Classical (Aristotle) and Stoic Cosmology and Ontology
Excerpts from
Aristotle, Cicero, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius
Aristotle (384-322
B.C.) The four causes, from Physics (Hardie and Gaye translation) References are to book and
sections.
II.3. Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a thing till they
have grasped the 'why' of it (which is to grasp its
primary cause). So clearly we too must do this as regards
both coming to be and passing away and every kind of physical
change, in order that, knowing their principles, we may try to refer to these principles each of our problems.
In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called 'cause', e.g.
the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the
genera of which the bronze and the silver are species.
In another sense (2) the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence, and its genera, are called 'causes' (e.g. of the
octave the relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the
parts in the definition.
Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g. the man
who gave advice is a cause, the father is cause of the child,
and generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of what
is changed.
Again (4) in the sense of end or 'that for the sake of which' a thing is
done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about. ('Why is he walking about?' we say. 'To be healthy',
and, having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) The same
is true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through
the action of something else as means towards the end, e.g. reduction of
flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means towards health.
All these things are 'for the sake of' the end, though they differ from
one another in that some are activities, others instruments.
This then perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term 'cause' is used.
As the word has several senses, it follows that there are several causes
of the same thing (not merely in virtue of a concomitant attribute), e.g.
both the art of the sculptor and the bronze are causes of the statue. These are causes of the statue qua statue, not in virtue of
anything else that it may be-only not in the same way, the one being the
material cause, the other the cause whence the motion comes. Some things
cause each other reciprocally, e.g. hard work causes fitness and vice
versa, but again not in the same way, but the one as end, the other as the
origin of change. Further the same thing is the cause of contrary results.
For that which by its presence brings about one result is sometimes blamed
for bringing about the contrary by its absence. Thus we ascribe the wreck
of a ship to the absence of the pilot whose presence was the cause of
its safety.
All the causes now mentioned fall into four familiar divisions. The
letters are the causes of syllables, the material of artificial
products, fire, &c., of bodies, the parts of the whole, and the premisses of the conclusion, in the sense of 'that
from which'. Of these pairs the one set are causes in the sense of
substratum, e.g. the parts, the other set in the sense of essence-the
whole and the combination and the form. But the seed and the doctor and the
adviser, and generally the maker, are all sources whence the change or
stationariness originates, while the others are causes in the sense of the
end or the good of the rest; for 'that for the sake of which' means what
is best and the end of the things that lead up to it. (Whether we say the
'good itself or the 'apparent good' makes no difference.)
Such then is the number and nature of the kinds of cause.
Now the modes of causation are many, though when brought
under heads they too can be reduced in number. For 'cause' is used in many senses and even within the
same kind one may be prior to another (e.g. the doctor and the expert are
causes of health, the relation 2:1 and number of the octave), and always
what is inclusive to what is particular. Another mode of causation is the
incidental and its genera, e.g. in one way 'Polyclitus', in another
'sculptor' is the cause of a statue, because 'being Polyclitus' and
'sculptor' are incidentally conjoined. Also the classes in which the incidental attribute is
included; thus 'a man' could be said to be the cause of a statue or,
generally, 'a living creature'. An incidental attribute too may be
more or less remote, e.g. suppose that 'a pale man' or 'a musical man'
were said to be the cause of the statue.
All causes, both proper and incidental, may be spoken of either as
potential or as actual; e.g. the cause of a house being built is
either 'house-builder' or 'house-builder building'. . . .
II.8. We must explain then (1) that
Nature belongs to the class of causes which act for the
sake of something; (2) about the necessary and its place in
physical problems, for all writers ascribe things to this cause, arguing that since the hot and the cold, &c., are of such and such a
kind, therefore certain things necessarily are and come to
be-and if they mention any other cause (one his
'friendship and strife', another his 'mind'), it is only to
touch on it, and then good-bye to it.
A difficulty presents itself: why should not nature work, not for the sake of something, nor because it is
better so, but just as the sky rains, not in order to make
the corn grow, but of necessity? What is drawn up must
cool, and what has been cooled must become water and descend, the result of this being that the corn grows. Similarly if a man's
crop is spoiled on the threshing-floor, the rain did not
fall for the sake of this-in order that the crop might be
spoiled-but that result just followed. Why then should it
not be the same with the parts in nature, e.g. that our teeth
should come up of necessity-the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food-since they
did not arise for this end, but it was merely a coincident
result; and so with all other parts in which we suppose
that there is purpose? Wherever then all the parts came
about just what they would have been if they had come be
for an end, such things survived, being organized spontaneously in a fitting way; whereas those which grew otherwise perished and
continue to perish, as Empedocles says his 'man-faced
ox-progeny' did.
Such are the arguments (and others of the kind) which may cause difficulty on this point. Yet it is impossible that this should be
the true view. For teeth and all other natural things
either invariably or normally come about in a given way;
but of not one of the results of chance or spontaneity is
this true. We do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence the
frequency of rain in winter, but frequent rain in summer we do; nor heat in the dog-days, but only if we have it in winter. If then,
it is agreed that things are either the
result of coincidence or for an end, and these cannot be
the result of coincidence or spontaneity, it follows that
they must be for an end; and that such things are all due to nature even the champions of the theory which is before us would agree.
Therefore action for an end is present in things which
come to be and are by nature.
Further, where a series has a completion, all the preceding steps are for the sake of that. Now surely as in intelligent action, so
in nature; and as in nature, so it is in each action, if
nothing interferes. Now intelligent action is for the sake
of an end; therefore the nature of things also is so. Thus
if a house, e.g. had been a thing made by nature, it would have been made in the same way as it is now by art; and if things made
by nature were made also by art, they would come to be in
the same way as by nature. Each step then in the series is
for the sake of the next; and generally art partly
completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and partly imitates her. If, therefore, artificial products are for the sake of an
end, so clearly also are natural products. The relation of
the later to the earlier terms of the series is the same
in both. This is most obvious in the animals other than
man: they make things neither by art nor after inquiry or deliberation. Wherefore people discuss whether it is by intelligence or by some
other faculty that these creatures work, spiders, ants,
and the like. By gradual advance in this direction we come
to see clearly that in plants too that is produced which
is conducive to the end-leaves, e.g. grow to provide shade
for the fruit. If then it is both by nature and for an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web, and plants grow leaves
for the sake of the fruit and send their roots down (not
up) for the sake of nourishment, it is plain that this kind of
cause is operative in things which come to be and are by
nature. And since 'nature' means two things, the matter
and the form, of which the latter is the end, and since all the
rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of 'that for the sake of which'. . . .
Cicero (106-43 B.C.) The "Dream of Scipio" from De re publica
(On the Commonwealth) (W.D. Pearman translation) References are to book and sections.
VI.17. And as I gazed upon this more intently, "Come!" said Africanus, "how long will your mind be chained to the earth? Do you see into what regions you have come? See! the universe is linked together in nine circles or rather spheres; one of which is that of the heavens, the outermost of all, which embraces all the other spheres, the supreme deity, which keeps in and holds together all the others; and to this are attached those everlasting orbits of the stars. Beneath this there lie seven, which turn backwards with a counter revolution to the heavens; and of these spheres that star holds one, which men on earth call Saturn's star. Next is that bright radiance, rich in hope and healing for the sons of men, which is called Jove's star; then one fiery red and dreaded by the world, which you call Mars; next lower down the sun holds nearly the middle region, the leader, chief and ruler of the other lights, the mind and ordering spirit of the universe, of such magnitude that he illumines the whole and fills it with his light. With him Venus and Mercury keep pace as satellites in their successive spheres; and in the lowest zone of all the moon revolves lighted up by the rays of the sun. Now below these there is nothing more but what is mortal and transient except those souls which the bounty of the Gods has given to the sons of men; above the moon all is eternal. As for the earth, the ninth and central globe, it does not move but is the lowest point, and towards it all heavy bodies tend by their own gravity."
VI.18. And, as I gazed on these things with amazement, when I recovered myself: "What," I asked, "what is this sound that fills my ears, so loud and sweet?" "This," he replied, "is that sound, which divided in intervals, unequal, indeed, yet still exactly measured in their fixed proportion, is produced by the impetus and movement of the spheres themselves, and blending sharp tones with grave, therewith makes changing symphonies in unvarying harmony. For not only is it impossible that such vast movements should sweep on in silence; but, by a natural law, the outermost parts on the one side give a grave, and on the other a sharp sound. Wherefore the highest of all, the celestial zone equipped with stars, whose revolution is more swift, moves with a sharp, high note; while this one of the moon, as it is the lowest, with the deepest tone of all. For the earth, which is the ninth, remaining motionless is ever firmly planted in one spot, clinging closely to the centre of the universe. Now the revolutions of those eight spheres, of which two have the same power, produce seven sounds with well-marked intervals; and this number, generally speaking, is the mystic bond of all things in the universe, And learned men by imitating this with stringed instruments and melodies have opened for themselves the way back to this place, even as other men of noble nature, who have followed godlike aims in their life as men.
Cicero (106-43 B.C. ) From De natura deorum (On the
Nature of the Gods) (Francis Brooks translation) References are to book and
section.
II.7. And the element which surpasses all these, I mean reason, and if we care to express it by a variety of terms, intelligence, design, reflection, foresight, where did we find, whence did we secure it? Shall the universe possess all other qualities, and not this one which is of most importance? Yet surely in all creation there is nothing nobler than the universe, nothing more excellent and more beautiful. There not only is not, but there cannot even be imagined anything nobler, and if reason and wisdom are the noblest of qualities, it is inevitable that they should exist in that which we acknowledge to be supremely noble. Again, who can help assenting to what I say when he considers the harmonious, concordant, and unbroken connection which there is in things? Would the earth be able to have one and the same time for flowering, and then again one and the same time in which it lies rough? Or could the approach and departure of the sun be known, at the time of the summer and winter solstice, by so many objects spontaneously changing? Or the tides of the sea, and of narrow straits, be affected by the rising or setting of the moon? Or the dissimilar movements of the planets be maintained by the one revolution of the whole sky? It would be certainly impossible for these things to come to pass in this way, with such mutual harmony amongst all parts of the universe, if they were not held together by one divine and all-pervading spirit. And this position, if argued, as I intend to argue it, in a fuller and more flowing style, is better able to escape the cavilling of the Academics, whereas if expressed more briefly and concisely in syllogistic form, as it used to be by Zeno, it is more exposed to criticism. For just as it is either difficult or impossible for a running stream to be tainted, while this may easily happen to water that is confined, so the onward flow of argument sweeps away the detractions of the critic, while that which is confined within narrow limits has hard work to defend itself. These arguments, for instance, which are expanded by modern Stoics, used to be compressed by Zeno [founder of Stoicism, 335-263 B.C.] as follows:—
II.8. “That which exercises reason is more excellent than that which does not exercise reason; there is nothing more excellent than the universe, therefore the universe exercises reason”. In the same way it may be proved that the universe is wise, blessed, and eternal, for all objects that possess these qualities are more excellent than those which do not possess them, and there is nothing of greater excellence than the universe. By this means it will be proved that the universe is divine. He has also the following: “No part can be sentient where the whole is not sentient; parts of the universe are sentient, therefore the universe is sentient”. He goes further and urges his point in more precise terms. “Nothing,” he says, “that is inanimate and without reason can produce from itself a being that is animate and possessed of reason; the universe produces beings that are animate and possessed of reason, therefore the universe is animate and possessed of reason.” He also, as his habit frequently was, stated the argument in the form of a comparison, which was to this effect: “If melodiously piping flutes sprang from the olive, would you doubt that a knowledge of flute-playing resided in the olive? And what if plane trees bore harps which gave forth rhythmical sounds? Clearly you would think in the same way that the art of music was possessed by plane trees. Why, then, seeing that the universe gives birth to beings that are animate and wise, should it not be considered animate and wise itself?”
II.11. There is, then, an element which holds together and maintains the entire universe, an element, moreover, which is not without sensation and reason. For it is necessary that every element which is not isolated or simple, but which is joined and linked with something else, should have in itself some ruling principle, as, for instance, mind in the case of man, and in the case of animals something similar to mind, which prompts their desires. In trees, and in things which spring from the earth, the ruling principle is supposed to be placed in their roots. By ruling principle I mean the principle which the Greeks call ἡγεμονικόν, which cannot but hold, and which ought to hold, the highest place in each genus. Consequently the thing in which the ruling principle of the whole of nature is contained, must in the same way be the most perfect of all, and the most worthy of power and dominion over all existence. Now we see that in parts of the universe (for there is nothing in the entire universe which is not a part of the whole), sensation and reason exist. These qualities must therefore exist, and exist more vividly and to a greater extent, in that part in which the ruling principle of the universe resides. Consequently the universe must be intelligent, and the element which holds all things in its embrace must excel in perfection of reason; the universe, therefore, must be divine, and so must the element by which the whole strength of the universe is held together. This fiery glow which the universe possesses is also far purer, clearer, and nimbler, and on that account better fitted to arouse sensation, than this heat of ours, by which the objects known to us are preserved and made strong. Since, then, men and animals are maintained by this heat, and through it possess motion and sensation, it is absurd to say that the universe is without sensation, when it is maintained by a burning heat which is unmixed, and free, and pure, and at the same time in the highest degree vivid and nimble, especially considering that the heat which belongs to the universe is moved by itself and its own action, and is not stirred by anything distinct from itself, or by impact from outside. For what can be mightier than the universe, so as to act upon and set in motion the heat by which the universe is to be held together?
II.12. Let us hear Plato on this question, Plato, the god of philosophers, as he may be called. He holds that there are two kinds of motion, one self-imparted and the other derived, and that a thing which is self-moved by its own action is more divine than that which is set in motion by impact from something else. The former kind of motion he declares to exist in soul alone, and he is of opinion that it was from soul that the first principle of motion was derived. Consequently since all motion arises from the heat possessed by the universe, and since that heat is moved by its own action, and not by impact from anything else, it must of necessity be soul, by which means it is proved that the universe is possessed of soul. It may also be understood that intelligence exists in the universe, from the fact that the universe is undeniably of greater excellence than any form of being. For just as there is no part of our body which is not less important than ourselves, so the whole universe must be more important than a part of the universe. If that is so, the universe must be intelligent, for if it were not, man, who is a part of the universe, would, as participating in reason, necessarily be of more importance than the entire universe. If, again, we wish to trace the advance from the first and rudimentary stages of being to the final and perfect, it is to a divine nature that we must come. For we observe that the first things maintained by nature are those which spring from the earth, to which nature has assigned nothing more than protection by means of nurture and development. To animals she has given sensation, movement, an impulse, combined with a certain desire, towards what is beneficial, and an avoidance of what is hurtful. To man she has given more in having added reason, which was meant to regulate the desires of the mind, at one time allowing them their way, and at another holding them in check.
II.13. The fourth and highest stage consists of beings who are created naturally good and wise, in whom right reason in an unchanging form is innate from the beginning, that reason which must be regarded as more than human, and must be assigned to what is divine, that is, to the universe, in which this complete and perfect reason must needs exist. For it cannot be said that in any order of things there is not something final and perfect. Just as in the case of vines or cattle, we see that, unless some force interposes, nature arrives by a way of her own at perfection, and just as a certain attainment of consummate workmanship exists in painting and architecture and the other arts, so it is inevitable that in collective nature there should much more be a progress towards completion and perfection. Many external influences can prevent the other kinds of being from reaching perfection, but nothing can stand in the way of universal nature, because it itself limits and contains all kinds of being. That, therefore, must be the fourth and highest stage, which no force can come near. Now it is in that stage that universal nature has its place, and since it is the characteristic of that nature that all things should be inferior to it, and nothing able to stand in its way, it necessarily follows that the universe is intelligent, and more than that wise. Besides, what is more foolish than that the nature which embraces all things should not be declared supremely excellent, or that, being supremely excellent, it should not be in the first place animate, in the second possessed of reason and forethought, and lastly wise? In what other way can it be supremely excellent? For if it resembled plants, or even animals, it would not deserve to be considered of the highest degree of excellence, but rather of the lowest, while if it participated in reason, and yet were not wise from the beginning, the condition of the universe as compared with that of man would be the lower of the two. For man can become wise, but if the universe during the limitless course of past time has been destitute of wisdom, it will assuredly never acquire it, and will therefore be lower than man. Since that is absurd, the universe must be regarded as wise from the beginning, and as divine.
II.14. It was, indeed, an ingenious remark of Chrysippus that just as the cover was created for the shield, and the sheath for the sword, so all other things with the exception of the universe were created for the sake of something else, the crops and fruits, for instance, which the earth produces, for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men, as the horse for carrying, the ox for ploughing, and the dog for hunting and keeping watch. As for man himself, he was born in order to observe and imitate the universe, being in no wise perfect, but a particle, so to speak, of that which is, for it is only the universe to which nothing is wanting, and which is knit together on every side, and is perfect and complete in all its numbers and parts. Now since the universe embraces all things, and there is nothing that is not contained within it, it is perfect at every point. How, then, can that which is of most excellence be lacking to it? There is nothing more excellent than mind and reason, so it is impossible that these should be lacking to the universe. Chrysippus, therefore, is again right when he declares, adding instances, that in what is matured and perfect everything is of higher excellence, in a horse, for example, than in a colt, in a dog than in a whelp, in a man than in a boy, and in like manner that whatever is best in the whole world, must reside in something that is perfect and complete. As there is nothing more perfect than the universe, and nothing more excellent than virtue, it follows that virtue is an attribute of the universe. Human nature is not indeed perfect, yet virtue is attained in man, so how much more easily in the universe! Virtue, then, does exist in the universe, which is therefore wise, and consequently divine.
Epictetus (c. late 1st-early 2d A.D.), Discourses (George Long translation) References are to book and
section.
I.6. From everything which is or
happens in the world, it is easy to praise Providence, if a man
possesses these two qualities, the faculty of seeing what
belongs and happens to all persons and things, and a grateful disposition.
If he does not possess these two qualities, one man will not see
the use of things which are and which happen; another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them. If God had made colours, but had not made the faculty of
seeing them, what would have been their use? None at all. On the other hand, if He had made the faculty of
vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under the
faculty, what in that case also would have been the use of it? None at all. Well, suppose that He had made both,
but had not made light? In that case, also, they would have been of
no use. Who is it, then, who has fitted this to that and that to this? And who is it that has fitted the knife to the case and the case
to the knife? Is it no one? And, indeed, from the very
structure of things which have attained their completion, we
are accustomed to show that the work is certainly the act of
some artificer, and that it has not been constructed without a
purpose. Does then each of these things demonstrate the workman, and
do not visible things and the faculty of seeing and light demonstrate Him? And the existence of male and female, and the desire of each
for conjunction, and the power of using the parts which are
constructed, do not even these declare the workman? If they do
not, let us consider the constitution of our understanding
according to which, when we meet with sensible objects, we
simply receive impressions from them, but we also select something from them, and subtract something, and add, and compound by means of
them these things or those, and, in fact, pass from some to
other things which, in a manner, resemble them: is not even
this sufficient to move some men, and to induce them not to
forget the workman? If not so, let them explain to us what it
is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that things
so wonderful and like the contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their own proper motion?
What, then, are these things done in us only. Many,
indeed, in us only, of which the
rational animal had peculiar need; but you will find many
common to us with irrational animals. Do they them understand what is
done? By no means. For use is one thing, and understanding
is another: God had need of irrational animals to make use of
appearances, but of us to understand the use of appearances. It
is therefore enough for them to eat and to drink, and to sleep
and to copulate, and to do all the other things which they
severally do. But for us, to whom He has given also the faculty,
these things are not sufficient; for unless we act in a proper and
orderly manner, and conformably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. For where the
constitutions of living beings are different, there also the
acts and the ends are different. In those animals, then, whose
constitution is adapted only to use, use alone is enough: but
in an animal which has also the power of understanding the use,
unless there be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never
attain his proper end. Well then God constitutes every animal, one to
be eaten, another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and another for some like use; for which purposes what need is
there to understand appearances and to be able to distinguish
them? But God has introduced man to be a spectator of God and
of His works; and not only a spectator of them, but an
interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to begin
and to end where irrational animals do, but rather he ought to
begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; and nature
ends in contemplation and understanding, in a way of life conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having been
spectators of these things. . . .
I.14. When a person asked
[Epictetus] how a man could be convinced that all his actions
are under the inspection of God, he answered, Do you
not think that all things are united in one? "I do,"
the person replied. Well, do you not think that earthly things
have a natural agreement and union with heavenly things?
"I do." And how else so regularly as if by God's command, when He bids the plants to flower, do they flower? when He bids them to send forth shoots, do
they shoot? when He bids them to produce fruit, how else do they produce fruit? when He bids
the fruit to ripen, does it ripen? when
again He bids them to cast down the fruits, how else do they cast them
down? and when to shed the leaves, do they shed the
leaves? and when He bids them to fold
themselves up and to remain quiet and rest, how else do they
remain quiet and rest? And how else at the growth and the wane of
the moon, and at the approach and recession of the sun, are so great an alteration and change to the contrary seen in earthly things?
But are plants and our bodies so bound up and united with the
whole, and are not our souls much more? and
our souls so bound up and in contact with God as parts of Him
and portions of Him; and does not God perceive every motion of
these parts as being His own motion connate with Himself? Now are you able to think of the divine administration, and about all things
divine, and at the same time also about human affairs, and to
be moved by ten thousand things at the same time in your
senses and in your understanding, and to assent to some, and
to dissent from others, and again as to some things to suspend
your judgment; and do you retain in your soul so many impressions from
so many and various things, and being moved by them, do you fall upon notions similar to those first impressed, and do you retain
numerous arts and the memories of ten thousand things; and is
not God able to oversee all things, and to be present with
all, and to receive from all a certain communication? And is
the sun able to illuminate so large a part of the All, and to
leave so little not illuminated, that part only which is occupied by
the earth's shadow; and He who made the sun itself and makes it go round, being a small part of Himself compared with the whole, cannot He
perceive all things?
“But I cannot," the man may reply, "comprehend all these things at once." But who tells you that you have equal power with
Zeus? Nevertheless he has placed by every man a guardian,
every man's daimon,
to whom he has committed the care of the man, a guardian who
never sleeps, is never deceived. For to what better and more
careful guardian could He have entrusted each of us? When,
then, you have shut the doors and made darkness within, remember never
to say that you are alone, for you are not; but God is within, and your daimon is within,
and what need have they of light to see what you are doing? To
this God you ought to swear an oath just as the soldiers do to
Caesar. But they who are hired for pay swear to regard the safety of
Caesar before all things; and you who have received so many and such great favours, will you not swear, or
when you have sworn, will you not abide by your oath? And what
shall you swear? Never to be disobedient, never to make any
charges, never to find fault with anything that he has given,
and never unwillingly to do or to suffer anything, that is necessary. Is this oath like the soldier's oath? The soldiers swear not to
prefer any man to Caesar: in this oath men swear to honour themselves before all.
IV.7. . . . .Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so disposed towards these things, and the Galilaeans through habit,1 and is it possible that no man can learn from reason and from demonstration that God has made all the things in the universe and the universe itself completely free from hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the use of the whole? All other animals indeed are incapable of comprehending the administration of it; but the rational animal man has faculties for the consideration of all these things, and for understanding that it is a part, and what kind of a part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be subordinate to the whole. And besides this being naturally noble, magnanimous and free, man sees that of the things which surround him some are free from hindrance and in his power, and the other things are subject to hindrance and in the power of others; that the things which are free from hindrance are in the power of the will; and those which are subject to hindrance are the things which are not in the power of the will. And for this reason if he thinks that his good and his interest be in these things only which are free from hindrance and in his own power, he will be free, prosperous, happy, free from harm, magnanimous, pious, thankful to God2 for all things; in no matter finding fault with any of the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming any of them.3 But if he thinks that his good and his interest are in externals and in things which are not in the power of his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a slave to those who have the power over the things which he admires (desires) and fears; and he must of necessity be impious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs to him; and he must of necessity be abject and mean. . . .
Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 121-180), Meditations
(George Long translation) References are to book and section.
IV.4. If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens; if this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is so, the cosmos is in a manner a state. For of what other common political community will anyone say that the whole human race are members? And from thence, from this common political community comes also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our capacity for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a portion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from another element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also returns to non-existence), so also the intellectual part comes from some source.
V.27. Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them, his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this is every man's understanding and reason.
VI.44. If the gods have determined about me and about the things which must happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire towards that? For what advantage would result to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object of their providence? But if they have not determined about me individually, they have certainly determined about the whole at least, and the things which happen by way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with them. But if they determine about nothing- which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were present and lived with us- but if however the gods determine about none of the things which concern us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful; and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me. Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest of the universal: this might be sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this also as a general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever is profitable to any man is profitable also to other men. But let the word profitable be taken here in the common sense as said of things of the middle kind, neither good nor bad.
VII.9. All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy; and there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For things have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form the same universe (order). For there is one universe made up of all things, and one God who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, one common reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth; if indeed there is also one perfection for all animals which are of the same stock and participate in the same reason.
VIII.34. If thou didst ever see a
hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying anywhere apart from
the rest of the body, such does a man make himself, as far as
he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates himself from others, or does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast
detached thyself from the natural unity- for thou wast made by nature a part, but now thou
hast cut thyself off- yet here there is this beautiful provision, that
it is in thy power again to unite thyself. God has allowed this to no
other part, after it has been separated and cut asunder, to come together again. But consider the kindness by which he has distinguished
man, for he has put it in his power not to be separated at all
from the universal; and when he has been separated, he has
allowed him to return and to be united and to resume his place
as a part.
VIII.35. As the nature of the universal has given to every rational being all the other powers that it has, so we have received from it this
power also. For as the universal nature converts and fixes in
its predestined place everything which stands in the way and
opposes it, and makes such things a part of itself, so also the
rational animal is able to make every hindrance its own
material, and to use it for such purposes as it may have designed.
Aristotle (384-322
B.C.) On the Prime Mover: Metaphysics
XII (W.D. Ross translation) References are to the sections of Book XII.
XII.6. Since there were three kinds of substance, two of them physical [sensible] and one unmovable, regarding the latter we must assert that it is necessary that there should be an eternal unmovable substance. . . .
Yet if we follow the
theologians who generate the world from night, or the natural philosophers who say that 'all things were together', the same impossible
result ensues. For how will there be movement, if there is no
actually existing cause? Wood will surely not move itself-the
carpenter's art must act on it; nor will the
menstrual blood nor the earth set themselves in motion, but the seeds must act on the earth and the semen on the menstrual blood.
This is why some suppose eternal actuality-e.g. Leucippus and
Plato; for they say there is always movement. But why and what
this movement is they do not say, nor, if the world moves in
this way or that, do they tell us the cause of its doing so.
Now nothing is moved at random, but there must always be
something present to move it; e.g. as a matter of fact a thing moves in one way by nature, and in another by
force or through the influence of reason or something else.
(Further, what sort of movement is primary? This makes a vast
difference.) But again for Plato, at least, it is not permissible
to name here that which he sometimes supposes to be the source of
movement-that which moves itself; for the soul is later, and coeval with the heavens, according to his account. To suppose potency
prior to actuality, then, is in a sense right, and in a sense
not; and we have specified these senses. That actuality is
prior is testified by Anaxagoras (for his 'reason' is
actuality) and by Empedocles in his doctrine of love and strife, and
by those who say that there is always movement, e.g. Leucippus. Therefore chaos or night did not exist for an infinite time, but the same
things have always existed (either passing through a cycle of
changes or obeying some other law), since actuality is prior to
potency. If, then, there is a constant cycle, something must
always remain, acting in the same way. And if there is to be
generation and destruction, there must be something else which
is always acting in different ways. This must, then, act in one
way in virtue of itself, and in another in virtue of something else-either of a third agent, therefore, or of the first. Now it must be in
virtue of the first. For otherwise this again
causes the motion both of the second agent and of the third.
Therefore it is better to say 'the first'. For it was the cause of eternal
uniformity; and something else is the cause of variety, and evidently both
together are the cause of eternal variety. This, accordingly, is the character
which the motions actually exhibit. What need then is there to seek for other
principles?
XII.7 Since (1) this is
a possible account of the matter, and (2) if it were not true,
the world would have proceeded out of night and 'all things
together' and out of non-being, these difficulties may be taken as
solved. There is, then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is motion in a circle; and this is plain not in
theory only but in fact. Therefore the first heaven must be
eternal. There is therefore also something which moves it. And
since that which moves and is moved is intermediate, there is
something which moves without being moved, being eternal,
substance, and actuality. And the object of desire and the object of
thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For
the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real good
is the primary object of rational wish. But desire is
consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire; for the
thinking is the starting-point. And thought is moved by the object of
thought, and one of the two columns of opposites is in itself the object of
thought; and in this, substance is first, and in substance, that which is
simple and exists actually. (The one and the simple are not the same; for 'one'
means a measure, but 'simple' means that the thing itself has a certain
nature.) But the beautiful, also, and that which is in itself
desirable are in the same column; and the first in any class is always best, or
analogous to the best.
That a final cause may exist among unchangeable entities is shown by the distinction
of its meanings. For the final cause is (a) some being for whose good an action
is done, and (b) something at which the action aims; and of these the latter
exists among unchangeable entities though the former does not. The final cause,
then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved.
Now if something is moved it is capable of being otherwise than as it is.
Therefore if its actuality is the primary form of spatial motion, then in so
far as it is subject to change, in this respect it is capable of being
otherwise,-in place, even if not in substance. But since there is something
which moves while itself unmoved, existing actually,
this can in no way be otherwise than as it is. For motion in space is the first
of the kinds of change, and motion in a circle the first kind of spatial
motion; and this the first mover produces. The first mover, then, exists of
necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of being is good,
and it is in this sense a first principle. For the necessary has all these
senses-that which is necessary perforce because it is contrary to
the natural impulse, that without which the good is impossible, and that which cannot be otherwise but can exist only in a single way.
On such a principle, then, depend the
heavens and the world of nature. And it is a life such as the
best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is
ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its
actuality is also pleasure. (And for this
reason are waking, perception, and thinking most
pleasant, and hopes and memories are so on account of these.) And thinking
in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and
that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is
best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself because
it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes
an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking
its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the
same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is thought. But it is active when it possesses
this object. Therefore the possession rather than the
receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to
contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant
and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we
sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs
to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that
actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good
and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being,
eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and
eternal belong to God; for this is God.
Those who suppose, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus
do, that supreme beauty and goodness are not present in the
beginning, because the beginnings both of plants and of animals
are causes, but beauty and completeness are in the effects of
these, are wrong in their opinion. For the seed comes from other
individuals which are prior and complete, and the first thing is not
seed but the complete being; e.g. we must say that before the seed there
is a man,-not the man produced from the seed, but another from whom the seed comes.
It is clear then from what has been said that there is a
substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things. It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any
magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it produces
movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite
power; and, while every magnitude is either infinite or finite,
it cannot, for the above reason, have finite magnitude, and it
cannot have infinite magnitude because there is no infinite
magnitude at all). But it has also been shown that it is impassive
and unalterable; for all the other changes are posterior to change of
place.