TINKER v. DES MOINES SCHOOL DIST.
393 U.S. 503 (1969)
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner John F. Tinker, 15 years old, and petitioner
Christopher Eckhardt, 16 years old, attended high schools in Des Moines, Iowa.
Petitioner Mary Beth Tinker, John's sister, was a 13-year-old student in junior
high school.
In December 1965, a group of adults and students in Des
Moines held a meeting at the Eckhardt home. The group determined to publicize
their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce by
wearing black armbands during the holiday season and by fasting on December 16
and New Year's Eve. Petitioners and their parents had previously engaged in similar
activities, and they decided to participate in the program.
The principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of the
plan to wear armbands. On December 14, 1965, they met and adopted a policy that
any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove it, and if he
refused he would be suspended until he returned
without the armband. Petitioners were aware of the regulation that the school
authorities adopted.
On December 16, Mary Beth and Christopher wore black
armbands to their schools. John Tinker wore his armband the next day. They were
all sent home and suspended from school until they would come back without
their armbands. They did not return to school until after the planned period
for wearing armbands had expired - that is, until after New Year's Day.
This complaint was filed in the United States District Court
by petitioners, through their fathers, under 1983 of Title 42 of the United
States Code. It prayed for an injunction restraining the respondent school
officials and the respondent members of the board of directors of the school
district from disciplining the petitioners, and it sought nominal damages.
After an evidentiary hearing the District Court dismissed the complaint. It
upheld [393 U.S. 503, 505] the
constitutionality of the school authorities' action on the ground that it was
reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school discipline. 258 F. Supp.
971 (1966). The court referred to but expressly declined to follow the Fifth
Circuit's holding in a similar case that the wearing of symbols like the
armbands cannot be prohibited unless it "materially and substantially
interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school." Burnside v. Byars, 363
F.2d 744, 749 (1966).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
considered the case en banc. The court was equally
divided, and the District Court's decision was accordingly affirmed, without opinion.
383 F.2d 988 (1967). We granted certiorari. 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
I.
The District Court recognized that the wearing of an armband
for the purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is
within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See West Virginia v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931). Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131 (1966). As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the circumstances
of this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive
conduct by those participating in it. It was closely akin to "pure
speech" [393 U.S. 503, 506] which,
we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the
First Amendment. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); Adderley
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
First Amendment rights, applied in light
of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available
to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for
almost 50 years. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Bartels
v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), this Court, in opinions by Mr. Justice
McReynolds, held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prevents States from forbidding the teaching of a foreign language to young
students. Statutes to this effect, the Court held, unconstitutionally interfere
with the liberty of teacher, student, and parent. See also Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, [393 U.S. 503, 507] 268
U.S. 510 (1925); West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); McCollum
v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952)
(concurring opinion); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Epperson v. Arkansas,
ante, p. 97 (1968).
In West Virginia v. Barnette, supra, this Court held
that under the First Amendment, the student in public school may not be
compelled to salute the flag. Speaking through Mr. Justice Jackson, the Court
said:
"The Fourteenth Amendment, as
now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and
all of its creatures - Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of course,
important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may
not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes." 319 U.S., at 637 .
On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school
officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe
and control conduct in the schools. See Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at
104; Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 402. Our problem lies in the area
where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules
of the school authorities.
II.
The problem posed by the present case does not relate to
regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, [393
U.S. 503, 508] to hair style, or deportment. Cf. Ferrell
v. Dallas Independent School District, 392 F.2d 697 (1968); Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S. W. 538 (1923). It does
not concern aggressive, disruptive action or even group demonstrations. Our
problem involves direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to "pure
speech."
The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners
for a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or
disturbance on the part of petitioners. There is here no evidence whatever of
petitioners' interference, actual or nascent, with the schools' work or of
collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.
Accordingly, this case does not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the
work of the schools or the rights of other students.
Only a few of the 18,000 students in the school system wore
the black armbands. Only five students were suspended for wearing them. There
is no indication that the work of the schools or any class was disrupted.
Outside the classrooms, a few students made hostile remarks to the children
wearing armbands, but there were no threats or acts of violence on school
premises.
The District Court concluded that the action of the school
authorities was reasonable because it was based upon their fear of a
disturbance from the wearing of the armbands. But, in our system,
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome
the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation
may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear.
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates
from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance.
But our Constitution says we must take this risk, Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); and our history says that it is this sort of
hazardous freedom - this kind of openness - that is [393 U.S.
503, 509] the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively
permissive, often disputatious, society.
In order for the State in the person of school officials to
justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.
Certainly where there is no finding and no showing
that engaging in the forbidden conduct would "materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school," the prohibition cannot be sustained. Burnside v. Byars, supra, at 749.
In the present case, the District Court made no such
finding, and our independent examination of the record fails to yield evidence
that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the
armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge
upon the rights of other students. Even an official memorandum prepared after
the suspension that listed the reasons for the ban on wearing the armbands made
no reference to the anticipation of such disruption. [393 U.S.
503, 510]
On the contrary, the action of the school authorities
appears to have been based upon an urgent wish to avoid the controversy which
might result from the expression, even by the silent symbol of armbands, of
opposition to this Nation's part in the conflagration in Vietnam. It is
revealing, in this respect, that the meeting at which the school principals
decided to issue the contested regulation was called in response to a student's
statement to the journalism teacher in one of the schools that he wanted to
write an article on Vietnam and have it published in the school paper. (The
student was dissuaded.)
It is also relevant that the school authorities did not
purport to prohibit the wearing of all symbols of political or controversial
significance. The record shows that students in some of the schools wore
buttons relating to national political campaigns, and some even wore the Iron
Cross, traditionally a symbol of Nazism. The order prohibiting the wearing of
armbands did not extend to these. Instead, a particular
symbol - black armbands worn to exhibit opposition to this Nation's
involvement [393 U.S. 503, 511] in
Vietnam - was singled out for prohibition. Clearly, the prohibition of
expression of one particular opinion, at least without
evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference
with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their
students. Students in school as well as out of school are "persons"
under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the
State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to
the State. In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients
of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined
to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the
absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate
their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views. As
Judge Gewin, speaking for the Fifth Circuit, said,
school officials cannot suppress "expressions of feelings with which they
do not wish to contend." Burnside v. Byars,
supra, at 749.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 402, Mr. Justice
McReynolds expressed this Nation's repudiation of the principle that a State
might so conduct its schools as to "foster a homogeneous people." He
said:
"In order to submerge the
individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into
barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and
training to official guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately
approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the relation between
individual and State were wholly different from those upon which our
institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could
impose such restrictions upon the people of a [393 U.S. 503,
512] State without doing violence to both letter and
spirit of the Constitution."
This principle has been repeated by this Court on numerous
occasions during the intervening years. In Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 , MR.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, speaking for the Court, said:
"`The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools.' Shelton v. Tucker, [ 364 U.S. 479 ,] at 487.
The classroom is peculiarly the `marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of
ideas which discovers truth `out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than
through any kind of authoritative selection.'"
The principle of these cases is not confined to the
supervised and ordained discussion which takes place in the classroom. The
principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students
during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among
those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. 6 This is not only an inevitable part of the
process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational
process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom
hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on [393 U.S. 503, 513] the campus during the
authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects
like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without "materially and
substantially interfer[ing]
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school" and without colliding with the rights of others. Burnside v. Byars, supra, at 749. But conduct by the student, in
class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place,
or type of behavior - materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. Cf. Blackwell v.
Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1966).
Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is
given only to be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact.
Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right could be exercised
only in an area that a benevolent government has provided as a
safe haven for crackpots. The Constitution says that Congress (and the
States) may not abridge the right to free speech. This provision means what it
says. We properly read it to permit reasonable regulation of speech-connected
activities in carefully restricted circumstances. But we do not confine the
permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four
corners of a pamphlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in a school
classroom.
If a regulation were adopted by school officials forbidding
discussion of the Vietnam conflict, or the expression by any student of
opposition to it anywhere on school property except as part of a prescribed
classroom exercise, it would be obvious that the regulation would violate the
constitutional rights of students, at least if it could not be justified by a
showing that the students' activities would materially and substantially
disrupt the work and discipline of the school. Cf. Hammond [393 U.S. 503, 514] v. South Carolina State College,
272 F. Supp. 947 (D.C. S. C. 1967) (orderly protest meeting on state college
campus); Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 613
(D.C. M. D. Ala. 1967) (expulsion of student editor of college newspaper). In
the circumstances of the present case, the prohibition of the silent, passive
"witness of the armbands," as one of the children called it, is no
less offensive to the Constitution's guarantees.
As we have discussed, the record does not demonstrate any
facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast
substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities, and
no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred. These
petitioners merely went about their ordained rounds in school. Their deviation
consisted only in wearing on their sleeve a band of black cloth, not more than
two inches wide. They wore it to exhibit their disapproval of the Vietnam
hostilities and their advocacy of a truce, to make their views known, and, by
their example, to influence others to adopt them. They neither interrupted
school activities nor sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of
others. They caused discussion outside of the classrooms, but no interference
with work and no disorder. In the circumstances, our Constitution does not
permit officials of the State to deny their form of expression.
We express no opinion as to the form of relief which should
be granted, this being a matter for the lower courts to determine. We reverse
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.