Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle
Trans. W.D. Ross
Excerpts relating to happiness and
pleasure.
[I have added some material in brackets or added emphasis by underlining. WSM]
Book
1, Chapter 4: Let us resume our inquiry
and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at
some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is
the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general
agreement; for both the general run of men [the vulgar] and people of superior
refinement [the wise] say that it is happiness, and identify living well
and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they
differ, and the many [the vulgar] do not give the same account as the wise. For
the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from one another— and often
even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is
ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they
admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension.
Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is
self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all
the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to
examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.
* * *
Book
1, Chapter 7: Let us again return
to the good we are seeking [happiness], and ask what it can be. It seems
different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in
strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each? Surely
that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in
strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something else,
and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this that
all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we
do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if there are
more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.
So the argument has
by a different course reached the same point; but we must try to state this
even more clearly. Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose
some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of
something else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is
evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will
be what we are seeking, and if there are more than
one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call that
which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of
pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for
the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both
in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final
without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for
the sake of something else.
Now such a thing
happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for self
and never for the sake of something else, but honour,
pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if
nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose
them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be
happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.
From the point of
view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow; for the final good is
thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which
is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also
for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow
citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit must be set to
this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and
friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this
question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient we now define as
that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such
we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things,
without being counted as one good thing among others—if it were so counted it
would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of
goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the
greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and
self-sufficient, and is the end of action.
Presumably, however,
to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account
of what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first
ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or
an artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity,
the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem
to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner
certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a
function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has
a function, may one lay it
down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this
be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar
to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there
would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the
horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the
element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle
in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one
and exercising thought. And, as 'life of the rational element' also has two
meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for
this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man
is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we
say 'so-and-so-and 'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in
kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all
cases, eminence in respect of goodness being added to the name of the function
(for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good
lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the function
of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of
the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be
the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed
when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this
is the case, human good [happiness] turns out to be activity of soul in
accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance
with the best and most complete.
But we must add 'in a
complete life.' For one swallow does not make a summer, nor
does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed
and happy.
Let this serve as an
outline of the good; for we must presumably first sketch it roughly,
and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that any one is capable
of carrying on and articulating what has once been well outlined, and that time
is a good discoverer or partner in such a work; to which facts the advances of
the arts are due; for any one can add what is lacking. And we must also
remember what has been said before [N.E.
I.3], and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of
things such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate
to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle in
different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is useful for
his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for
he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the same way, then, in all other
matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinated to minor questions.
Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike; it is enough in some cases
that the fact be well established, as in the case of the first principles; the
fact is the primary thing or first principle. Now of first principles we see
some by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and
others too in other ways. But each set of principles we must try to investigate
in the natural way, and we must take pains to state them definitely, since
they have a great influence on what follows. For the beginning is thought to be
more than half of the whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by
it.
Book
2, Chapter 1: [This was part of the first assigned reading in Aristotle earlier
in the semester.] Virtue [excellence],
then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the
main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it
requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of
habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the
word ethos (habit). From this it is
also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing
that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the
stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not
even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can
fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature
behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then,
nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by
nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.
Again, of all the
things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later
exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not
by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary
we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them);
but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of
the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we
learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by
playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing
temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.
This is confirmed by what
happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in
them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it
miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad
one.
Again, it is from the
same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and
destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both
good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding statement is true
of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result
of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no
need of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft.
This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in
our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts
that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or
confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and
feelings of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others
self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the
appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character
[character, hexis]
arise out of like activities [by habit]. This is why the activities we exhibit
must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to
the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we
form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very
great difference, or rather all the difference.
Book
2, Chapter 3: We must take as a
sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that ensues on acts; for the
man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is
temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who
stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or at
least is not pained is brave, while the man who is pained is a coward. For
moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the
pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from
noble ones. Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our
very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the
things that we ought; for this is the right education.
* * *
Book
6, Chapter 2: The virtue [arête] of a thing is relative to its
proper work. Now there are three things in the soul which control action and
truth—sensation, reason, desire.
Of these sensation
originates no action; this is plain from the fact that the lower animals have
sensation but no share in action.
What affirmation and
negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since
moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is
deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire
right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the
former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the
intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and
the bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of
everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual
the good state is truth in agreement with right desire.
The origin of action—its efficient, not its final cause—is choice, and that of
choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot
exist either without reason and intellect or without a
moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a
combination of intellect and character. Intellect itself, however, moves
nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical; for this
rules the productive intellect, as well, since everyone who makes makes for an end, and that which is made is not an end in
the unqualified sense (but only an end in a particular relation, and the end of
a particular operation)—only that which is done is that; for good action is an
end, and desire aims at this. Hence choice is either desiderative reason or
ratiocinative desire, and such an origin of action is a man. (It is to be noted
that nothing that is past is an object of choice, e.g. no one chooses to have
sacked Troy; for no one deliberates about the past, but about what is future
and capable of being otherwise, while what is past is not capable of not having
taken place; hence Agathon is right in saying
For this alone is lacking even to God,
To make undone things that have once been done.
The work of both the
intellectual parts, then, is truth. Therefore the states that are most strictly
those in respect of which each of these parts will reach truth are the virtues
of the two parts.
Book
6, Chapter 5: Regarding practical
wisdom [prudence, phronesis]
we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons
we credit with it. Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of
practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient
for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing
conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the
good life in general. This is shown by the fact that we credit men with
practical wisdom in some particular respect when they have calculated well with
a view to some good end which is one of those that are not the object of any
art. It follows that in the general sense also the man who is capable of
deliberating has practical wisdom. Now no one deliberates about things that are
invariable, nor about things that it is impossible for
him to do. Therefore, since scientific knowledge involves demonstration, but
there is no demonstration of things whose first principles are variable (for
all such things might actually be otherwise), and since it is impossible to
deliberate about things that are of necessity, practical wisdom cannot be
scientific knowledge nor art; not science because that which can be done is
capable of being otherwise, not art because action and making are different
kinds of thing. The remaining alternative, then, is that it is a true and
reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or
bad for man. For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for
good action itself is its end. It is for this reason that we think Pericles and
men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general; we consider
that those can do this who are good at managing households or states. (This is
why we call temperance (sophrosune)
by this name; we imply that it preserves one's practical wisdom (sozousa tan phronsin).
Now what it preserves is a judgment of the kind we have described. For it is
not any and every judgment that pleasant and painful objects destroy and
pervert, e.g. the judgment that the triangle has or has not its angles equal to
two right angles, but only judgments about what is to be done. For the
originating causes of the things that are done consist in the end at which they
are aimed; but the man who has been ruined by pleasure or pain forthwith fails
to see any such originating cause—to see that for the sake of this or because
of this he ought to choose and do whatever he chooses and does; for vice is
destructive of the originating cause of action.) Practical wisdom, then, must
be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods. But
further, while there is such a thing as excellence in art, there is no such
thing as excellence in practical wisdom; and in art he who errs willingly is
preferable, but in practical wisdom, as in the virtues, he is the reverse.
Plainly, then, practical wisdom is a virtue and not an art. There being two
parts of the soul that can follow a course of reasoning, it must be the virtue
of one of the two, i.e. of that part which forms opinions; for opinion is about
the variable and so is practical wisdom. But yet it is not only a reasoned
state; this is shown by the fact that a state of that sort may forgotten but
practical wisdom cannot.
Book
10, Chapter 1: After these matters
we ought perhaps next to discuss pleasure. For it is
thought to be most intimately connected with our human nature, which is the
reason why in educating the young we steer them by the rudders of pleasure and
pain; it is thought, too, that to enjoy the things we ought and to hate the
things we ought has the greatest bearing on virtue of character. For these
things extend right through life, with a weight and power of their own in
respect both to virtue and to the happy life, since men choose what is pleasant
and avoid what is painful; and such things, it will be thought, we should least
of all omit to discuss, especially since they admit of much dispute. For some
say pleasure is the good, while others, on the contrary, say it is thoroughly
bad—some no doubt being persuaded that the facts are so, and others thinking it
has a better effect on our life to exhibit pleasure as a bad thing even if it
is not; for most people (they think) incline towards it and are the slaves of
their pleasures, for which reason they ought to lead them in the opposite
direction, since thus they will reach the middle state. But surely this is not
correct. For arguments about matters concerned with feelings and actions are
less reliable than facts: and so when they clash with the facts of perception
they are despised, and discredit the truth as well; if a man who runs down
pleasure is once seen to be aiming at it, his inclining towards it is thought
to imply that it is all worthy of being aimed at; for most people are not good
at drawing distinctions. True arguments seem, then, most useful, not only with
a view to knowledge, but with a view to life also; for since they harmonize
with the facts they are believed, and so they stimulate those who understand
them to live according to them. Enough of such questions; let us proceed to
review the opinions that have been expressed about pleasure.
[In
chapter 2 he critiques the view of Greek philosopher Eudoxos
that pleasure is the good, and in chapter 3 he critiques the view that pleasure
is evil.]
Book
10, Chapter 4: What pleasure is, or
what kind of thing it is, will become plainer if we take up the question again
from the beginning. Seeing seems to be at any moment complete, for it does not
lack anything which coming into being later will complete its form; and
pleasure also seems to be of this nature. For it is a whole, and at no time can
one find a pleasure whose form will be completed if the pleasure lasts longer.
For this reason, too, it is not a movement. For every movement (e.g. that of
building) takes time and is for the sake of an end, and is complete when it has
made what it aims at. It is complete, therefore, only in the whole time or at
that final moment. In their parts and during the time they occupy, all
movements are incomplete, and are different in kind from the whole movement and
from each other. For the fitting together of the stones is different from the
fluting of the column, and these are both different from the making of the
temple; and the making of the temple is complete (for it lacks nothing with a
view to the end proposed), but the making of the base or of the triglyph is incomplete; for each is the making of only a
part. They differ in kind, then, and it is not possible to find at any and
every time a movement complete in form, but if at all, only in the whole time. So, too, in the case of walking and all other movements. For
if locomotion is a movement from to there, it, too, has differences in
kind—flying, walking, leaping, and so on. And not only
so, but in walking itself there are such differences; for the whence and
whither are not the same in the whole racecourse and in a part of it, nor in
one part and in another, nor is it the same thing to traverse this line and
that; for one traverses not only a line but one which is in a place, and this
one is in a different place from that. We have discussed movement with
precision in another work, but it seems that it is not complete at any and
every time, but that the many movements are incomplete and different in kind,
since the whence and whither give them their form. But of pleasure the form is
complete at any and every time. Plainly, then, pleasure and movement must be
different from each other, and pleasure must be one of the things that are
whole and complete. This would seem to be the case, too, from the fact that it
is not possible to move otherwise than in time, but it is possible to be
pleased; for that which takes place in a moment is a whole.
From these
considerations it is clear, too, that these thinkers
are not right in saying there is a movement or a coming into being of pleasure.
For these cannot be ascribed to all things, but only to those that are
divisible and not wholes; there is no coming into being of seeing nor of a
point nor of a unit, nor is any of these a movement or coming into being;
therefore there is no movement or coming into being of pleasure either; for it
is a whole.
Since every sense is
active in relation to its object, and a sense which is in good condition acts
perfectly in relation to the most beautiful of its objects (for perfect
activity seems to be ideally of this nature; whether we say that it is active,
or the organ in which it resides, may be assumed to be immaterial), it follows
that in the case of each sense the best activity is that of the
best-conditioned organ in relation to the finest of its objects. And this
activity will be the most complete and pleasant. For, while there is pleasure
in respect of any sense, and in respect of thought and
contemplation no less, the most complete is pleasantest, and that of a
well-conditioned organ in relation to the worthiest of its objects is the most
complete; and the pleasure completes the activity. But the pleasure does not
complete it in the same way as the combination of object and sense, both good,
just as health and the doctor are not in the same way the cause of a man's
being healthy. (That pleasure is produced in respect to each sense is plain;
for we speak of sights and sounds as pleasant. It is also plain that it arises
most of all when both the sense is at its best and it is active in reference to
an object which corresponds; when both object and perceiver are of the best
there will always be pleasure, since the requisite agent and patient are both
present.) Pleasure completes the activity not as the corresponding permanent
state does, by its immanence, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of
youth does on those in the flower of their age. So long, then, as both the
intelligible or sensible object and the discriminating or contemplative faculty
are as they should be, the pleasure will be involved in the activity; for when
both the passive and the active factor are unchanged and are related to each
other in the same way, the same result naturally follows.
How, then, is it that
no one is continuously pleased? Is it that we grow weary? Certainly all human beings
are incapable of continuous activity. Therefore pleasure also is not
continuous; for it accompanies activity. Some things delight us when they are
new, but later do so less, for the same reason; for at first the mind is in a
state of stimulation and intensely active about them, as people are with
respect to their vision when they look hard at a thing, but afterwards our
activity is not of this kind, but has grown relaxed; for which reason the
pleasure also is dulled.
One might think that
all men desire pleasure because they all aim at life; life is an activity, and
each man is active about those things and with those faculties that he loves
most; e.g. the musician is active with his hearing in reference to tunes, the
student with his mind in reference to theoretical questions, and so on in each
case; now pleasure completes the activities, and therefore life, which they
desire. It is with good reason, then, that they aim at pleasure too, since for
everyone it completes life, which is desirable. But whether we choose life for
the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life is a question we may
dismiss for the present. For they seem to be bound up together and not to admit
of separation, since without activity pleasure does not arise, and every activity
is completed by the attendant pleasure.