Principal
Doctrines
Epicurus
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The “Principal Doctrines”
(also sometimes translated under the title “Sovran Maxims”) are a collection of
forty quotes from the writings of Epicurus that serve as a handy summary of his
ethical theory:
1. A blessed and
indestructible being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any
other being; so he is free from anger and partiality,
for all such things imply weakness.
2. Death is nothing to us;
for that which has been dissolved into its elements experiences no sensations,
and that which has no sensation is nothing to us.
3. The magnitude of pleasure reaches its
limit in the removal of all pain. When such pleasure is present, so long as it
is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both
together.
4. Continuous bodily pain
does not last long; instead, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time,
and even that degree of pain which slightly exceeds bodily pleasure does not
last for many days at once. Diseases of long duration allow an excess of bodily
pleasure over pain.
5. It is impossible to live a
pleasant life without living wisely and honorably and justly, and it is
impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly without living pleasantly.
Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able
to live wisely, though he lives honorably and justly, it is impossible for him
to live a pleasant life.
6. In order to obtain protection from other
men, any means for attaining this end is a natural good.
7. Some men want fame and
status, thinking that they would thus make themselves secure against other men.
If the life of such men really were secure, they have attained a natural good;
if, however, it is insecure, they have not attained the end which by nature's
own prompting they originally sought.
8. No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but the
things which produce certain pleasures entail disturbances many times greater
than the pleasures themselves.
9. If every pleasure had been
capable of accumulation, not only over time but also over the entire body or at
least over the principal parts of our nature, then pleasures would never differ
from one another.
10. If the things that
produce the pleasures of profligate men really freed them from fears of the
mind concerning celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, and the
fear of pain; if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should
never have any fault to find with such persons, for they would then be filled
with pleasures from every source and would never have pain of body or mind,
which is what is bad.
11. If we had never been
troubled by celestial and atmospheric phenomena, nor by fears about death, nor
by our ignorance of the limits of pains and desires, we should have had no need
of natural science.
12. It is impossible for
someone to dispel his fears about the most important matters if he does not
know the nature of the universe but still gives some credence to myths. So without the study of nature there is no enjoyment of pure
pleasure.
13. There is no advantage to
obtaining protection from other men so long as we are alarmed by events above
or below the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe.
14. Protection from other men, secured to some extent
by the power to expel and by material prosperity, in its purest form comes from
a quiet life withdrawn from the multitude.
15. The wealth required by
nature is limited and is easy to procure; but the wealth required by vain
ideals extends to infinity.
16. Chance seldom interferes
with the wise man; his greatest and highest interests have been, are, and will
be, directed by reason throughout his whole life.
17. The just man is most free
from disturbance, while the unjust
is full of the utmost disturbance.
18. Bodily pleasure does not
increase when the pain of want has been removed; after that it only admits of
variation. The limit of mental pleasure, however, is reached when we reflect on
these bodily pleasures and their related emotions, which used to cause the mind
the greatest alarms.
19. Unlimited time and
limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we
measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.
20. The flesh receives as
unlimited the limits of pleasure; and to provide it requires unlimited time.
But the mind, intellectually grasping what the end and limit of the flesh is,
and banishing the terrors of the future, procures a complete and perfect life,
and we have no longer any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless
the mind does not shun pleasure, and even when circumstances make death
imminent, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.
21. He who understands the
limits of life knows that it is easy to obtain that which removes the pain of
want and makes the whole of life complete and perfect. Thus
he has no longer any need of things which involve struggle.
22. We must consider both the
ultimate end and all clear sensory evidence, to which we refer our opinions;
for otherwise everything will be full of uncertainty and confusion.
23. If you fight against all
your sensations, you will have no standard to which to refer, and thus no means
of judging even those sensations which you claim are false.
24. If you reject absolutely
any single sensation without stopping to distinguish between opinion about
things awaiting confirmation and that which is already confirmed to be present,
whether in sensation or in feelings or in any application of intellect to the
presentations, you will confuse the rest of your sensations by your groundless
opinion and so you will reject every standard of truth. If in your ideas based
upon opinion you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as
that which does not, you will not avoid error, as you will be maintaining the
entire basis for doubt in every judgment between correct and incorrect opinion.
25. If you do not on every
occasion refer each of your actions to the ultimate end prescribed by nature, but
instead of this in the act of choice or avoidance turn to some other end, your
actions will not be consistent with your theories.
26. All desires that do not
lead to pain when they remain unsatisfied are unnecessary, but the desire is
easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to obtain or the desires
seem likely to produce harm.
27. Of all the means which
wisdom acquires to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the
most important is friendship.
28. The same conviction which
inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long
duration, also enables us to see that in the limited evils of this life nothing
enhances our security so much as friendship.
29. Of our desires some are
natural and necessary, others are natural but not necessary; and others are
neither natural nor necessary, but are due to
groundless opinion.
30. Those natural desires
which entail no pain when unsatisfied, though pursued with an intense effort,
are also due to groundless opinion; and it is not because of their own nature
they are not got rid of but because of man's groundless opinions.
31. Natural justice is a pledge of reciprocal benefit,
to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.
32. Those animals which are incapable of making
binding agreements with one another not to inflict nor suffer harm are without
either justice or injustice; and likewise for those peoples who either could
not or would not form binding agreements not to inflict nor suffer harm.
33. There never was such a thing as absolute justice,
but only agreements made in mutual dealings among men in whatever places at
various times providing against the infliction or suffering of harm.
34. Injustice is not an evil in
itself, but only in consequence of the fear which is associated with the
apprehension of being discovered by those appointed to punish such actions.
35. It is impossible for a
man who secretly violates the terms of the agreement not to harm or be harmed
to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already
escaped ten thousand times; for until his death he is never sure that he will
not be detected.
36. In general justice is the same for
all, for it is something found mutually beneficial in men's dealings, but in
its application to particular places or other
circumstances the same thing is not necessarily just for everyone.
37. Among the things held to
be just by law,
whatever is proved to be of advantage in men's dealings has the stamp of
justice, whether or not it be the same for all; but if a man makes a law and it
does not prove to be mutually advantageous, then this is no longer just. And if
what is mutually advantageous varies and only for a time corresponds to our
concept of justice, nevertheless for that time it is just for those who do not
trouble themselves about empty words but look simply at the facts.
38. Where without any change
in circumstances the things held to be just by law are seen not to correspond with the
concept of justice in actual practice, such laws are not really just; but
wherever the laws have ceased to be advantageous because of a change in
circumstances, in that case the laws were for that time just when they were advantageous for the
mutual dealings of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they
were no longer advantageous.
39. The man who best knows
how to meet external threats makes into one family all the creatures he can;
and those he cannot, he at any rate does not treat as aliens; and where he
finds even this impossible, he avoids all dealings, and, so far as is
advantageous, excludes them from his life.
40. Those who possess the
power to defend themselves against threats by their neighbors, being thus in
possession of the surest guarantee of security, live the most pleasant life
with one another; and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy is such that if
one of them dies prematurely, the others do not lament his death as though it
called for pity.