is not changed so that what it prescribes be not
right in most cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare
occurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance of such
precepts, as stated above (Article [4]).
(6)
Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess.
ii): "Thy law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself
effaces not." But the law which is written in men's hearts is the natural
law. Therefore the natural law cannot be blotted out.
I answer that, As stated above (Articles
[4],5), there belong to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts,
that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed
precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles.
As to those general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be
blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a
particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the general
principle to a particular point of practice, on account of concupiscence or
some other passion, as stated above (Question [77], Article [2]). But as to the
other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the
human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors
occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt
habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle
states (Rm. i),
were not esteemed sinful.